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ABSTRACT 
Estonian identity politics in the 1990s were firmly rooted in the narrative of 
‘returning to Europe’ and breaking with the Soviet past – to become a ‘normal’ 
country again. This narrative underwent a significant change on successful entry 
to key international organisations such as the EU and NATO. This research is a 
qualitative in-depth investigation into the complex and multi-layered Estonian 
national identity constructions evident within Estonian society after it had had 
nearly a decade to ‘settle into’ this European ‘normality’.  
Estonia formally validated its ‘return in Europe’ in 2004, but how is ‘Europeanness’ 
conceptualised by the people on the ground? The thesis demonstrates that the 
economic crisis which hit Europe in 2008, and had an impact on the defining of 
‘Europeanness’, encouraged a new binary of North vs South division in how Europe 
was perceived. Following interviews with 33 persons from different parts of 
Estonia, an emergent theme from the empirical findings was, that for many, 
Estonia was seen as embodying the ‘true’ neoliberal values associated with the 
understanding of ‘Europe’. The same neoliberal paradigm was at play in helping 
to shape understandings of Russia, which also frame domestic interethnic relations 
to a degree. The latter has been the central focus of previous studies to which the 
current research offers a novel perspective.  
Themes of security have not lost their relevance in relations with Russia but the 
pragmatic understanding of reconciling the economic necessity and the more 
national emotional element has become pertinent nearly a decade after officially 
‘returning to Europe’. Another key finding of this research shows a shift from the 
inter-war period to the early 1990s as a benchmark for Estonian identity-
construction, which implies that at the time of conducting this study there was no 
longer a need to return to ‘Europe’.  
In addition to the limited research done on Estonian national identity since joining 
the EU and NATO, there has been minimal attention paid to a grassroots 
perspective on the issue. By taking a bottom-up perspective through in-depth 
interviewing and using an innovative visual methodology, this research makes a 
significant and timely contribution into understanding the ‘normality’ that had 
settled in Estonia after EU and NATO accession. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
1.1 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this research is to bring forward a more complex, multi-layered 
picture of national identity construction in post-accession Estonia, with particular 
reference to the concept of ‘normality’ and its role within this process. It does 
this through an in-depth examination of perspectives from below nearly a decade 
after the country joined the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO). By giving a fuller appreciation of outlooks in one of the 
relatively recent new member states, this thesis helps to illuminate questions that 
are crucial to the future of the EU, at a time when the Union has been placed 
under severe pressure by the economic crisis and the relationship with Russia, its 
policies and intentions towards neighbouring states, is a particular focus of 
international politics. The material collected in this thesis provides a rich basis 
for further consideration of these issues. 
Estonia’s geographical position as a border state between the European Union and 
the Russian Federation provides an interesting case for mapping the ideational 
and practical construction of nationhood and geopolitical belonging in the post-
Soviet period. One of the main agendas for Estonia during the early transition 
period was to distance itself from anything Soviet/Russian and to ‘return to the 
Western world’ politically and economically. Belonging to its natural place in the 
‘West’ again was supposed to re-establish a state of ‘normality’ from which 
Estonia had been forcefully removed with the Soviet occupation. 
This thesis is theoretically guided by Barbara Misztal’s (2001; 2015) use of the 
term ‘normality’ in social research. It builds upon and modifies Henry Hale’s 
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(2008) ‘The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in 
Eurasia and the World’ account of group formation in order to highlight the 
important role that constructions of ‘normality’ play in this process. The main 
premise for Hale’s approach to group formation (which also draws on Social 
Identity Theory) is that groups are constructed as a means for reducing uncertainty 
and navigating the social world. He states that identity is a set of points of 
personal reference people rely on to navigate the social world and groups are 
formed by having common relationships to points of reference. These common 
relationships provide the essential link between the top-down and the ground 
level. And the points of reference which can be deemed the common sense, taken 
for granted assumptions are the core for holding together the ‘imagined political 
community’ of the nation. 
And this is how ‘normality’ is seen in this research – it is an ideational collection 
of ‘thicker’ or more meaningful points of reference related to perceptions of 
national identity that are shared by the people in Estonia. Hale’s approach to 
group formation provides a very useful theoretical basis for looking at ‘normality’ 
within national identity constructions in Estonia. It guides the study and provides 
a basic foundation as to how and why ‘normality’ is sought for and explains the 
relative stability and the feasibility of change within these ideational 
constructions. 
As already mentioned in terms of gaining a better understanding of Estonian 
national identity, the thesis follows the social constructivist approach to explore 
these constructions within the wider perception of ‘normality’. National identity 
is addressed here as a facet of an ‘imagined political community’, as famously put 
forward by Benedict Anderson (1983). In this definition, a nation is a community 
socially constructed, imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of 
that group. In order to identify the Self as a community, there has to be something 
outside that community, an Other. As national identity should not be seen as 
something fixed but as something that is constantly ‘negotiated and renegotiated’ 
(Mole 2012: 3) within the constructivist paradigm, then the same applies to the 
process of Othering. The relational construction of identity derives from the idea 
that the delineation of a Self from an Other is an active and ongoing part of 
identity construction and that the Self and Other also merge into one another 
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(Neumann 1999: 35-36). Defining the boundaries of an ‘imagined community’ is 
therefore not a straightforward task. As in the case of a contemporary state, who 
belongs can be looked at in terms of citizenship, but also in terms of who is 
included within the dominant narrative of national identity in the respective 
country. The dominant narrative of national identity requires placing the nation-
state in time and space. 
In order to look specifically at if and how ‘normality’ in Estonia has changed in 
the post-2004 context - which ostensibly signified becoming a ‘normal’ Western 
country again - the use of the term is contextually guided by Daina Stukuls Eglitis’ 
(2002) work on Latvia and also by Sigrid Rausing’s (2004) discussions based around 
the idea of ‘normality’ in Estonia in the early 1990s. These accounts are valuable 
in demonstrating the ‘commonsense’ perceptions of society, state and economics 
held by Estonia’s inhabitants in the relatively early stages of its reconstruction as 
an independent state. However, Rausing’s research is a deep anthropological 
study of a very specific locality and setting in Estonia in the early 90s. While it 
brings out some useful perspectives on ‘normality’, it is limited in its scope and 
was not intended to bring out the more comprehensive perceptions of ‘normality’ 
in Estonia even at the time.  
Eglitis proposes a more useful and far-reaching model for defining ‘normality’ 
through spatial and temporal narrative constructions. The interplay of spatial, 
with emphasis on the ‘West’ as a natural place of belonging and themes of 
democracy and economic prosperity; and temporal as glorification of the inter-
war period, national freedom and cultural development narratives over time 
provided a useful model for addressing Latvia’s self-positioning at that time 
(Eglitis 2002). I argue, that this theoretical framework can be similarly applied in 
the case of Estonia. According to Eglitis’ concept, the idea of this ‘normality’ was 
largely set against the ‘abnormality’ of the Soviet period and included general 
aspirations for an open society, democracy, markets, civil society. Both these 
studies were conducted prior to the Baltic States joining the EU and NATO, and 
there remains a gap as to addressing ‘normality’ in the post-accession context. 
This research aims to fill this gap. 
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The question becomes whether the same understandings can still be taken to apply 
in a very different context of 2013 when Estonia’s statehood had been 
consolidated, society transformed by far-reaching processes of political, economic 
and social transformation during the 1990s and Estonia had joined an EU that was 
at the time experiencing a period of profound economic crisis? And if not, then 
how is ‘normality’ framed and interpreted in a more present-day context? In other 
words, the overarching question for this research is what kind of ‘normality’ is 
understood to have developed in Estonia after nearly a decade of formally 
validating its ‘return to the Western World’ through processes of accession to the 
EU and NATO that were widely hailed in the 1990s as drawing a line under the 
Soviet past.   
The bottom-up approach taken here provides original and significant new insights 
into this complex topic. The substantial amount of new data gathered for this 
research in 2013 in the form of in-depth interviews using an innovative visual 
methodology will help to further our understandings of these complex processes.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The self-positioning within the international arena is closely tied to how Estonia 
and being Estonian is envisioned by the people living there. In the Estonian case, 
nation-building and through that understanding ‘normality’ has been bound up 
with the concept of ‘return to Europe’, which has blurred the boundaries between 
internal and external. At the same time, it is bound up with making a definitive 
break with the Soviet past which is still embodied by Russia in present-day official 
narratives. In the case of Russia, the internal and external boundary is also 
blurred, given the issue of the large Russian-speaking population in Estonia, which 
has tended to frame and dominate many previous studies. Exploring the various 
Others in Estonian national identity constructions and their possible merging into 
the Self therefore become the key dimensions to explore in this research. This 
thesis addresses grassroots understandings of Europe as the ‘positive Other’, 
Russia as the ‘negative Other’, and brings out how people’s construction of 
national identity emerges from the ways in which they talk about everyday life. 
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The goal is not to achieve an ‘objective’ reality but to uncover a range of 
simultaneously existing identity constructs. Looking into how understandings of 
Estonian national identity have developed and how these constructions affect the 
everyday lives of the respondents, a better understanding of the various 
perspectives on social and political realities, through which the post-accession 
‘normality’ in Estonia is constructed, is achieved. In order to fully address these 
issues, the main research question with three sub questions for this thesis are as 
follows: 
How is ‘normality’ constructed and understood by people in Estonia in the 
post-accession context?  
- how did the relation between Estonia and the European Other 
change in constructions of Estonian identity during the first decade 
after accession to Western structures? 
- how did the mode of Othering Russia change in this new context? 
- how did people in Estonia negotiate the current ‘normality’ in their 
everyday perspective? 
While interest in the construction of Estonian national identity has remained 
rather muted since 2004, the nature of the issue has arguably become more 
complex as the country distances itself from the simple binary of East/West. The 
economic crisis, which hit Europe in 2008, has intensified the competition for 
defining Europeanness, with Estonia perceiving itself as ‘true Europe’ in terms of 
neoliberal market values from both the top-down dimension as well as on the 
grassroots level, as I will demonstrate in the analysis. In light of this, the various 
perceptions of identity that are emerging between different groups of society, 
especially in the light of the economic crisis, deserve careful consideration. 
This thesis claims that having acceded to the European Union and NATO in 2004, 
Estonia formally validated its place in Europe. However, the way in which this 
belonging to Europe is conceptualised by the people living in Estonia can vary. 
Top-down narratives launched by politicians and reiterated by the mainstream 
media discourse provide a basis for how people understand Estonia and its place 
in the wider world, but how this political discourse is received and re-
contextualised on a grassroots level needs further examination.  
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Most existing studies on Estonia’s identity-building process and its relation to 
Russia and history have focused on dominant discourses, media outlets, archives 
and survey results, with an emphasis on the role of the political elite. While there 
is strong agreement among scholars that multiple layers of inter-community 
identities do exist, the use of ethnographic and bottom-up methods, in order to 
receive a better understanding of the complexity of these identities, has hardly 
been utilised in the case of Estonia. As stated above, this research took a ground-
up approach to analysing Estonia’s current political and social situation, and 
through in-depth interviews offers a more detailed and nuanced insight into the 
life-worlds of the respondents and their constructions of Estonian ‘normality’. The 
interviews also contained an aspect of visual methodology in order to generate 
additional insight into the issues under investigation. A range of images were 
included in the interviews to enhance quality and open up internal worlds and 
interpretations of participants regarding issues that one might not otherwise think 
to probe. These images were intended to reflect key themes and components of 
the dominant ‘top-down’ discourse, in order to discover how people interpret 
these at the everyday level. The themes of the images were chosen based on the 
existing body of academic research on Estonian national identity. This was then 
supplemented by analysis of a more dominant political and media discourse.  
The main argument advanced in this thesis is that a certain ‘normality’ compatible 
with the Estonian national identity constructions had settled nearly a decade after 
joining the EU. What needs to be kept in mind though, is that this research was 
conducted in 2013, prior to Russia invading Ukraine in 2014 which established a 
new security structure - a ‘new normality’ in Europe - and altered Estonia’s 
national identity constructions within it. 
 
1.3 TRANSITION TO A ‘NORMAL’ EUROPEAN DEMOCRACY 
When Estonia regained independence in 1991, the inter-war experience of 
sovereignty (1918-1940) that Estonia had, was invoked as an ideal and a 
benchmark for further developments within politics, society and economics (see 
Smith 2003, Aalto 2003). This was set against the ‘abnormality’ of not only the 
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Soviet Union but also post-Soviet Russia, which has refused to accept the 
foundational narrative of Estonian statehood and is generally seen as neo-
imperialist and a security threat to Estonia. 
The Western political structures – namely EU and NATO – were seen as security 
guarantees by Estonia. It was widely believed that belonging to these institutions 
would protect Estonia’s sovereignty. Additionally, the EU was seen as a proven 
model and a harbinger of the economic prosperity characteristic of Western 
Europe. The integration process, however, exposed tensions and different 
understandings and priorities held by the EU and Estonia.  
Within this wider frame of regaining independence, the idea of ‘returning to 
Europe’ or ‘returning to the Western World’, which Estonia had been a part of 
during in the interwar period, plays a significant role in shaping the national 
identity perceptions in Estonia. On the one hand, it provides a wider framework 
for developing the understandings among the people in Estonia of what ‘European’ 
and ‘Western’ mean and the specific way in which Estonia fits within these 
categories.  
The slogan ‘Return to Europe’ began to be voiced at demonstrations along with a 
desire for restored independence already in the late 1980s. This conveyed an idea 
that Estonia had formed part of ‘Europe’ between the wars; but, one can ask what 
did ‘return to Europe’ mean in a context shaped by the experience of the Cold 
War? Lennart Meri in 1991 gave a speech1 in which he called Europe a goal, not a 
geographical concept. Europe was a goal because it formed an ethical, political 
and economic programme for Estonians which was counterpoised to a ‘totalitarian 
past’.  
“We come from the same past, which is called totalitarianism and we’re 
heading to the same future, named Europe.” Lennart Meri (in Meri 1996: 
268) 
This ‘returning to Europe’ narrative was equalled to ‘returning to the Western 
World’ in terms of distancing from the Soviet Union - or the ‘East’ - and moving 
towards the opposite – the ‘West’. However, and as will be discussed in this thesis 
                                                          
1 Lennart Meri speech at the Council of Europe in Strasbourg on 26 November 1991 
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as well, ‘Europe’ and the ‘West’ have also been subject to redefinition following 
the end of the Cold War and especially following the enlargement of the 
institutions in question. Estonia cannot be seen simply as ‘fitting’ within these 
categories after officially validating its place in 2004, it has begun to play and 
active role in constructing them from within. 
At the same time, the process of ‘returning to Europe’ itself has also been shaping 
perceptions of national identity. In the 1990s the main goal of re-establishing 
Estonia’s place in Europe included joining the EU and NATO. Even though marking 
an official return to the ‘Western world’ through these structures was defined 
through collective security, there were cultural aspects firmly attached to this 
approach (see Lauristin, Vihalemm, Rosengren and Weibull 1997). The process of 
fulfilling the membership criteria in order to join these organisations became a 
part of how Estonia as a state was perceived by the Estonian people. 
Transforming from a centralised totalitarian2 political and state-controlled 
economic system to a democratic state and liberal market economy also required 
re-establishing the national identity narrative suppressed during the Soviet era. 
To lay out the context for the following chapters, the introduction provides a brief 
overview of some of the broad directions in Estonian politics since 1991 relevant 
for this research to allow for a better understanding of the processual 
development of the national identity narrative and through that, the ‘normality’ 
in Estonia. 
 
1.4 FRAMING THE ESTONIAN ‘POLITICAL COMMUNITY’ 
The principles of the re-established democratic state were set down in the new 
constitution adopted in 1992. It defines Estonia as a nation-state (by right of the 
people of Estonia to national self-determination) which is founded on liberty, 
justice and the rule of law, and emphasises the need to preserve the Estonian 
people, Estonian language and culture (preamble of The Constitution of the 
                                                          
2 Academic debate is still ongoing as to exact nature (totalitarian to various forms of 
authoritarian) of the Soviet regime especially towards the end of it. 
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Republic of Estonia 1992). The principle of continuation of the Estonian state 
declared independent in 1918 and therefore the illegality of the Soviet occupation 
period is stated in the preamble of the constitution. The fundamental rights, 
freedoms and duties of the citizens were laid out and the functioning of key 
political institutions established. The framework for becoming a democratic 
country was therefore in place and the first steps towards ‘returning to Europe’ 
taken. However, substantiating this framework with political, economic and social 
processes is a more complicated task. In this study, these processes are seen as 
mutually constitutive with Estonian national identity constructions which both 
guide the policy direction and are continuously shaped by the very same processes.  
In looking at national identity and nation as ‘imagined political community’, then, 
as mentioned, who is included in this perceived political community plays a 
significant role in how it is understood. After the repressive Soviet era migration 
policies had left Estonia with a considerable Russian-speaking ethnic minority, 
restrictive citizenship and language laws were adopted in the immediate 
aftermath of regaining independence in an attempt to ‘restore’ also the ethnic 
composition of the interwar Estonian Republic. The 1938 Estonian Citizenship Law 
was used as a basis in 1992 to grant citizenship to those who held Estonian 
citizenship before June 16, 1940 and their descendants. 
In 1992, this meant that almost a third of the population, mostly Russian-speakers 
who settled in Estonia during the Soviet times and their descendants, became 
‘aliens’ without the citizenship of their country of residence or voting rights, and 
in the first parliamentary election held in Estonia in the same year, 100% of the 
deputies were ethnic Estonians (Pettai 1998). Language requirements are also a 
condition for naturalisation in Estonia and using the common language, meaning 
Estonian, has been the centrepiece of Estonian policy for integrating the Russian-
speakers. These restrictions on citizenship and language for the Russophones 
residing in Estonia exemplify the rationale of minimising Russian influence in the 
region after half a decade of Soviet rule aiming to dismantle any sense of Estonian 
national self-esteem, and at the same time promoting national identity as one of 
the fundamental values. These early 1990s Citizenship and Language laws proved 
somewhat contentious at the time and have gone through various amendments. 
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The language laws received expected critique from Russia, but also from 
international organisations. Russia’s grievances about the situation of the national 
minorities in Estonia were regarded as an attempt to interfere in Estonia’s internal 
affairs and further the depiction that Estonia still belongs to its sphere of 
influence. However, the conditionality attached to the European Union 
membership had some effect (among others) in the implementation of revised 
policies in this matter (see Smith 2002a, 2003b; Sasse 2008). The purpose here is 
not to evaluate how influential this conditionality clause has been to changing the 
conditions on the ground, but to show that Estonia demonstrated the will to 
comply with the norms in order to, among other motives, advance the ‘return to 
Europe’. 
In 1997, when Estonia received an early invitation for starting membership 
negotiations to be included in the European Union, the official policy discourse 
started to focus on the need for integration of non-Estonian residents into Estonian 
society (Budryte 2005: 78). In 1998 the Citizenship Law of Estonia was amended 
to improve the condition of ‘stateless children’ (Budryte 2005: 82; Pettai and 
Kallas 2009: 111). Seven-year integration programmes have been in place since 
2000 (current one renamed ‘Integrating Estonia 2020’). The closing of the OSCE 
mission in 2001 and Estonia’s accession to the EU and NATO in 2004 provided 
validation for these policies by the West and could be interpreted as passing the 
‘international litmus test’ (Hughes 2005: 24). Additionally, the new integration 
programmes demonstrate a shift in the approach to integration with the current 
one ‘Integrating Estonia 2020’ (p. 3) clearly stating that integration should be seen 
as a holistic process in the society and not based only on language or nationality. 
So, to what extent are understandings of societal divisions in terms of language, 
citizenship and nationality still relevant in Estonia nearly a decade after the 
accession? 
A case that provides a heightened context for analysing the relevance of these 
aspects is the relocation of the Bronze Soldier in 2007, which was an indication 
that the integration process was not finished, and raises the question of how 
people relate to this issue in general in a post-accession context and after more 
than five years had passed? Are ethno-linguistic cleavages still the most important 
feature of Estonian society, which has by far been the biggest focus of attention 
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in existing studies, in a post-EU context, or is the picture actually far more 
complex than this? The data-analysis carried out for this thesis indicates the 
latter. 
 
1.5 ‘NORMALISING’ RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 
While the situation of Russian-speakers in Estonia has been a contentious one 
between Estonia and Russia, there have been a range of other matters 
complicating the relationship as well. Examples are the Border Agreement, which 
is yet to be ratified at the time of writing this thesis, German-Russian gas pipe 
(Nord Stream), trade and transit issues etc. These are only a few mentioned prior 
to Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its continued hostile activities 
in the Donbass region, which as stated, can be seen to constitute the ‘new 
normality’ in Europe.  
However, ‘normal’ relations with Russia were advocated for in the 1990s. As David 
J. Smith argues, in the wake of Russian troops withdrawal in 1994, Estonia began 
to focus its attention upon westward integration, and this also dictated a new 
approach to relations with Russia – being a ‘normal’ European country meant 
conducting its foreign policy like one and a willingness to move towards 
‘normalisation’ of relations with Russia was placed in this context (2003: 169). As 
stated above, entry to collective security organisations was expected to 
‘normalise’ relations with Russia. However, and as has been rightly argued even 
pre-2014, this prospect failed to conform to the predictions advanced by the 
Estonian political elite in the 1990s (Berg and Ehin 2009; Mälksoo 2009). Nearly a 
decade after formally becoming part of the ‘West’, Estonian identity politics can 
be said to have shaped an alternative ‘reality’ to what was expected in Estonian-
Russian relations, a ‘reality’ which constantly reconstructs the securitised nature 
of Estonian-Russian relations. That Russia is seen as a perennial Other - as an 
imperialistic, backward and a more traditional country in its security logic - has 
not lost its relevance in Estonian (and European) identity construction.  
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In addition, Estonia joined the European Union and NATO at a time when the 
‘West’ itself no longer appeared fixed, but rather as something ‘fluid and 
contested’ (Lehti 2007: 137-138), and so the perception of being part of ‘Europe’ 
requires an assessment of the construction of ‘Europe’ in its own right, both 
spatially and temporally at the EU level, and an examination of the mutually 
contingent relationship between Estonian and EU narratives. After almost ten 
years officially within the union, the question now becomes how Estonia 
contributes to this construction? 
 
1.6 THE ONLY ‘TRUE’ CHOICE – NEOLIBERALISM 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Estonia was facing a dual challenge in 
moving from a planned economy to a market one and trying to transform its 
provincial economy to correspond to the globalised market environment (Smith 
2002b: 113).  
The first free parliamentary election in 1992 brought a right-centre coalition to 
power who supported the radical marketisation and Westernisation of Estonia’s 
economy and implemented ‘shock-therapy’, one of the most radical agendas for 
post-communist reform (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009: 9). The new political elite 
quickly introduced liberalisation, stabilisation, privatisation, and structural and 
institutional reforms despite having little experience and limited resources, both 
human and financial. This is undoubtedly so, despite claims that Estonia was 
better prepared and had a more competent political elite than some of the others, 
having prepared for the implementation of IME3 (self-managing Estonia) 
programme already in 1988-1991 (Norkus 2007: 23). The neoliberal policy choices 
adopted in Estonia and advocated by the Washington consensus (currency boards 
with fixed pegs, fiscal discipline, liberalisation of prices and trade, and wide-
ranging privatisation) appeared to have put Estonia and the other Baltic states on 
a remarkable growth track which was only interrupted by the Russian crisis at the 
end of 1990s (Kattel and Raudla 2013: 427). 
                                                          
3 Isemajandav Eesti 
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The strength of the market-liberal parties in the 1992 election illustrates the 
strong popular support for such ideas at the time (Feldman and Sally 2002: 89) and 
public opinion remained supportive of reform policies throughout the entire period 
of transition (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009: 11). Lauristin and Vihalemm argue 
that the majority accepted shock therapy as the only safe way to get out of 
Russia’s economic influence and achieve economic sustainability, and this was 
communicated from the local authorities in the ‘voice of international authorities 
and ‘higher’ national interests’ (2009: 11). While the results of these reforms were 
not immediate and Estonia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was in decline in the 
beginning of the 1990s, the rapid economic growth that started from 1995 just as 
restlessness with the reforms had started to surface, justified these and affirmed 
radical marketisation as the only ‘true’ option. Already in 1994 Estonia was hailed 
‘a shining star from the Baltics’ for its economic performance by foreign economic 
analysts John Hansen and Piritta Sorsa (1994) and in 1997, the EU invited Estonia 
to begin negotiations on accession two years ahead of the other Baltic states in 
light of this performance (Norkus 2007: 21-22). The external image of Estonia’s 
economy was an overwhelmingly positive one. Estonia was depicted as the ‘Baltic 
Tiger’ in terms of the substantial economic growth of the 2000s prior to the 
economic crisis, Hong Kong of Europe (Feldman and Sally 2002) in reference to 
Hong Kong’s economic achievements, low tax and efficient business environment. 
A Newsweek headline in 1993 read ‘Estonia: The Little Country That Could’ and 
talked about the successful economic transformation Estonia had made from the 
Soviet system (even if this supplement in Newsweek had been purchased by 
Estonia to promote itself and strengthen its appeal for foreign investments). The 
impact that this had on Estonia’s national identity should not be underestimated. 
But how, more exactly, has this 1990s transition period between a Soviet past and 
still vaguely defined prosperous European future shaped Estonian identity 
constructions?   
In general, Estonia had experienced a rather sustained economic growth from 1995 
to 2008 with only the interruption in 1998-1999 in relation to the Russian financial 
crisis. Economic growth continued from 2000 and after accession to the EU, there 
was an unprecedented boom in the Estonian economy with the average annual 
growth rate 8.5 percent (Kattel and Raudla 2013: 427-428). This ended with the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, even though as Karsten Staehr 
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(2015) points out, the quarter-on-quarter growth rates had already turned 
negative in Estonia from the second half of 2007. He demonstrates that the GDP 
declined by approximately 14 percent in 2009 in all of the Baltic States, a deeper 
decline than in any other EU country and even though GDP growth bounced back 
in 2010 and 2011, it had since then been rather muted (Staehr 2015: 3-4). 
However, due to the years of growth, the magnitude of the economic downturn 
came as a surprise to the local policymakers and was not foreseen by the academic 
circles either (Kattel and Raudla 2013: 429).  
Kattel and Raudla (2013) bring in the term nationalist neoliberalism to 
comprehend Estonia’s responses to the economic crisis, which also provides a good 
basis for understanding the post-economic-crisis ‘normality’ addressed in this 
study. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a specific form of capitalism – 
embedded capitalism - developed in Eastern Europe, which works in a different 
manner to the originally proposed understanding whereby the state functions as a 
curtailer of free market excesses by means of social protection mechanisms, and 
rather that self-regulating markets are seen as bringing social well-being (Kattel 
and Raudla 2013: 442). This construct can work by instrumentalising the idea of 
nation and nationalism as a substitute for social wellbeing, and so, it is not that 
much a socially more balanced society what capitalism in this case can deliver, 
but rather the survival of the nation (Kattel and Raudla 2013: 442). Kattel and 
Raudla (2013: 442) argue that this form of nationalist neoliberalism developed in 
its purest form in Estonia, the characteristics of which will be discussed further in 
Chapter 3. 
As this study also demonstrates, the low levels of economic growth have done 
little to shift the understandings of the non-negotiable acceptance of the 
neoliberal paradigm, seen here broadly as entrepreneurial beliefs, attitudes and 
thinking - that a free market will allow efficiency, economic growth and 
technological progress to occur - which guide the understandings of people’s lives 
and identities. Within this paradigm, the emphasis is on market relations, lack of 
state intervention, and individual responsibility. 
Neoliberalism has been advocated for by the Estonian elites and, as the data 
gathered for this research also demonstrates, widely accepted by the people on 
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the ground, who have also been part of the process of shaping these 
understandings from the early 1990s onward. Even though this has given Estonia 
the image of an economic success story, the implications of this national narrative 
ought to be considered as well.  
It is hardly surprising that the neoliberal approach of minimal state interference 
has had an impact on the social sphere. The 2011 Estonian Human Development 
Report which focused specifically on achievements made during the first 20 years 
after re-establishing independence shows how the social indicators in the Baltic 
States were lagging clearly behind the so-called old EU states in terms of minimum 
wage, social protection expenditure, poverty and income inequality. The relative 
poverty indicators and shadow economy share were high in the Baltic States also 
in comparison to the so-called new EU states (Aidukaite 2011: 71). The emphasis 
on neoliberal individualistic values has done little to ease social inequalities in 
Estonia. The rate of people living in relative poverty has not really decreased even 
as the economy has been on the rise after the economic crisis and poverty risk 
amongst the elderly has been a particular problem in Estonia as well (Eurostat). 
The gender pay-gap in Estonia is highest among the EU countries, still reaching 
over 25% in 2017 (Eurostat).  
The poorer population has not benefited as much from the neoliberal reforms and 
there are problems with the rates of domestic violence, alcoholism, crime, 
suicides etc (see Usha 2017). The ‘normalised’ understanding of ‘fair competition’ 
in the neoliberal paradigm can be said to also lead to a reluctance to make policy 
changes to further the more socially caring agenda in Estonia and the associated 
individualistic values tend to place the blame rather on the individual than the 
political elite for these issues. The theory chapter (Chapter 2) brings out how and 
why the constructions of ‘normality’ are relatively stable over time and this 
further helps explain the prevalence of these perceptions in Estonia. 
Also, as Thorhallsson and Kattel point out, the economic problems, especially 
during the economic crisis, were blamed on exogenous factors (2013: 94), meaning 
that the underlying principles of Estonian structural economy were not placed 
under any doubt by the population. The Estonian political elite, who has been 
successful in advocating for the neoliberal agenda, have therefore had little 
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reason to make changes, since it has been supported relatively broadly in the 
Estonian population.  
 
1.7 A RECAP OF THE POLITICAL CONTEXT IN ESTONIA 
Even though the Estonian political landscape in terms of changing ministers and 
merging or splitting of political parties might appear volatile from the beginning 
of 1990s, the general policy line has been relatively stable throughout the period 
after regaining independence and this overview of the main parties in power and 
opposition is provided as context for the data collection and analysis done for this 
study. For a better understanding of the political development in Estonia, I have 
also included a brief examination of the main political parties’ agendas since the 
first parliamentary election held in 1992. 
The parliamentary (Riigikogu) election in 1992 brought victory to the right-wing 
conservative Fatherland Bloc (Valimisliit Isamaa). One of the first items on their 
election platform was, not surprisingly, that Estonia was in need of change. They 
were presenting an alternative to the leftist world view aiming to ‘liberalise the 
economy [and make] radical economic reform’ (Isamaa 1992: 3). Fatherland Bloc’s 
economic agenda ahead of the 1992 election stated that they will stop the socialist 
system where the state’s massive bureaucracy is used for redistributing the 
income from high taxation – ‘every person should have the opportunity to decide 
for themselves, how to use their income’ (p. 10). The idea behind this was to 
place tax on goods rather than income and increase people’s drive to higher 
salaries. Their economic agenda supported minimal taxation with the programme 
stating ‘the lower the taxes, the wealthier the society’ (p. 11).  
Fatherland Bloc’s economic agenda was driven from their understanding of social 
market economy where private capital was viewed as holy and untouchable (p. 
9). Other issues of main importance for the electoral alliance at the time were 
issues of state security, especially in regard to the Russian troops still in Estonia, 
de-sovietisation of the Estonian society, placing the individual ahead of the state 
and putting together a government implementing right-wing policy (Isamaa 1992: 
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3-4). The flat income tax (26%) was introduced with Fatherland Bloc’s Prime 
Minister Mart Laar’s government in 1994 and this has remained one of the tenets 
of Estonian taxation system since then (the flat income tax has even been lowered 
by the Reform Party since 2006 to reach 20% in 2015). 
The shock neoliberal economic reforms instigated by the Mart Laar government 
after the 1992 election resulted in a temporary backlash to this agenda in the 1995 
parliamentary election, mainly due to the high social cost of these reforms (Saarts 
and Lumi 2012: 204). The economic situation in Estonia had not dramatically 
improved by 1995 election and this created a protest vote against Laar’s radical 
reform agenda and Fatherland Bloc had a dramatic fall of votes in the 1995 
election. The 1995 election saw the electoral alliance Coalition Party and Country 
Union (Koonderakonna ja Maarahva Ühendus (KMÜ)) win comprehensively (41 
seats out of 101).  
KMÜ won the election by presenting itself as more experienced and reliable, 
‘competent, capable and with a sense of mission’ (Eesti Koonderakonna 
programmilised seisukohad 1993: 3) as opposed to the young and new politicians. 
Just a reminder that Mart Laar was 32 years old when he became Prime Minister 
in 1992. The main agenda for most parties at the time, however, had not changed 
significantly. The aim was still to continue with the reforms and developing the 
market economy. As to financial policy, the emphasis was still on a balanced 
budget and stability of the Estonian currency (Kroon). KMÜ was not advocating for 
raising taxes but saw it possible to make changes within the taxation system (p. 
13). Economically they were running on an ‘open social market economy’ 
platform. 
KMÜ won a landslide victory and the period 1995-1999 is the only exception 
between the right-wing governments in Estonia up to 2016, and even this 
government cannot be considered left-wing. KMÜ formed a coalition at first with 
the Centre Party (the main opposition to the Reform Party in the ensuing years), 
but this fell through quickly and between 1995-1997 KMÜ formed a coalition with 
the Reform Party and the liberal-centrist Development Party (Arengupartei). This 
coalition basically continued with the previous government’s economic policies. 
This change in 1995 was, as Saarts and Lumi point out, was in line with the wider 
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trend in Central and Eastern Europe, where the radical market economy got 
replaced by a more moderate agenda (2012: 204).  
The 1995 election was significant in the sense that they saw the rise of the 
newcomer, the Reform Party (19 seats), the main driver of the liberal economic 
agenda for years to come, onto the Estonian party landscape. Since then the 
Reform Party has established itself as the dominant force in Estonian politics. It 
rose to power in the 1999 election, was involved in forming the government in 
Estonia until 2016, and has won the parliamentary election in 2007, 2011, 2015 
and 2019.  
The 1999 parliamentary election saw the beginning of a more consolidated party 
system in Estonia (Saarts and Lumi 2012: 205). The electoral alliances were 
abolished, and this forced the parties to deal with developing their organisational 
structures (2012: 205). The main conflict at the time was whether to be for or 
against the Centre Party – or more specifically its leader (this dynamic will be 
discussed in more detail below). While the Reform Party’s platform for the 1995 
election started with an emphasis on family issues, the 1999 programme begins 
straight with the economic perspective stating that the Estonian state is as strong 
as is its economy (p. 1). The stability of the Kroon, a balanced budget, economic 
growth, no increase in taxation - ‘the Reform Party will not allow the state to 
unfairly take away your income and redistribute them just for the sake of 
redistribution’ (p. 2) - were all included in the relatively short manifesto. The 
more conservative family values perspective with a promise for financial support 
was still included in their agenda as well. The 1999 election also had the largest 
gap in party manifestos in terms of placement to the left or right on the ideological 
spectrum. The Centre Party drifted more to the left while the Pro Patria Union 
(Isamaaliit) placed itself more to the right (see Toomla 2012). As Toomla (2012) 
points out, in all other elections (at least until 2011) the main party programmes 
have been relatively close in the centre.  
The Centre Party was advocating for progressive taxation in its campaign for the 
1999 election. It is worth noting that the 1999 election was held during another 
economic crisis affecting Estonia – the Russian financial crisis. This backdrop might 
have had some effect on the election with the oppositional Centre Party coming 
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out on top (28 seats). The Pro Patria Union and Reform Party both got 18 seats, 
and the Moderates (Mõõdukad) 17. The three latter, however, having reached an 
agreement early on, formed the coalition, with Mart Laar from the Pro Patria 
Union serving as Prime Minister for the second time. Estonia managed to pull out 
of the Russian economic crisis in a relatively short time – only a year and a half- 
with Estonia’s clear direction towards joining the EU playing an important role in 
this (Rei 2009: 9). This adds another possible explanatory factor to the positive 
image of Estonia’s economic success through the more liberal economic policies. 
The 2003 general election brought in a new but temporary political force in Estonia 
– the Res Publica party. However, their populist agenda and forming a coalition 
with the Reform Party saw little change in the overall dominating narrative. Res 
Publica’s success in the early 2000s can be seen as a protest against the 
government but directed rather at the ruling elite than the ideology. The populist 
agenda of countering corruption and demanding change proved to be relatively 
short-lived and Res Publica merged with the right-wing conservative Pro Patria 
Union in 2006 to form the Pro Patria and Res Publica Union (Erakond Isamaa ja Res 
Publica Liit). Saarts and Lumi argue that even though there are several reasons 
for the short-lived success of Res Publica, one of the explanations was that the 
right-wing spectrum of the Estonian party system was already exhausted (Pro 
Patria Union, Reform Party) (2012: 206).  
The 2003 Reform Party election platform had a focus on family and children while 
emphasising the party’s success in Estonia’s economic development. They firmly 
supported joining the European Union and clearly stated the need to ‘preserve our 
advantages, prove and defend the superiority of our liberal economic model also 
in the European Union’ (Reform Party election platform 2003). And even though 
the coalition was in the end formed by Res Publica, the general neoliberal agenda 
remained unchanged. It is worth noting that the Centre Party managed to get 
more votes than Res Publica in the 2003 election but was again left out of forming 
the government. The Centre Party finally managed to get into the government in 
2005 after the Res Publica-led coalition was dissolved and a new coalition was 
created with Andrus Ansip from Reform Party serving as the Prime Minister (a 
position he remained in until 2014). Both these coalitions also involved People's 
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Union of Estonia (Rahvaliit) (an agrarian party whose predecessor was part of the 
KMÜ alliance). 
The 2007 Riigikogu election brought about the infamous slogan from the Reform 
Party about taking Estonia into the five richest countries in Europe in 15 years. 
The emphasis was again on supporting families, low taxation and improving 
conditions for entrepreneurs in Estonia. Reform Party won the election and the 
support for Prime Minister Andrus Ansip was further consolidated by the removal 
and events surrounding the Bronze Soldier in April 2007.  
The Reform Party was also quite a comprehensive winner in the 2011 Riigikogu 
election. Their 2011 election platform already brings in the Nordic dimension – 
stating that Estonia has the best economic environment in the Nordic countries. 
Otherwise the Nordic example in their manifesto is mostly addressed in reference 
to the level of education, infrastructure and environment. The 2015 platform 
takes this element much further and is discussed in more depth in section 3.5. 
The 2007 and 2011 elections saw the success of the Reform Party further 
consolidated. The party held the Prime Minister position from 2005-2016. Even 
more, the Reform Party has been part of the ruling coalitions since 1999 and their 
agenda has had a significant impact on Estonia’s political path in the 2000s. The 
success of the Reform Party with its neoliberal agenda demonstrates the wider 
acceptance of this paradigm by a significant part of the Estonian population. After 
the brief backlash in 1995 to the radical economic reforms introduced in 1992, the 
neoliberal agenda has not been challenged by the voters in Estonia since 1999. 
Even though the 1990s neoliberal capitalism in Estonia was not the result of an 
original Estonian thought, but rather reflecting the international economic policy 
dogmas of the time (Kattel 2012: 393), this research shows that the belief in the 
success of these policies has been internalised in Estonia.  
It is therefore not surprising that the Estonian political parties have not 
significantly shifted from the liberal economic agenda. The only larger parties in 
the Estonian political spectrum advocating for a wider state involvement and a 
progressive income tax have been the Centre Party and the Social Democratic 
Party (former Moderates). The Centre Party positions itself centre-left on the 
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ideological spectrum, appealing to the votes of pensioners, Russian-speaking 
minority, lower-income groups and protest votes. As discussed, the left-wing of 
the political spectrum has not gained much traction in Estonia with the more 
moderate Social Democratic Party serving at most as a partner in the right-wing 
Reform Party and Pro Patria Party governing coalitions prior to 2014 (e.g. 2007-
2009; Moderates in 1999-2002). 
Assessing the platforms and success of political parties at the Riigikogu elections 
since 1992 demonstrates that the Reform Party’s neoliberal agenda had been 
relatively widely accepted by the second half of 2000s, and even prior to that, the 
general political direction was mostly in line with this perspective. The 1995 
victory of KMÜ coming as a result of a backlash against shock reforms did little to 
derail Estonia from this course. And the 2003 Res Publica led coalition was not 
advocating for any major shift in the economic thinking as the party placed itself 
also on the right-wing of the ideological spectrum.  
As demonstrated, the centre-right parties have dominated the political landscape 
since 1992 and the neoliberal economic paradigm has been dominant in Estonia. 
The liberal market agenda has been most forcefully driven by the Reform Party, 
who has participated in most government coalitions since 1995. Since 2005 to 
2013, when the interviews were conducted, the Reform Party’s agenda had been 
dominating the political scene with them holding the Prime Minister position since 
2005 and the party winning the general election in 2007, 2011 (and again in 2015 
and 2019). At the time of conducting this study, it was in government with its 
head, Andrus Ansip, serving as Prime Minister. Ansip served as Prime Minister of 
Estonia for nearly a decade - from April 2005 to March 2014 and was until July 
2019 the European Commissioner for Digital Single Market and Vice President of 
the European Commission. Even though the Reform Party won the 2015 
parliamentary election, it was ousted from the government in late 2016 with a 
vote of no confidence for the Prime Minister, Taavi Rõivas, at the time. However, 
as discussed, their proposed approach has been widely accepted in the Estonian 
society, given the party’s success in four consecutive elections, including their re-
election after the global economic crisis, and provides a basis for better 
understanding the ideational political and social frameworks in Estonia when this 
research was conducted. 
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The main opposition party to the Reform Party has for years been the Centre 
Party, whose ideology can be described as social-liberal, but has also received a 
populist reputation in Estonia with its long-time leader, Edgar Savisaar, who with 
his declining health was under trial with criminal charges of corruption from 2015-
2018 (case dismissed in the end due to his health), having a dominant role in the 
party and an authoritarian style of running it. Savisaar has a long history in 
Estonian politics, as he was a co-founder of the Popular Front (Rahvarinne) 
movement in 1988.  
The Centre Party has ties to Russia and a cooperation agreement with Russia’s 
dominant party, United Russia, which has been (and still is) a source of controversy 
in Estonia. The Party has drawn on the Russian-speaking population’s votes and 
has been successful in winning the local elections in Tallinn for years, with 
Savisaar being the mayor of Tallinn from 2001-2004 and 2007-2015. Due to the 
criminal charges brought against him, he was removed as the acting mayor in 2015. 
Savisaar was also ousted as the long-term Chairman of the Centre Party in 2016, 
and shortly after the election of the new head for the party, Jüri Ratas, a vote of 
no confidence was issued in the parliament for the serving Prime Minister, Taavi 
Rõivas, and the Centre Party along with the Social Democratic Party and Pro Patria 
and Res Publica Union formed a new coalition with Jüri Ratas as the new head of 
government. The Centre Party’s possible inclusion in coalition governments in 
recent years had remained closed off because of the leader of the party. All the 
controversies surrounding the Centre Party, but also the Reform Party and various 
other political parties and politicians in Estonia are too detailed to bring out in 
this brief contextual background for the thesis, but just to note that Estonia has 
not been immune to this over the past years.  
However, one further recent shift in the political party landscape deserves 
mentioning, even though it does not directly affect the time this research was 
conducted. Along with the migration crisis in Europe and the surge of populist 
parties in general, there has been a noteworthy rise of the far-right Conservative 
People's Party of Estonia since the beginning of 2015, with the party winning 7 
seats in the parliament at the 2015 election. Even though the hardship was 
significant in Estonia during the economic crisis and severe austerity measures 
were adopted to combat it, the impact of rightist populism compared to some 
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other European countries was perhaps not quite as severe. Even so, the support 
for the far-right party has been on the rise since these elections.  
 
1.8 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This study is divided into eight sections. After the introduction, a theoretical 
framework is provided for understanding how ‘normality’ and national identity are 
approached in the study at hand. It outlines the main approach to ‘normality’ 
relying on Barbara Misztal’s work (2001, 2010) on using the concept in sociological 
research and brings forward the theoretical premises I use for understanding group 
identity. For the latter, I draw on the work of Henry Hale (2008), who argues that 
groups are constructed as a means for reducing uncertainty and navigating the 
social world. Hale defines identity as a set of points of personal reference people 
rely on to navigate the social world and groups are formed by having common 
relationships to points of reference. And this is how ‘normality’ is seen in this 
research – it is an ideational collection of ‘thicker’ or more meaningful points of 
reference related to perceptions of national identity to which people in Estonia 
have common relationships – the commonsense or taken-for-granted perceptions 
of the social world. This is followed by a discussion on the concept of national 
identity within the constructivist paradigm and a look into how it is constructed. 
Last but certainly not least, the chapter finishes with providing an overview of the 
contextual ‘normality’ in relation to Estonia’s nation-building process starting 
from the beginning of 1990s. As mentioned earlier, the concept of ‘normality’ in 
relation to nation-building in Latvia and Estonia has been used by Daina Stukuls 
Eglitis (2002) and also Sigrid Rausing (2004), and their work has guided the overall 
conceptual framework for this research. This general overview of the theoretical 
premises is then followed by an overview of the existing academic literature on 
Estonian national identity. 
The literature review chapter situates the current study in relation to existing 
work on the question of national identity in contemporary Estonia and 
demonstrates how the themes addressed in this prior research guide the study at 
hand. In this regard, ‘returning to Europe’, constructions of Russia as the Other in 
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Estonia’s identity-building process and conflicting narratives of history emerge as 
the underlying themes which have framed Estonia’s identity construction. The 
wider over-arching concept of ‘normality’ is furnished in this section with the 
various core themes of Estonian national identity brought forward by the bulk of 
research conducted on the topic since the 1990s.  
First, it discusses the role conflicting narratives of history with Russia and memory 
politics in general play in Estonia’s identity and how it frames the policy-making. 
The significant works of Berg and Ehin (2009), Mälksoo (2006, 2009, 2010), 
Kasekamp and Brüggemann (2009), Brüggemann (2007), Fofanova and Morozov 
(2009), Onken (2007, 2009, 2011), Smith (2010, 2012), Lehti (2010) and others are 
discussed in this section. Second, since identity is always constructed in relation 
to an Other, the various Others of Estonia’s identity-building process are 
discussed. This includes the widely discussed threatening qualities of Russia as the 
Other, but also how the perceptions of Europe and the European Union guide 
Estonia’s self-positioning in the international sphere and how this in turn impacts 
upon people’s perceptions of everyday life and through that ‘normality’ on a 
grassroots level. Third, the literature review chapter gives an overview of other 
labels attached, whether internally or externally, to Estonia’s self-definition. 
These include regional identification labels such as Baltic or Nordic, temporal 
concepts such as ‘new’ Europe, and attempts to establish Estonia as the flexible, 
innovative and an economic success story within the new democracies of 1990s. 
The idea of nationalist neoliberalism in Estonia is discussed through the work of 
Kattel and Raudla (2013). The core themes presented in the volume of previous 
research on Estonian national identity guided my choice of images used during the 
interview process. 
The fourth chapter discusses the methodology of this research. It provides a 
theoretical overview why interviews and visual methods are applied for this case, 
reflects on the process of interviewing and the data collected with this method. 
It covers a range of aspects related to fieldwork in Estonia and discusses some 
ethical implications that accompanied the research process. An overview of media 
analysis and the process of analysing the interview data are also provided. 
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The fifth chapter is the first of three empirical chapters that bring out the analysis 
conducted for this study. It discusses the perceptions of ‘Europe’ more generally 
and the European Union specifically and is separated into two sections 
accordingly. While ‘Europe’ is seen as more fluid category based on values, with 
boundaries drawn according to perceived cultural differences, the European Union 
is understood more commonly in terms of fixed rules and regulations applied to 
formal member states. The main argument in this chapter is that these values and 
the idea of belonging to Europe - the construction of ‘European normality’ - has 
been taken in without much self-reflection. The non-negotiable acceptance of the 
neoliberal paradigm shapes these values and Estonia is seen as embodying the 
‘true’ Europe in terms of adopting austerity measures. A clear dividing line could 
be drawn in this regard between the Northern and Southern Europe, a new spatial 
‘normality’ within the overarching and increasingly contested category of 
Europeanness. A further significant element arising in this chapter is the notion of 
a ‘Second Estonian Republic’ as a new temporal reference point for respondents 
within an EU context. By this, I mean that people no longer look to the interwar 
period as a foundation for the present-day Estonian identity; instead, they invoke 
the ‘sovereign’ Estonian Republic during the period between regaining 
independence in 1991 and joining the EU and NATO in 2004. This suggests - 
following Eglitis’ framework - that the 1990s produced a new temporal ‘normality’ 
for understanding the identity-constructions of post-accession Estonia.  
The sixth chapter looks at Russia as the Other in understanding Estonian national 
identity. The material analysed in this chapter shows that issues of security have 
not lost their relevance in Estonia’s relations with its ‘Eastern neighbour’ within 
the decade following the accession to the EU and NATO, but certain new aspects 
have emerged. The first part of this chapter focuses on the securitised nature and 
threatening qualities of Estonian-Russian relations while the second part looks at 
the non-threatening qualities i.e. pragmatic, economic ones within Othering 
Russia in Estonian identity-building process. The research demonstrates that the 
threat emanating from Russia was still a valid concern for the Estonian-speaking 
respondents in 2013. The data analysis shows that Russia’s nostalgia for the Soviet 
Union and its expansionist interests had not disappeared with Estonia joining the 
EU and NATO. However, the traditional security dimension can be seen to have 
diminished to a degree and a more ‘cultural’ way of Othering had become 
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applicable within securitising relations with Russia. The most significant finding in 
this chapter, however, was the prevalence of the neoliberal economic narrative 
in perceptions of relations with Russia which has emerged in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis. Having spent almost a decade in the EU and NATO in relatively 
calm times in terms of security (prior to 2014), the chapter demonstrates that a 
certain ‘normalisation’ – different to that which had been articulated as a goal in 
the 1990s - had been achieved in relation to Russia and that pragmatic economic 
themes had become more relevant in people’s everyday perceptions. 
The previous two chapters focused on the post-EU accession understandings of the 
Estonian Self through its relationship to two external Others - Europe and Russia - 
chapter seven will provide an understanding of how the respondents discussed the 
internal essence of Estonia as a state nearly a decade on from EU accession. The 
chapter brings out the everyday experiences of the participants which emerged 
from the rich data. These experiences are examined from the standpoint of the 
dominant neoliberal paradigm underpinning constructions of Estonia’s identity as 
well as the more emotional, securitised angle, in terms of the interethnic relations 
in Estonia. The chapter is split up into three sections: societal integration, 
economic aspects and political system. To summarise, the chapter explains that 
even though themes of language, cultural Othering and education are still 
important dividing factors in perceived ethnic boundaries in Estonia, the picture 
is far more complex with the reconciliation between the pragmatic understanding 
of economic necessity and the more national emotional element being pertinent 
in understanding interethnic relations in Estonia a decade since joining the 
Western structures. The main argument in this chapter is that the post-crisis 
economic fatigue appears to have increased the importance of the neoliberal 
paradigm within Estonian national identity constructions and provided a 
consolidating element in the interethnic relations as the Russophone interview 
findings also suggested a generalised trend towards pragmatic adaptation to new 
realities rather than voice of protest. Another key finding in this chapter confirms 
the findings in chapter five in terms of a shift in the temporal narrative of 
‘normality’ in relation to the glorification of the 1990s as an idealised benchmark. 
Chapter eight pulls together the main findings of this study and posits possibilities 
for further research.  
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1.9 POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS RESEARCH 
This study falls within the qualitative paradigm and seeks to uncover how 
‘normality’ in relation to national identity discourse shapes people’s perceptions 
of Estonia’s place in the international sphere, how it frames their understandings 
of various social, economic and political aspects in their everyday lives a decade 
since officially becoming a member of the European Union and NATO. The goal of 
the study is not to provide a comprehensive and representative overview of what 
is Estonian national identity, but rather to further the understanding of the 
complex process of how socially constructed national identity themes frame and 
continue to be shaped by the people in Estonia. 
The insights from this study can be used to address questions of foreign and 
internal policy in Estonia, to understand the more complex approach people in 
Estonia have towards the EU, in regard to relations with Russia and more generally 
placing Estonia in the international sphere. Even though national identity, and 
especially national identity of the former Soviet countries, received a fair amount 
of attention in the 1990s and to a degree in the 2000s, there is a limited amount 
of research conducted to obtain the perspectives on the grassroots level in 
Estonia. This study aims to fill this gap to an extent and help to uncover relevant 
questions for further research on the topic. The results can be used for studies 
researching how various policies have impacted and are perceived by people in 
Estonia, for developing questionnaires for statistical, and for policy-making 
purposes. Additionally, the methodological approach of this study demonstrates 
the added value visual aids can bring to a complex research topic like national 
identity. 
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL PREMISES 
 
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to understand the importance of why and how Estonian ‘normality’ and 
national identity are analysed here, it is necessary to provide an overview of the 
theoretical framework guiding my research and unpack the key concepts discussed 
in this thesis. This chapter first presents the theoretical premises for why 
‘normality’ is a valuable concept, for understanding people’s perceptions of the 
social world and exploring Estonia’s national identity constructions. It then draws 
on Henry Hale’s (2008) sophisticated account of identity and group formation in 
order to argue that national identity (like ethnic identity – the focus of Hale’s 
analysis) is based on uncertainty reduction, and that the broader concept of 
‘normality’ has an important role to play in this. In the remainder of the chapter, 
I first discuss the existing theories on national identity and explain the social 
constructivist approach that is employed in this thesis. Finally, I discuss the more 
specific Estonian ‘normality’ narratives brought forward and analysed by previous 
researchers. This leads the way to the more comprehensive overview of the 
academic literature which then usefully sets the scene for the empirical chapters 
to follow. 
 
2.2 ‘NORMALITY’ IN THE SOCIAL WORLD  
We often hear the word ‘normal’ used to describe a situation in a particular 
country or its relations with another. Normal life, normal politics, normal 
relations. The term is far from straightforward and to presume that everybody 
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attaches the exact same meaning to it would be fanciful to say the least. Having 
said this, there do appear to be certain broad shared understandings within 
different groups about what is considered ‘normal’ in the social world in general, 
a society, its various subgroups etc. (see Goffmann 1983, Misztal 2010, Eglitis 
2002). This section provides a theoretical overview of the concept, looking at why 
and how ‘normality’ is seen to exist and how utilising this concept can help us 
further our understandings of national identity constructions in Estonia.  
Very broadly put, ‘normality’ is understood here as ‘the social world as it is 
described in the here and now: the implicit, the common sense, the taken for 
granted, which is perceived as the unquestionable basis for everyday action and a 
fortiori political action’ (Croce and Salvatore 2016: 288). Common sense and 
taken-for-granted situations are described as such because they do not usually get 
noticed by the people living in them. In so far as these ideational frames of 
‘normality’ form a basic and almost undetectable part of the organisation of 
people’s lives, the fact that they rely on them becomes apparent mainly in times 
of crisis (Misztal 2015: 3). This applies clearly in the case for Estonia, where the 
‘abnormality’ of the Soviet times can be seen as the crisis, which brought up 
perceptions of what ‘normal’ Estonia would have been and would be like had the 
Soviet occupation not taken place. However, the 1990s political transformation 
and the economic ‘shock’ therapy can be seen to constitute another period of 
crisis in Estonia. One could also argue that another crisis hit Europe in 2014 with 
Russia’s illegal takeover of Crimea, which forced a closer examination of the 
European ‘normality’ (from the EU level as well as on individual states including 
Estonia) and brought about a further ‘new normality’ as referred to in Chapter 1. 
I will discuss the particular theoretical groundings for Estonian ‘normality’ prior 
to 2014 in more detail in the last part of this chapter. First, I will start by drawing 
out the theoretical premise for using ‘normality’ more generally and discuss how 
national identity is situated within this wider framework.  
This broader theoretical notion of ‘normality’ can be used in the case of any 
society as a way of guiding our understanding of the frames in which ‘people see 
and interpret their particular historical circumstances’ (Misztal 2015: 1). Such 
frames are delimited by the cultural repertoires to which people have access and 
the structural context in which they live (Misztal 2015: 1). Barbara Misztal, who 
42 
 
has extensively dealt with the concept, explains that in the wider sense 
‘normality’ can be regarded as perceptions which do not depart negatively from 
the particular expectations shared by the wider society. That being a ‘normal 
person’, a human being like anyone else, means incorporating standards from 
wider society and meeting others’ expectations about what we ought to be. Simply 
put, ‘abnormal’ persons are those individuals who are deprived of the claims and 
the institutional supports to normal identity that are taken for granted by the 
majority of others (Misztal 2001: 316-317). Conceptualising ‘normality’ therefore 
entails consideration of how these wider standards are defined and imposed. 
Another crucial aspect of Misztal’s approach to the concept of ‘normality’ for the 
research at hand is its aspirational quality. As she points out in her research, 
people living in undemocratic nations often express the desire to live in a ‘normal’ 
country (Misztal 2015: 2). In this sense ‘normality’ is not only the aspiration to 
regain certain kind of order after a disturbance but it is also about having a chance 
to have dreams and expectations fulfilled in the future that could not be met in 
the past (Misztal 2015: 2). Erving Goffman sees this aspiration for the future as 
immersed in the present. The present provides the context from where these 
desires arise. Misztal has pulled together Goffman’s approach to this aspirational 
quality as follows: 
“If we follow Goffman’s observation that normality also refers to an 
aspiration for the future, seen as always immersed in the present from 
which desires and ambitions originate, we can say that the notion of 
normality adds a descriptive component that allows us to understand what 
it is about our societies that is desirable, thereby establishing a crucial 
prescriptive ideal.” (Misztal 2015: 2). 
As well as its applicability to times of crisis, this aspirational element is 
particularly relevant in the case of post-communist countries striving towards 
becoming ‘normal’. This falls in line with how the concept of ‘normality’ has been 
discussed in the context of Estonia, especially related to the understanding of 
what the country would have been had the Soviet occupation not taken place (see 
section 2.7). One could argue that the ‘transition’ paradigm applied in Estonia 
after 1991 was already by definition supposed to be temporary, a means to an 
aspirational end of a bright future – ‘normality’. However, it ended up becoming 
a benchmark for ‘normality’ in itself as this thesis also demonstrates in Chapter 5 
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in relation to Estonia’s response to the financial crisis. In this sense the aspiration 
did not just reflect the present reality, but it actively shaped it too. 
These historical circumstances, the cultural and structural context, and the 
aspirational quality of ‘normality’ provide a very broad framework for addressing 
what is considered a ‘normal’ social order and one might ask what this concept 
has to offer that is not already addressed with the theoretical underpinnings of 
‘national identity’ or social psychological approaches to (social) identity. So how 
does this common sense, taken for granted perception of a ‘normal’ political 
community come about? And how and why is it taken in by various groups?  
 
2.3 GROUP IDENTITY AS PART OF ‘NORMALITY’  
It has been argued that people’s judgements of ‘normality’ are related in 
fundamental ways to the classification of things (Misztal 2001: 316-317). That 
there is a basic need to ‘normalise’ aspects of life, be it in private or public, and 
even though the perceptions of ‘normal’ are continuously renegotiated, people 
try to maintain a sense of themselves as ‘normal’ (Misztal 2015: 8). Useful as this 
explanation is in a broad sense of why perceptions of ‘normality’, seen as a 
process, have resilience in the social world, a more nuanced account of why and 
how certain understandings of ‘normality’ develop on a group level will advance 
our insight into national identity constructions in Estonia. 
This is where Henry Hale’s sophisticated development of the concept of ethnicity 
is very useful. Even though his focus is on ethnicity, how he has unpacked the 
concept assists this research in drawing out the complex basis of how group 
identity can be approached and why it is useful to acknowledge the processes that 
lie underneath this in conducting social research. After an extensive discussion on 
the shortcomings and helpful advancements of the concept in existing theories on 
ethnicity and national identity from various fields in the social sciences including 
psychology, he posits that ethnicity is primarily about uncertainty reduction while 
ethnic politics is mainly about interests (Hale 2008: 33). According to his take, 
there are in fact no values inherently attached to ethnicity, and no such thing as 
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group interest per se. Rather ethnicity operates as a sort of a social radar that 
guides how people interpret the social world and pursue their interests. I argue 
here that groupness and, for the purposes of this thesis, nation as an imagined 
group or community, rests on a similar basis to the one Hale discusses in the case 
of ethnicity. 
The core idea of uncertainty reduction coincides to a degree with the 
understanding that people’s judgements of ‘normality’, a part of how they see 
themselves in the social world, are related in fundamental ways to the 
classification of things. While these ‘classifications’ can perhaps indicate more 
clear-cut divisions between categories, Hale (2008: 34) talks about points of 
reference as the main basis for identity construction: 
“Identity is the set of points of personal reference on which people rely to 
navigate the social world they inhabit, to make sense of the myriad 
constellations of social relationships that they encounter, to discern one’s 
place in these constellations and to understand the opportunities for action 
in this context.” 
And through this, Hale defines groups by common relationships to these points of 
reference. Providing a basis for it from social psychology, he relies on Erik 
Erikson’s idea that identity cannot be understood apart from the social world – 
that the interplay between the social and the psychological could only be seen as 
kind of psychosocial relativity (Hale 2008: 34). The world is too complex to survive 
without some means of simplifying and ordering it first. From this, Hale deduces 
that identity at its core is a means for reducing uncertainty and making sense of 
the social world in which to live and succeed (Hale 2008: 35). Relying on evidence 
from social psychology, he states that people tend to categorise themselves and 
others in ways that help make sense of the social world we live in and ‘this 
facilitates recognition and response to both members and non-members of these 
categorizations’ (Hale 2008: 35). The need for people to categorise ourselves into 
groups and group-oriented behaviour is based on psychological research (e.g. 
Social Identity Theory) and is seen here as one of the main categories for people 
to reduce uncertainty in the social world. 
Hale also explains how the groups that people form tend to be based on at least 
some sense that they share a common fate (Hale 2008: 35). This common fate can 
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be based on any aspect of the social world, so in order for the categorisation to 
be meaningful and helpful in reducing complexity and uncertainty as Hale puts it, 
there are different levels of meaning attached to these categorisations: „Personal 
points of reference, groups, categorizations become ‘thicker’ when they come to 
have greater importance in people’s lives, when people’s lives are seen to be 
affected in more significant ways by the referent.“ (2008: 35). 
Another question that arises here, is which certain ‘thick’ categorisations are 
activated while others remain more muted. In Hale’s view this depends on the 
accessibility of the particular category and the fit between the category and 
observed reality. The reason why some categories are thicker than others is either 
intrinsically in the case of a common language, which could mean high transaction 
costs in interaction; impositional in a sense of what the broader social 
environment has placed on people; or usefulness as rules of thumb meaning that 
if a simpler social category frequently coincides with another, more complicated 
points of reference, which might be important for independent reasons, the more 
obvious ones can serve as rules of thumb for determining whether someone else 
belongs to a group defined by less detectable or more complicated traits (Hale 
2008: 37). Looking at national identity, in how people group themselves and others 
into nations, can be seen as a simple category in the wider social world, it is this 
classification that can be argued to be used first and foremost for defining who 
belongs and who does not.  
“Points of personal reference, then, even group labels themselves, can 
become thick with meaning not only when the original referents become 
important in their own right, but also when they come to connote 
relationships to other referents seen to be correlated with the originals. At 
their most robust, these rules of thumb can involve whole patterns of 
recognition and can imply appropriate relational action to such extent that 
they can be fruitfully analyzed as cognitive schemas. Psychologists Hogg 
and Mullin find that identifying themselves strongly as group members, 
individuals are effectively replacing aspects of their own individuality 
(including their unshared attitudes and behaviors) with stereotypical 
beliefs, attitudes and/or behaviors. Likewise, categorizing others this way 
leads people to assume individuals in these other groups are much more 
similar than they actually are.” (Hale 2008: 38). 
As Hale points out, these simple perceptions can be powerful in determining how 
a person interprets the social situation and responds to it. Thick categorisations 
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are quite stable due to their pervasive availability and usefulness in various 
situation, but also due to the fact that some of the situations themselves are quite 
stable (Hale 2008: 40). However, research has shown that even if these thick 
categorisations help people navigate the social world, they can be discarded if 
they lose their uncertainty reducing value (Hale 2008: 40). This explanation gives 
a solid basis for understanding how certain categorisations within national identity 
are more stable than others and the complexity behind these points of reference.  
Pulling together the various lines of discussion, ‘normality’ is used in this research 
as an ideational collection of thicker points of reference related to perceptions of 
national identity which are useful for the people in Estonia for navigating and 
reducing uncertainty in the social, economic and political world. The concept 
provides a very useful framework for looking at national identity constructions in 
Estonia. It helps uncover how the idea of becoming and being a ‘normal’ country 
again after regaining independence in 1991 has changed in the post-2004 context, 
which ostensibly signified becoming a ‘normal’ Western country again. Since 
‘normality’ is looked at here in relation to national identity, then before engaging 
in analysing the empirical data gathered for this research, I will next bring out the 
theoretical premise for how national identity is approached here before discussing 
the previous academic literature on ‘normality’ relating more specifically to the 
Estonian context. 
 
2.4 NATIONAL IDENTITY 
As already stated, the idea of ‘normality’, which has been central to Estonia’s 
nation-building context since 1991, is approached in this research in relation to 
national identity. The second part of this chapter explains the theoretical premise 
taken for understanding national identity in the case of Estonia by establishing 
how national identity is approached here and providing a theoretical framework 
for addressing ‘normality’ in the Estonian context. 
During the past two decades, there has been little resistance in the academic 
community to the constructivist paradigm in researching national identity. The 
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constructivist approach to studying national identity is challenging for its 
underlying understanding that identity is a process and even with careful 
consideration of how this process is described there is a risk of reifying identity as 
something that ‘exists’. Before delving into the constructivist approach and 
explaining the usefulness of this for the research at hand, I will briefly outline the 
main schools of thought for studying nationalism and national identity. 
One of the older theories on nationalism comes from primordialists whose main 
argument lies in nation and nationalism being ancient and natural phenomena. 
They argue that nations and nationalism are based on deep rooted historical and 
cultural ties. Primordialists’ approach can be regarded as one that sees 
nationalism as a natural and universal and can therefore be described as more or 
less essential. Approaches vary to a degree within the primordialist perspective 
from a purer sociobiological theory of Pierre van den Berghe which refers to 
genetics as the binding link for holding together a nation to the perceived cultural 
similarities from territory, kinship, language, and religion which have been the 
main constitutive elements for nationalism for such notable primordialists as 
Edward Shils and Clifford Geertz. Perennialists’ accounts of the nation and 
nationalism do not differ to a significant degree from the primordialists’ approach. 
The nations are seen as having existed over a very long time (as opposed to the 
modernist approach) and as based on non-rational psychological bonds, extended 
kinship or as ‘expressions of premodern ethnic identity rooted in the remote past’ 
(Smith 1998: 156-169).  
Another approach to gaining a perspective into national identity is put forward by 
Anthony Smith and is termed ethno-symbolism. This approach places emphasis on 
understanding the roles of ethnic symbols, myths, memories, traditions and values 
in how the ‘nation’ is reinterpreted and rediscovered in the modern times. 
However, as Richard Mole (2012: 5) points out, Anthony Smith’s claim that identity 
and symbols of the nation resonate with society below because of their underlying 
roots in pre-modern cultures fails to explain how members of civic nations feel a 
powerful identification with their national symbols.  
Even though the debate regarding various approaches to studying national identity 
and whether the term should be utilised at all as a category of analysis (see 
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Brubaker 2000) is still ongoing, and Hale’s account of ethnicity provides a solid 
contribution to this debate, there is general consensus in the academic community 
that national identity is best understood within the social constructivist paradigm 
which this research follows as well. This does not mean that the primordialist 
understanding of shared history, culture, kinship or even genetics do not 
contribute to the perceptions that people hold of their national identity. However, 
it is the ideas of the history, culture etc. that can vary among various groups and 
can contribute to the self-understandings of a nation. It is how these ideas are 
used by the elites from the top-down and taken in by people from the bottom-up 
which needs to be explored to understand the role these perceptions play in 
‘national identity’ and through that in constructing ‘normality’ (see section 2.6 
for further discussion on this). 
The modernist approach, to which in broad strokes this research relies on as well, 
views nations as social constructions that were created by the socioeconomic and 
political changes during the 19th century with the birth of the contemporary 
nation state. The main theoretical premise used in this study, comes from 
Benedict Anderson (1983) who described nations as ‘imagined political 
communities’. In this definition a nation is a community socially constructed, 
imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group. The 
community is imagined because, as he states, ‘members of even the smallest 
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear 
of them but all of them possess an image of their communities’ (Anderson 2000: 
6). The nation is conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship (Anderson 2000: 7) 
and these shared perceptions of the political community, however complex and 
negotiable, constitute national identities – conceived as specific forms of social 
identities. National identity must therefore not be seen as something fixed but 
something that is constantly ‘negotiated and renegotiated’ (Mole 2012: 3). 
However, as explained earlier, the fundamental need for classification and 
reducing uncertainty in the social world also provides a solid ground for the 
relative stability in thicker perceptions of national identity. 
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2.5 THE OTHER IN NATIONAL IDENTITY 
Considering the discussion above, defining the boundaries of an ‘imagined political 
community’ is not a straightforward task. As already mentioned, in the case of a 
state, who belongs can be simply looked at in terms of citizenship, but also in the 
more complex terms of who is included within the dominant narrative of national 
identity. The dominant narrative of national identity requires situating the nation-
state relation to Others, placing it in time and space, and a multitude of various 
other elements which can vary according to context (see Chapters 5 and 6). 
Therefore, national identity has to be looked at as a relational concept as it is 
always constituted in relation to something else – the Other. One of the main 
tenets of Henry Tajfel’s Social Identity Theory is that people tend to think and act 
in terms of groups so they can ascribe positive elements to their own group and 
accentuate negative ones in the Other group and through that raise their self-
esteem. The latter is an important aspect and it has been argued that ‘national 
identity is, fundamentally, a matter of dignity’ (Greenfeld 1995 cited in Browning 
2015: 199), which means that nationalism is driven by the community’s desire to 
justify itself, legitimatise and possibly also enhance its position and standing 
(Browning 2015: 199). Self-esteem is related to how we view ourselves, which is 
here seen as contingent on how Others view us as well. As Browning notes, on a 
collective level, positive self-images are directed internally as well as externally 
and are dependent on the context (2015: 199). While the internal and external 
are seen as mutually contingent here, the self-image cannot exist without in being 
related to an Other.  
Taking a step back to Social Identity Theory, I argue here that these negative traits 
are not necessarily the only Others that the Self may have. The positive Other, 
something to aspire to, works similarly in the process of identifying oneself as can 
be the case of Others ‘simply being there’ as Maria Mälksoo notes (2010: 9). Pille 
Petersoo has discussed the various Others in regard to nationalism and brings out 
that the idea of one significant negative and threatening Other in national identity 
is outdated and suggests looking at the multiple simultaneously existing Others, 
which are not necessarily negative, to understand these constructions (Petersoo 
2007: 117). Since national identity is constantly negotiated and renegotiated, so 
are the Others and how they function in this process. The relational construction 
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of identity derives from the idea that the delineation of a Self from an Other is an 
active and ongoing part of identity construction and that the Self and Other also 
merge into one another (Neumann 1999: 35-36, for further discussion see 
Neumann 1999).  
Based on this, not all values, traits, self-understandings in national identity are 
seen here as derived from the opposites. Estonia’s national identity is seen as 
constructed, transformed and reinterpreted through the reflexion of several 
Others. Maria Mälksoo has also brought up the problems with simplifying the 
process of Othering in academic discussion and states that ‘the assumed need for 
others in constructing oneself has, more often than not, led to the somewhat 
problematic deduction that constitutive difference between Self and Other 
inevitably translates into a behavioural relationship of Othering, be it in the form 
of representing the Other as an existential threat (securitisation), backward and 
inferior (practices of Orientalism), or simply different’ (2010: 9). Although these 
practices are seen here to certainly form part of the Othering process, this study 
acknowledges that this relationship is more complex with various possible Others 
whose influence on the Self can vary over time (Petersoo 2007: 118). Therefore, 
it is important to assess this relationship between the Self and Other(s) 
dynamically, to fully appreciate these constructions.  
Before proceeding, however, I will explain the two concepts introduced at this 
point in relation to Othering. Here, securitisation is not seen as always necessarily 
reaching the extent of existential threat. As Ole Wæver, who coined the term, 
defined it and how it is used in the research at hand, the process of securitisation 
places issues into the sphere of extraordinary politics or the politics of emergency, 
which would otherwise belong to the realm of normal everyday politics (1998: 26). 
The term is interesting in a sense that the baseline for perceptions of ‘normal’ 
everyday politics is not clear and in the case of Estonia, one could argue that the 
idea of ‘normal’ relations with Russia posited in the 1990s by Estonian politicians 
regarding ‘normalisation’ was part of the aspirational ‘normality’ of that time, 
and while in next two decades the political relations with Russia have certainly 
not ‘normalised’ in the sense put forward then, they have not reached the level 
of existential threat either. This relationship ought to be looked at more in terms 
of varying degrees of threat perception over time, but nevertheless, relations with 
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Russia cannot be seen as ‘normal’, as put forward in the 1990s from the point of 
view of the Estonian political elite, throughout that period. One might also 
question how extraordinary is politics that in a broad stroke has not changed all 
that much in two decades? The change, however, certainly came with Russia’s 
illegal takeover of Crimea 2014 and the ongoing war in Donbass, which this 
research precedes. 
The process of securitisation, as with other ideational processes discussed in this 
theoretical chapter, is not seen here as relying on a binary scale, but rather that 
there can be various degrees and layers how an issue becomes securitised in 
politics, and it does not have to be a conventional security issue as the 
Copenhagen School has discussed in more depth. Here, however, it is mostly used 
in examining the relationship with Russia to gain a better understanding of the 
‘normality’ in the changed post-accession context. 
The second concept Mälksoo refers to is Orientalism, which according to the 
original definition by Edward Said, is a particular Western style of defining, 
dominating, restructuring and having authority over the Orient that produces the 
alleged superiority and hegemony over the East (Said 2003: 3). This has been, and 
possibly still is, part of the Estonian identity construing process, since being 
labelled Eastern Europe within the West has been an integral part of how Estonia 
has tried to represent itself against these misrecognitions (see Mälksoo 2010). 
Here, however, the term is used not in the ‘imperial’ sense but rather as a means 
for how Estonia as part of the West is distinguished from the completely different, 
incomprehensible East. Considering the forced policies of the Soviet Union and 
lack of development in most areas of life, the Orientalising practices towards the 
Soviet successor state Russia can be viewed to coincide also with the perceptions 
of the ‘abnormal’ Soviet occupation discussed further in section 2.7 (also see 
Chapter 3, sections 3.2-3.4 for discussion on Russia as the Other and constructions 
of ‘Europe’). 
To sum up, the Other then does not necessarily have to be a negative one to 
oppose, to oversimplify the matter, but a positive one to aspire to, and in general 
Others simply being there, can have an impact on self-identification for a state. 
In any case, since Othering is not something that exists in identity construction 
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and is looked at as a process within it, how certain ideational constructions of 
Others emerge, alter or disappear is dependent on the context. In terms of 
Estonia’s national identity construction, the opposition to the ‘abnormal’ Soviet 
Union and its successor state Russia, has been established in previous studies 
(Rausing 2004; Berg and Ehin 2009; Petersoo 2007) and can be seen as a broader 
perception for an Other in Estonia’s national identity construction.  
Exploring what this Othering entails in the post-accession context will bring out 
the more complex nature of the process of Othering in national identity 
construction. The post-accession context also brings in a further Other – namely 
the Western community and Estonia’s self-positioning in this after officially 
validating its return. This context provides an interesting case for researching the 
perceptions of the Others in Estonian national identity, and looking at whether, 
to what degree and how the process of Othering Russia and the Western 
community play a role in this construction.  
 
2.6 HOW TO RESEARCH NATIONAL IDENTITY? 
Now that I’ve established why national identities are constructed, and the main 
premise for understanding the constructivist approach to national identity, it is 
necessary to take a closer look at how national identities are constructed and 
therefore how they should best be studied. 
As already explained in detail, this project follows a similar line to previous 
research on identity, claiming that there is no such thing as a single national 
identity in an essentialising sense but that identities are socially constructed. As 
the word ‘socially’ already indicates, communication plays a key role in the 
construction process. National identities are seen here as discursively ‘produced, 
reproduced, transformed and destructed’ through language and semiotics (De 
Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak 1999: 153). This means that there are no inherent 
characteristics of Estonian national identity to bring out: ‘rather that different 
identities are discursively constructed according to context that is, according to 
the social field, the situational setting of the discursive act and the topic being 
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discussed’ (De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak 1999: 154). De Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak 
(1999: 154) assume that ‘there are certain relations (of transfer and contradiction) 
between the images of identity offered by political elites or the media and 
‘everyday discourses’ about nations and national identities’, and this is also a basis 
for how national identity is approached here.  
The idea of an imagined political community is seen to be realised through beliefs 
and practices, and these are conditioned by people of influence (e.g. politicians 
and intellectuals) and systems of communication (media, education, etc.) (De 
Cillia, Reisigl and Wodak 1999: 153). The role that elites play in constructing 
nations and national identities cannot be overlooked in the constructivist 
approach. Constructivists view nations and national identities as constructs forged 
by elites to achieve various socio-political and economic objectives (Mole 2012: 
3). However, as Mole points out, emphasising the role of the elites in constructing 
national identity leaves unanswered the question about why and how people 
accept the top-down constructions of national identity. Furthermore, if identities 
are constructed, the question arises as to how social groups become treated as 
real and with the potential for political agency? (Mole 2012: 5). In this sense, the 
main constructivist argument that emphasises the role of the elites in constructing 
national identities has some explanatory power in analysing and understanding 
how perceptions of national identity are constructed, but they are also 
conditioned by the existing understandings of ‘normality’ in the society.  
Richard Mole (2012) looks at the discursive constructions of national identity as a 
source of political power in more detail. Mole argues that identity has become the 
object of political manipulation, with elites using a range of means to attach 
precise meanings to floating signifiers such as ‘nation,’ ‘state,’ and ‘territory’ 
and, at the same time, convey the idea of shared identity (2012: 18). He explains 
how and why the grand discourse of nationalism has developed and based on 
Ernesto Laclau’s and Chantalle Mouffe’s Discourse Theory, which posits that all 
social and political action takes place within a historically situated discourse, he 
demonstrates that while discourses have to be flexible to accommodate to 
changes on the ground, they cannot be seen as infinitely elastic either (Mole 2012: 
15). If the discourse no longer represents or explains specific events, it is 
dislocated [original emphasis] and this allows for a reconfiguration of it by the 
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political elite resulting in a new common sense (Mole 2012: 15). This clarification 
of the role of discourse helps us understand how changes in the constructions of 
‘normality’ happen and while the main emphasis is placed on the political elite 
here, their action is ‘conditioned and constrained by contingent hegemonic 
discourses and truth and value regimes, which determine what may be considered 
true or false, good or bad, rational or irrational, legitimate or illegitimate’ (Mole 
2012: 15). This has to be taken into account to understand the process of any 
change in perceptions of national identity and ‘normality’ in general. 
This also falls in line with Rogers Brubaker’s performative understanding by which 
‘groupness’ is constructed within discursive social fields and that nation or 
national identity has to be studied from various sides within these fields to capture 
how people construct and are framed in their everyday perceptions by national 
identity: 
“Ethnicity and nationalism could best be understood if studied from below 
as well as above, in microanalytic as well as macroanalytic perspective. 
From a distance it is all too easy to “see” bounded and homogenous ethnic 
and national groups, to whom common interests, perceptions, intentions 
and volition can be attributed. Up close, on the other hand, one risks losing 
sight of the larger contexts that shape experience and interaction. The 
study of large- and mid-scale structures and processes remains 
indispensible, but I came to believe that it must be complimented by 
research pitched at a level close to everyday experience if one is to avoid 
unwarranted assumptions of “groupness” and capture the way ethnicity 
actually ‘works’.” (Brubaker 2006: xiv). 
Exploring this relationship between top-down and ground-up is one of the central 
aims and contributions of this thesis. This research seeks to explore the 
constructions of Estonian national identity by focusing on the perspective from 
below, but also incorporating the view from above. This means that while it 
acknowledges the role elites have in the construction of national identity, these 
constructions have to also to a degree ‘meet an inherent need for meaning and 
self-esteem in the population below’ (Mole 2012: 6). The images used for 
conducting the interviews reflect the dominant elite discourse in Estonia and 
provide for a very useful way of examining this relationship as demonstrated in 
Chapter 4 and the empirical chapters 5, 6 and 7.  
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This approach will enable us to understand how Estonian identity is perceived and 
how Estonian inhabitants, both Estonian- and Russian-speaking, negotiate and 
renegotiate the categories of national identity. If political choices and decisions 
are made based on this shared understanding of rules and norms, then providing 
a more nuanced account of these shared understandings can add a useful insight 
into the processes of decision-making. In line with the social constructivist 
approach, the aim here is not to achieve an objective reality but to uncover a 
range of simultaneously existing identity constructs. Looking into how 
understandings of Estonian national identity have developed and how these 
constructions affect the everyday lives of the respondents, a better understanding 
of the various perspectives on social and political realities is achieved. 
 
2.7 RE-CONSTRUCTING ‘NORMALITY’ IN ESTONIA   
Terms like ‘normalisation’ and ‘normal politics’ have surfaced in various accounts 
dealing with Estonian identity politics (see Mälksoo 2006, Berg and Ehin 2009 etc.), 
but an overarching idea of ‘normality’ in the post-Soviet context has been 
discussed in more depth by two researchers, whose works also guide the direction 
of this study. These are the works by Daina Stukuls Eglitis ‘Imagining the Nation: 
History, Modernity and Revolution in Latvia’ (2002) applicable also in the case of 
Estonia and Sigrid Rausing’s ‘History, Memory, and Identity in Post-Soviet Estonia: 
The End of a Collective Farm’ (2004), which are taken as a basis here for discussing 
what the idea of ‘normality’ entailed in the Estonian post-communist context prior 
to accession to the Western structures in 2004. 
Eglitis utilises the term ‘normality’ to demonstrate the already discussed 
‘commonsense’ quality in the concept in addressing the late Soviet and early post-
Soviet era in people’s perception of society, state and economics in the Baltic 
States. She brings out a useful definition from Ann Swidler of common sense as 
‘the set of assumptions so unselfconscious as to seem natural, transparent, 
undeniable, part of the structure of the world’ (2002: 13), which helps to 
understand the gap the Baltic populations’ perceived between what was forced 
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upon them with the Soviet Communist ideology and the ‘common sense’ about 
what the state was supposed to be. 
Related to the aspirational quality of ‘normality’, Eglitis discusses how the 
‘normal’ world order remained to be reconstructed after the fall of the communist 
regime in the Baltic States and that ‘normality’ was an ideological structure which 
developed largely in opposition to the putative ‘abnormality’ of the Soviet regime 
(Eglitis 2002: 7). She points out how there was not a particular ideological model 
for the construction of society in the wake of the death of the old order, aside 
from the often-repeated but vague aspirations for an open society, democracy, 
markets, civil society, and, more generally, ‘normality’ (Eglitis 2002: 7). Part of 
the challenge of a post-communist society, was not just to realise the institution 
of a new social order but to construct models of what that social order should be 
and to endow that social order with meaning (Eglitis 2002: 7). In other words, to 
‘normalise’ the social order. This widely shared desire for ‘normality’ contributed 
to the construction of a unified opposition to the ‘abnormal Otherness’ of the 
USSR projected onto Russia after August 1991, and also advanced the contests 
over how a post-Communist state and society should be imagined and 
reconstructed (Eglitis 2002: 8). The idea of ‘normality’ therefore played a central 
role in how the national identity narrative was established after regaining 
independence. 
Rausing also provides a very useful account of ‘normality’ in post-Soviet Estonia 
claiming that ‘normal’ meant not only what Estonia was seen to be at the time, 
but what it would have been had the Soviet occupation not taken place (Rausing 
2004: 37). The aspirational quality of ‘normality’ is a central aspect here. At the 
time when Rausing conducted her research (1993-1994), which focused on one 
particular locality in Estonia (Noarootsi), she argues that the ‘normal’ was a form 
of cultural narrative that in fact expressed the lack of ‘normality’ of Estonians’ 
lives.  
This related both to their Soviet past and the discomfort of their own recent 
realisation that they were not ‘normal’ in relation to the West (Rausing 2004: 37). 
In the 1990s people did not see themselves as authentically Western, and hence 
‘normal’ (Rausing 2004: 37). Rausing (2004: 39) claims that ‘cultural knowledge 
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about the West therefore came to be defined as ‘normal’ and was widely 
understood as the logical extension of a core, or an essence, of Estonianness’ – 
and this was imagined as natural rather than cultural.  
The construction of ‘normal’ in Estonia pre-dated independence from the Soviet 
Union and functioned as a means of distinction not only from the Russians but also 
from the Soviet Union itself (Rausing 2004: 40). Not only was the regime illegal 
and illegitimate, it was also a fundamental deviation from what was perceived to 
be the normal course of national, state, social and economic development (Eglitis 
2002: 12). Sigrid Rausing reiterates Eglitis’ point by claiming that ‘the Estonians, 
however poor and underprivileged they felt in relation to the West, seemed to 
have no doubts that they could change and leave the Soviet culture and way of 
life comfortably behind in order to assume their [perceived] natural place in the 
West’ (Rausing 2004: 40). 
Rausing also discusses (2004: 40), perhaps somewhat simplistically, how as a 
nation, Estonians knew exactly what they would have been like if the situation 
had been ‘normal’ and thus what they wanted to become. Westernness as 
Americanness was not it, since it was regarded more as cultureless and the 
Estonians were moving away from the Soviet mode of living towards a Finnish, 
Swedish and German cultural sphere (Rausing 2004: 40). An earlier point regarding 
‘normality’ being how people see and interpret their particular historical 
circumstances delimited by the cultural repertoires and structural context 
provides a broad explanation for this approach, given Estonia’s historical ties to 
Germans and Swedes, and the linguistic, cultural and also geographical closeness 
to Finland, which had had the chance to develop in the Western world while 
Estonia was occupied by the ‘abnormal’ Soviet rule.  
The Northern European identity (see further in section 3.5) became an important 
element in Estonia’s ‘return to the West’ and this was seen as representing 
Estonians’ own inner core, which had been denied its ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ 
expression and development during the Soviet order (Rausing 2004: 38). Rausing 
also makes an interesting point in how Estonia’s process of change – the strive to 
become a ‘normal’ country – differed from the Russian process, since Estonia was 
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not only moving from one system to another but also from one geographical realm 
of belonging to another (Rausing 2004: 40).  
Eglitis sees a somewhat more varied picture as to the broad direction Latvia was 
supposed to be headed in the immediate post-Soviet context. She argues that 
some considered the restoration of pre-Soviet social order as the desired 
‘normality’, others preferred to model the future not on the past but on the 
modern West, seeing the country becoming like Western Europe as the desired 
goal (Eglitis 2002: 8). As the Soviet reality differed from both perspectives, the 
‘normal’ during the Soviet era was the unfamiliar while the ‘not normal’ had 
become the familiar (Rausing 2004: 37). The aspirational quality of ‘normality’ is 
therefore of particular importance in framing perceptions of the social world in 
the 1990s Estonia. The question then becomes, what, if anything, is aspired to in 
the Estonian in today’s context? 
There is a multiplicity of understandings attached to Eglitis’ concept of 
‘normality’ and the term itself is referred to as rather a background knowledge or 
shared relationship to points of reference as discussed earlier that people in the 
Baltic States had during the era of change. While the previous paragraphs discuss 
how people in Estonia appeared to have quite a clear understanding that their 
‘normality’ entailed belonging to ‘Europe’ after half a century of occupied rule, 
looking more closely into what this idea of ‘Europe’ entailed is, however, not as 
straightforward as it might appear. As Eglitis has pointed out the ‘European 
normality’ to which the Baltic countries were returning to was itself an indistinct 
and contested construct, with different narratives of Europeanness placing 
differing degrees of emphasis on spatial and temporal components. The latter 
aspect has become even more relevant since 2004, in ways few could have 
anticipated in the 1990s, when entering the EU and NATO was presented as a 
panacea in Estonia. Recognising that ‘Europe’ itself is a contested construct is an 
important point for understanding how the perceptions of Europe and Estonia’s 
place within them inherently belong to the process of constructing Estonian 
‘normality’ and a separate section (3.4) in this literature review will explore the 
idea of ‘returning to Europe’ further. 
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Eglitis has provided a useful analytical model for defining ‘normality’, which pulls 
together the discussion above. Her model for looking at ‘normality’ through 
spatial and temporal narrative constructions is useful in understanding the thick 
points of reference for how national belonging was perceived by people in Estonia. 
The interplay of spatial, with emphasis on the ‘West’ as a natural place of 
belonging and themes of democracy and economic prosperity; and temporal as 
glorification of the inter-war period, national freedom and cultural development 
narratives over time was a useful analytical framework for addressing Latvia’s 
self-positioning at that time (Eglitis 2002) and works similarly in the case of 
Estonia. The spatial and temporal dimensions are linked in the sense that the 
inter-war Baltic States were remembered as successful European states which – 
had they not given way to Soviet ‘abnormality’ - would have shared in the post-
war prosperity of the ‘West’. Independence was supposed to set Estonia back on 
this course, but the image of the ‘West’ as synonymous with eternal economic 
prosperity and progress has since been called into question by the economic crisis 
and the fallout from it. Having gained full membership in the European Union, 
validating the ‘return to Europe’ and with NATO securing its eastern border for 
more than a decade already, the changing perceptions of society, state and 
especially economics deserve another careful examination.   
 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
This chapter establishes the theoretical grounds for why and how ‘normality’ and 
national identity are approached and analysed in the study at hand. ‘Normality’ 
is broadly addressed as the common sense and taken for granted situations in the 
social world which usually don’t get noticed by the people living it. ‘Normality’ 
can help us understand the frames in which people see and interpret their 
particular historical circumstances and what they find desirable about their 
society, limited by the cultural and structural context they inhabit. 
The theoretical premise for understanding identity and groupness relies on Henry 
Hale’s account of ethnicity, which he sees as being mainly about uncertainty 
reduction in a complex social world. Identity is defined as a set of points of 
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reference which help categorise and navigate the world around us and groups are 
formed by having common relationships to points of reference. Pulling the broader 
theoretical discussion together, ‘normality’ is used in this research as an 
ideational collection of thicker point of references related to perceptions of 
national identity which are useful for the people in Estonia for navigating and 
reducing uncertainty in the social, economic and political world.  
The chapter then narrows down to how national identity is approached within the 
social constructivist paradigm. Following Benedict Anderson’s famous definition 
of the nation as ‘an imagined political community’, national identity is not seen 
as something fixed or in an essentialising sense, but rather as discursively 
produced and reproduced by means of language and constantly negotiated and 
renegotiated. In order to understand these constructions of national identity one 
needs to study the discursive fields from ‘below as well as above’.  
Finally, the specific Estonian post-Soviet but pre-accession ‘normality’ central to 
narratives of Estonia’s national identity is discussed through the works of Eglitis 
and Rausing. One of the core points of reference for ‘normality’ in Estonia was 
opposition to the ‘abnormal’ Soviet rule. ‘Normality’ was largely based on the 
idea of what Estonia would have been like had the Soviet occupation not taken 
place. The spatial – belonging to the Western world – and the temporal – 
glorification of the inter-war era of independence – became the pillars for identity 
construction for Estonia after regaining independence in 1991.  
The concept of ‘normality’ provides a very useful framework for looking at 
national identity constructions in Estonia. It helps uncover the main agenda for 
this research as to how the idea of becoming and being a ‘normal’ country again 
after regaining independence in 1991 has changed in the post-2004 context, which 
ostensibly signified becoming a ‘normal’ Western country. Joining the EU and 
NATO in 2004 accession has certainly had an impact on the dominant set of ideas 
which shape the policy-making process and Estonia’s self-positioning within the 
international arena. The question is, what does a ‘normal’ European state look 
like today and has Estonia finally ‘returned’ to being one? 
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CHAPTER 3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter provides an overview of the academic literature on Estonian national 
identity and positions this study within it. Estonian national identity, in relation 
to which ‘normality’ is looked at here, has been studied in a variety of ways and 
there is a large amount of research out there that touches in one way or another 
on this complex topic. The literature review is structured in order to provide a 
background for the current study and to demonstrate its value, especially in terms 
of methodological significance. Since the main argument of this thesis relies on 
the idea of Estonia having acquired a certain ‘normality’ within a decade of 
belonging to Europe, this chapter looks more closely at the various overarching 
themes on ‘normality’ in Estonia, discussed at the end of the theory chapter 
(section 2.7), that have surfaced in prior research concerning Estonian national 
identity.  
The aim here is to offer a contextualisation of Estonian national identity within 
the existing academic literature. The key themes arising from the previous 
literature provide the groundwork for this research. The first section discusses the 
conflicting history narratives in the academic literature as a basis for Russia as the 
Other in Estonian identity constructions. After exploring the relationship with 
Russia, I will look at the previous studies related to Estonia and Europe, along with 
the temporal and spatial constructions of ‘returning to Europe’ which then leads 
into an overview of a few sub-themes and labels attached to Estonia’s self-
positioning and identity constructions. This is then accompanied by an 
examination of the economic issues and a discussion on the neoliberal paradigm 
in Estonia, which, as brought out already in Chapter 1, have played a significant 
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role in the national narrative since regaining independence in 1991. These main 
themes are viewed here as thicker points of reference for Estonian national 
identity construction and form the basis for my data collection as I used them 
guide the selection of images used for the purposes of interviews (which will be 
discussed in depth in Chapter 4).  
As one might expect, there has been a significant amount of research on Estonian 
politics and identity contributing to the academic literature in the pre-accession 
period. This topic was of particular interest to scholars following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and therefore the volume of research has somewhat decreased 
in recent times. However, the ethnographic and bottom-up perspective has 
remained relatively neglected throughout, as discussed below, even though recent 
research has called for this (see Polese, Morris, Pawłusz and Seliverstova 2018). 
A comprehensive account of how national identity narratives frame the policy 
choices in the Baltic States from the beginning of the 1990s to EU accession is 
Richard Mole’s (2012) book ‘The Baltic States from the Soviet Union to the 
European Union: Identity, Discourse and Power in the Post-Communist Transition 
of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania’. The very useful theoretical premise of this book 
on discourse analysis and its relation to understanding national identity was 
discussed briefly already in Chapter 2. While Mole acknowledges that national 
identity constructions are also conditioned by the existing understandings in the 
society, this research takes a more bottom-up approach to uncovering the national 
identity constructions in Estonia and chronologically picks up from where Mole left 
off to address the post-EU period.  
As to the limited ethnographic research mentioned above, a very useful recent 
edition by Abel Polese, Jeremy Morris, Emilia Pawłusz and Oleksandra Seliverstova 
(2018) ‘Identity and Nation Building in Everyday Post-Socialist Life’ brings forward 
the value of bottom-up approach for gaining insights into identity and nation-
building in the post-socialist life. The authors in this edition argue for and look at 
everyday practices as a meaningful and useful site for looking at the process of 
identity formation, an approach this study takes on as well albeit in a slightly 
different perspective. The main emphasis of their work is on the ‘banal’ practices 
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(see Billig 1995) related to consumption, kinship, mobility, music, use of objects 
and artefacts (p. 2).  
The research conducted by the number of authors is what the editors of the book 
deem ‘micro’ or the bottom-up look into the everyday which allows for a deeper 
look into the official and unofficial national, ethnic and civic categorisations cut 
across everyday practices is a useful addition to the academic literature on also 
Estonian national identity with two chapters dedicated to it. Exploring some of 
these everyday practices in Estonia, Emilia Pawłusz looks at Estonian identity 
through music and looks at the case of a folk metal band in order to better 
understand popular music as part of nation-building. She also brings out that while 
Estonia known for its singing festivals and choral music, nationally themed songs 
are not limited only to this and themes of nationalism also belong to the sphere 
of popular music. Her main point by looking at a case of a heavy metal band, is to 
demonstrate how ‘ordinary citizens have the agency to (re)create ideas of what 
it means to belong to the nation’ (p. 47) and that this process of belonging to a 
nation is mediated every day in informal ways. Another chapter on Estonia in this 
edition by Seliverstova discusses the consumer practices as part of constructing 
national identity. She looks into food consumer culture in Estonia to again 
demonstrate the ‘everyday’ expressions and enactments of national belonging for 
different ethnic groups. Through her bottom-up research she claims that although 
because of different factors, the representatives of ethnic groups fail to recognise 
that they already have a large amount of overlapping identity markers. The 
consumer practices in Estonia as part of identity have been also addressed by 
Vihalemm and Keller (2011) and Kalmus, Keller and Kiise (2009). 
Michael Billig’s (1995) famous take on ‘banal nationalism’ states that nationalism 
is not just about ‘hot’ conflicts happening ‘somewhere else’, but that nationalism 
is everywhere and constantly socially reproduced through symbols and everyday 
mundane practices. The focus of this research is somewhat different, as it does 
not look into these ideological everyday practices of nationalism but rather at 
‘normality’ and its role in nation-building. In other words, it explores how 
dominant top-down discourses of spatial and temporal ‘normality’ (and associated 
practices of defining the Self and the Other) are received, negotiated and 
reproduced at the everyday level, in a context where ‘normality’ as originally 
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constructed at the start of the 1990s had ostensibly been attained and ‘normality’ 
itself was thus especially open to redefinition and reinvention. In this way, I 
provide a fuller picture of the dominant discursive formations that sit at the heart 
of Estonian ‘national identity’, uncovering their most important shared 
components and shedding further light on the overall construction of Estonian 
national identity. 
As discussed more thoroughly in the theory chapter (section 2.7), Sigrid Rausing 
(2009) has also brought forward the changing aspects of everyday life and a deeper 
sense of identity on a former collective farm in Estonia through ethnographic 
methods. However, as noted above, this research was limited in scope and 
conducted in the early 1990s. Given the significant changes that have taken place 
in Estonia over the last two decades discussed in Chapter 1, it is high time to 
revisit exploring Estonian ‘normality’ through a bottom-up approach in a post-EU 
context.  
 
3.2 RUSSIA AS THE OTHER - NARRATIVES OF HISTORY 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of ‘normality’ can help us understand 
theoretically the frames in which people see and interpret their particular 
historical circumstances. The historical circumstances in the case of Estonia frame 
the present national identity construction process on various and complex levels, 
but as has been pointed out, the conflicting history narratives with Russia is a 
pillar of Estonian national identity construction. The constructions of Russia as the 
Other in Estonia’s identity-building process heavily related to the conflicting 
narratives of history emerge as the underlying themes which have framed 
Estonia’s identity construction, and this topic has received its fair share of 
scholarly attention. 
One of the earlier significant engagements with identity politics in the region is 
an edited volume by Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin titled ‘Identity and Foreign Policy: 
Baltic-Russian Relations and European Integration’ (2009). Adopting a 
constructivist approach, Berg and Ehin claim that the poor relations between 
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Estonia and Russia can be explained by the fact that the national identity 
constructions of the Baltic States and Russia, together with the historical 
narratives they are based on, are incompatible and indeed antagonistic (Berg and 
Ehin 2009: 9). The multi-causal analysis presented in the volume relies on 
perspectives from prominent scholars (Morozov and Fofanova; Mälksoo; 
Brüggemann and Kasekamp etc.) studying identity and historical narratives of the 
Baltic States, several of whom will receive separate attention here. While these 
scholars try to uncover the reasons for the failure to ‘normalise’ relations, this 
thesis argues that the identity-shaped discursive construction of Estonian-Russian 
relations has become a part of Estonia’s post-accession ‘normality’ in its own 
right. In a word, Othering of Russia has become constitutive of an Estonian Self, 
which has persisted even after the ostensible reason for Othering Russia in the 
first place i.e. with joining the EU and NATO disappeared. 
Before delving into the conflicting history narratives, it is important to expand 
somewhat on the temporal construction within the Estonian ‘normality’. As briefly 
pointed out in the Chapters 1 and 2, Estonian national identity is rooted in the 
idea of restoration of its sovereign statehood after the Soviet occupation that 
lasted from 1940 up to 1991 (Berg and Ehin 2009: 27). David J. Smith argues that 
the 22-year experience of Estonian independence (1918-1940) between the two 
world wars has played a crucial role in shaping discourses on national identity 
during and after the restoration of independence (Smith 2003a: 161). The 
narrative of ‘state restorationism’ lay on the notion that the Soviet-imposed 
communism never took ‘significant root’ after 1940 among an ethnic Estonian 
population that had so recently experienced an ‘alternative, non-Soviet and self-
determined national existence’ (Vardys 1975, cited in Smith 2003a: 161). The 
nation-statehood of 1918-1940 was represented as European ‘normality’, as 
opposed to the ‘abnormal’ Soviet reality (see Eglitis 2002). It therefore becomes 
rather clear that the identity construction of the titular nation did not simply 
derive from the 1980s opposition to Soviet nationalities policy but refers to an 
earlier independence period of 1918-1940 (Aalto 2003: 574). This does not only 
apply to the temporal aspect of ‘normality’ but also the spatial elements. Having 
experienced independence in the interwar Europe, it was this ‘normal’ Europe, 
which was seen as the desired goal also spatially in the 1990s. The prior experience 
of statehood as also a spatial point of reference became part of the national 
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narrative in the context where goal was attaining and guaranteeing full national 
sovereignty. 
Put in a nutshell, the restorationist vision was more compelling to the Estonian 
national movement and its leaders than the notion of a post-Soviet ‘third republic’ 
that would recognise and thereby legitimise the new social realities left behind 
by Soviet rule. However, Russia’s denial of Soviet Union’s occupation of the Baltic 
States, and through that their ‘rightful’ place in Europe, and these contradictory 
narratives form a constitutive pillar in Estonian (and Latvian and Lithuanian) 
‘normality’ in relation to national identity constructions (see Mälksoo 2009; 
Morozov 2003, 2005). 
These contradictory historical narratives Estonian and Russian identities are based 
upon did not disappear once the Baltic States joined the EU and NATO. Indeed, 
this process of joining the Western structures arguably amplified the Russian 
narrative, meaning that politics of memory quickly became the defining feature 
of the post-2004 period as far as the relationship with Russia (and by extension 
with the EU) was concerned. These contradictory history narratives have been 
incorporated into the works of Andres Kasekamp and Karsten Brüggemann (2009; 
Brüggemann 2007), Vyacheslav Morozov (2003; 2005) and the ‘politics of memory’ 
relating to the historical narrative in Estonia is extensively researched by Eva-
Clarita Onken (2007; 2009; also see Pettai 2011), who also, along with Siobhan 
Kattago (2012), lays bare the different ‘memory regimes’ that operate in Western 
Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and Russia.  
The ‘memory wars’ (Kasekamp and Brüggemann 2008) between Estonia and Russia 
are directly related to the conflicting collective memories and are a more complex 
social and political phenomena when looked at in more detail. Conflicting 
collective memories can lead to a situation where national identities are seen to 
be under threat and therefore securitised by the political elite (Pääbo 2008: 7). 
Within these memories, the commemorative activities play a crucial role, since 
‘to remember a past event that is considered important for the community or the 
state’ (Onken 2007:23). Memorials and commemoration days can facilitate social 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion and provide an opportunity for 
67 
 
demonstrating political positions and different perceptive standpoints (Onken 
2007: 23-24). 
Eva-Clarita Onken, who has written extensively on the topic (2007; 2009; Pettai 
2011), covers the 2005 Moscow commemoration of the sixtieth anniversary of the 
end of World War II as an example of this and reveals the many levels on which 
European memory politics is based by looking at the decision-making process of 
the presidents of the Baltic States on whether to accept the invitation (Onken 
2007: 24). A ‘normal’ Europe for Estonia is seen as one that takes on board the 
Baltic narrative with regard to the Second World War and the Soviet Union, at a 
time when Russia was assertively pushing its own narrative on these. Kasekamp 
and Brüggemann (2009) discuss the much-debated Bronze soldier incident in 
Tallinn in 2007 in terms of commemoration and ‘war of monuments’. David J. 
Smith (2008: 424) demonstrates how this ‘war of monuments’ started in 2004 with 
the erection of a monument by Estonian nationalists to Estonian ‘men who fought 
in 1940–1945 against Bolshevism and for the restoration of Estonian independence’ 
and which the Estonian government ordered to be removed, which ended in 
clashes with local residents. As he demonstrates, the following discursive conflict 
between Estonia and Russia and the 2005 Moscow commemoration event focused 
attention on the ‘Bronze Soldier’ as a continued locus for commemoration in 
Tallinn. In this changed context 2005–2006, this monument was ‘re-Sovietized’ in 
that ‘it ceased to be a simple memorial to the dead and was again politicised as 
a symbol of occupation/liberation’ (Smith 2008: 426).   
A series of events surrounding the removal of the Bronze Soldier, a Soviet era 
Second World War monument in the centre of Tallinn have been discussed in 
length (see Ehala 2009) and will not be reiterated here in such detail. The removal 
of the Bronze Soldier located in the centre of Tallinn on April 27, 2007 sparked 
widespread protests in Estonia and caught international attention. Russia’s 
response to the crisis – with the misrepresentations of events by the state 
controlled Russian media, cyber-attacks on Estonian websites and a blockade of 
the Estonian Embassy in Moscow by the Russian youth organisation Nashi for a 
week, further exacerbated the issue (Smith 2008: 426). The statue was re-located 
in the military cemetery in Tallinn and has not been a source of such controversy 
since. However, in domestic terms, as David Smith notes, while the immediate 
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effect appeared to polarise the society, there were indications already then that 
‘the profound sense of shock engendered by the nights of violence in April 2007 
has served to engender a more meaningful public debate over how to resolve the 
continued challenges of ‘multicultural integration’’ (Smith 2008: 426). But what 
kind of an impact had this debate had by 2013? In so far as continued Othering of 
Russia is part of post-2004 ‘normality’, what then are the implications for 
constructions of ‘normality’ in the domestic sphere, given the presence of a large 
Russian-speaking population? These complex perceptions among people in Estonia 
regarding these events and their possible wider implications is one of the topics 
explored in this study as well (see Chapter 7). 
The 2005 Moscow commemoration event and the 2007 Bronze Soldier incident are 
also used as an empirical example in Maria Mälksoo’s book ‘The Politics of 
Becoming European: A study of Polish and Baltic Post-Cold War security 
imaginaries’ (2010) based on her PhD thesis where she seeks to demonstrate how 
memory politics in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland is used to push for their 
narrative of the events of the Second World War in an attempt to be recognised 
as part of Europe the way they have always depicted themselves to be. Another 
addition to the relatively extensive list of academic research focusing on memory 
politics in the region is ‘Memory and Pluralism in the Baltic States’ edited by Eva-
Clarita Pettai (2011) where a further element of this debate is brought in by Wulf 
and Grönholm who look at the role of historians in generating meaning in Estonia.  
The so-called ‘war of monuments’ has also been incorporated into Jörg Hackmann 
and Marko Lehti’s edited volume ‘Contested and Shared Places of Memory: History 
and Politics in North Eastern Europe’ (2010) where the removal of the German-
uniformed monument at Lihula in 2004 and the relocation of the red army 
monument in Tallinn in 2007 sparked an extensive discussion and contextualisation 
by David J. Smith, Siobhan Kattago and Marko Lehti and others. They demonstrate 
the importance of war monuments and contested past as part of memory politics 
and identity, especially in a divided society such as Estonia. 
The presentation of history is interwoven in the core concepts of national identity, 
like state and nation. As stated, while the Baltics and the international community 
view the annexation of the republics to the Soviet Union as an illegal occupation, 
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Russia denies the illegality of it and in this sense views the occupation as voluntary 
incorporation into the Soviet Union. This gap in historical narratives creates the 
divisions in perceptions with the ‘West’ and is one of the main sources of Russia’s 
drift in the anti-Western direction (Fofanova and Morozov 2009: 26). And the 
deterioration of relations with the West includes deterioration of relations with 
Estonia as a subset. The ‘domestic politics of memory’ (for further on this see 
Onken 2007) of prior independent statehood and nationalities policy of the 
occupational era constitute a crucial starting point for ‘them’ versus ‘us’ identity 
construction, which is not merely an external boundary but cuts across Estonia’s 
society.  
The explicit engagement with history is a striking feature in the identity politics 
in the former Soviet republics. In all cases, but especially here, the ‘temporal’ 
and the ‘spatial’ cannot be so easily distinguished or disentangled. Contrasting 
ideologies and cultural geographies as Estonia’s escape from Russia play an 
important role in the pattern of self-narration (Darieva and Kaschuba 2007: 22). 
Estonian elites are striving to reject the old, canonised borders of a limited 
definition of ‘Estonia’ and aim to find new frames for identification in 
geographical, historical or intellectual ‘spaces’ (Brüggemann 2007: 147). It is not 
surprising, in that sense, that Estonia, after being largely conceived as part of the 
East in Western Europe and as ‘our West’ within the Soviet Union, tried 
discursively to become part of the Scandinavian North at the end of the 1990s 
(Darieva and Kaschuba 2007: 22). This is a part of perceptions of ‘spatial 
normality’ at the time, which, as the analysis here shows, is still relevant in 
ideationally placing Estonia in the post-accession perspective, albeit in an 
adjusted manner given the changed context. 
The conflicting narratives surrounding the erection and relocation of monuments 
in 2004 and 2007 offer a fascinating example of the role history narratives play in 
Estonia-Russia bilateral relations as well as in the broader international scene 
(Kasekamp and Brüggemann 2009: 51). Estonia’s ‘new identity’ had become more 
than just ‘escaping the East’. Rather, Brüggemann coins the desired perception of 
being seen as a victim of history as ‘an escape from history’ (2007: 153). He states 
that Estonian everyday politics places Estonia as either being a country of contact 
between the East and the West or as a country located at the eastern edge of 
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Western security structures (Brüggemann 2007: 153), also referred to as the 
‘liminal’ character of Estonia (see Mälksoo 2010). For Estonia, becoming part of 
the West also meant becoming its eastern frontier (Brüggemann 2007: 144). 
Additionally, the hard securitised border with Russia has remained post-EU and 
NATO enlargement, giving basis for continuation of a threatened border state 
narrative which was important for purposes of domestic political legitimation.  
Complementing this, Darieva and Kaschuba’s edited volume ‘Representations on 
the Margins of Europe: Politics and Identities in the Baltic and South Caucasian 
States’ (2007), focuses on how different identity strategies, arguments of history, 
and figurative sights of collective remembering are constructed and represented 
in an attempt to balance the contradictory logics of local identity politics and 
‘becoming European’ in South Caucasia and Baltic States (Darieva and Kaschuba 
2007: 12). This is a rare and solid addition to the ethnographic approach in 
understanding identity politics in the Baltic and South Caucasus. Even though the 
emphasis and most of the ethnographic work is conducted in Armenia, they have 
brought to bear how much an in-depth investigation into people’s perceptions can 
contribute to our understanding of the ‘margins’ of Europe.  
While most of the studies focusing on Estonia’s identity-building process and its 
relation to Russia and history have done so by examining the dominant discourses, 
media outlets, archives and survey results and emphasis has been placed on the 
elites, there remain only a limited few ethnographic or grassroots level works out 
there.  
An important contribution to the ethnographic research in identity studies in 
Estonia was the study done by David J. Smith and Stuart Burch in Narva in 2006-
2008 (2012). By utilising an ethnographic approach to the case and addressing a 
wide range of identity markers in Estonia, they received a more complex 
perspective of the city’s identity politics than commonly put forward in the 
literature. The results pointed more to hybridity rather than nationality as the 
defining characteristic of identity politics within the city. This research has been 
influenced by their methodological approach as they used photo elicitation in 
uncovering the complex identity constructions on the ground in Narva.  
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There is little denying that memory politics forms a significant part of Estonia’s 
identity constructions and this is constantly accentuated in the dominant 
discourse, the media, politicians etc. However, these studies focus mostly on how 
the Second World War and the Soviet era has influenced Estonia after joining the 
EU and leave the present-day people in Estonia and their idea of national identity 
largely unexplored.  
 
3.3 CONTEXTUALISING RUSSIA AS THE OTHER 
The theoretical underpinnings of this research and identity construction were 
discussed in the previous chapter, and the relevance of Others in Estonian national 
identity construction clearly outlined. It is therefore not surprising that the focus 
in academic research thus far has been on the threatening qualities of Russia as 
the Other in understanding Estonian identity and a lot of emphasis placed on the 
contradicting history narratives discussed in the previous section. Indeed, issues 
of security have not lost their relevance for present day research focusing on 
Estonia’s relations with its Eastern neighbour. 
Fofanova and Morozov have argued that while Russia’s identity had been 
developed in the civic direction, with the Russian nation being imagined as a 
political community including all citizens of Russia, this same civic nationalism 
presupposes a clear-cut differentiation between those who belong and those who 
do not (2009: 22). However, Vladimir Putin's regime moved this idea of statism 
towards ethnic nationalism, to oversimplify this complex issue. As Taras Kuzio 
(2015: 165) notes, Vladimir Putin's nation‐building policies promoted ‘an 
alternative neo‐Soviet, ethnic and imperial‐Great Power’ national identity, which 
has also become a basis for Putin’s very high approval ratings. Emil Pain (2016) 
reiterates a similar point with his term of ‘imperial nationalism’ indicating a 
balancing act between acknowledging the leading role of the ethnic Russians in 
the Russian state, while at the same time emphasising perceptions of Russia as a 
great power to keep the multi-ethnic country together. The scope of this research 
does not allow for a more thorough examination of the issue, but this ‘imperial 
nationalism’ includes direct policy efforts to include Russian-speakers in the post-
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Soviet space and also elsewhere. Agnia Grigas (2016: 10) has listed Russia’s 
‘reimperialisation’ policy trajectory towards Russians living in the territory of the 
former Soviet Union as soft power, humanitarian policies, compatriot policies, 
information warfare, offering passports, protection by military means, and 
annexation. Some of these hostile policies which have been directed towards 
Russian-speakers in Estonia to keep them in its ‘sphere of influence’ create 
grounds for the securitisation of relationship with Russia. 
Putin’s Russia defined itself as not only the legal successor, but also the 
geopolitical heir of the Soviet Union, and this concept of continuer-state lies at 
the core of national identity and its attempt to (re)establish itself as a great power 
(Fofanova and Morozov 2009: 26). History most certainly did not end with the 
accession to EU and NATO, because the Russian Federation has mentally still not 
accepted that the Baltic States are no longer in its sphere of influence 
(Brüggemann 2007: 142). However, again, this topic has not been explored from 
a bottom-up standpoint. Even though this research is conducted pre-2014, and the 
current situation in which populism and Euroscepticism are on the rise across 
Europe and official Russian discourses are finding an ever broader reception, this 
situation makes it all the more timely and important to understand the 
perspectives of ‘ordinary people’. Uncovering how ordinary people think about 
the relationship with Russia in a post-EU context provides a useful addition not 
only to the academic literature but to broader debates. The same is equally if not 
more true with regard to how Estonia positions itself within an EU context in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis. 
 
3.4 EUROPE OR NOT QUITE EUROPE? 
With the insecurity related to Estonia being located on the ‘margins’ of Europe, 
this small state has been of interest to scholars looking into the identity and 
security dynamics of Estonia in relation to Russia, although more so prior to 
Estonia’s accession to NATO and EU.  
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Russia, however, is not the only Other in Estonia’s identity-construction. As 
Mälksoo argues, Estonia’s ‘liminal character’ questions the usual binary 
understanding of ‘Self’ and ‘Other’ and assumes a continuum of collective 
identifications with varying degrees of difference, rather than clear dichotomies 
(2010: 67). Kuus puts forward a similar idea from a broader angle claiming that 
Eastern Europe itself is one of the generalised 'Others' necessary for Europe's own 
self-image (Kuus 2007: 36), making the conflation process a lot more complex and 
providing security issues with varying degrees of Europeanness and Easternness 
(Kuus 2004: 36). This point is highly relevant in understanding the discursive, 
narrative structure of identity. The aim here is not to make a clear-cut distinction 
between different factors or measure how they affect the construction of identity, 
but rather to provide a backdrop for understanding the discursive construction of 
national identity and perceptions of ‘normality’ in Estonia. 
There has been a general consensus in studies focusing on Estonia that since the 
early 1990s the notion of securing a ‘return to Europe’ – and, more broadly, a 
‘return to the Western World’ (Smith 2003a: 156) has been one of the dominating 
features of the national discourse in Estonia (see Lehti 2006; Lehti and Smith 2003; 
Mälksoo 2010 etc.). But what have ‘Europe’ and the ‘Western World’ – themselves 
discursive constructs – meant in this context, and how have understandings shifted 
over time?  
The double enlargement of the European Union and NATO after the end of the 
Cold War was intended to erase at last the long-standing division of Europe 
between West and East and reunite the European continent as a cultural whole 
(Kuus 2007: 21). The concept of Europe is not a straightforward one and as Kuus 
brings out, it has functioned to maintain and reproduce the division between East 
and West (2007: 21).  
For the Baltic States, in the 1990s, the EU and NATO integration had been 
securitised with the utilisation of a discourse of ‘returning to Europe’ in 
constructing their post-Cold War identities to achieve also hard military security 
vis-a-vis Russia (Browning and Joenniemi 2004: 237). Membership in these 
organisations was equated with international acceptance of their desired 
identities (Browning and Joenniemi 2004: 237) and can be seen today in the effort 
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to impose one’s view of history at the international level as mentioned above. 
Among the professed reasons for such a construction was the hope that 
membership in Western organisations would reconstruct the relationship between 
Estonia and its eastern neighbour, forcing Russia to abandon its post-imperial 
manners and treat Estonia as a ‘normal’ country, rather than as part of its sphere 
of influence (Berg and Ehin 2009: 3). Part of this was to demonstrate Estonia as a 
‘normal’ European country whereby problems in the Estonian-Russian relationship 
are viewed as Russia’s unwillingness or inability to change. In addressing the core 
of Estonia’s foreign policy, integration to the West was seen as a necessary prelude 
to the full ‘normalisation’ of relations with Russia (Smith 2003c: 64).  
This narrative was rather forcefully included in Estonian public debate. In 1994, 
Jüri Luik, Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs (1994-1995), in his speech ‘Quo Vadis 
Estonian Foreign Policy?’ put forward an equation of ‘Security equals Integration 
plus Normalisation’4. A similar idea was added by Estonia’s then president Lennart 
Meri, who said that ‘Normalisation for us means establishing the same kinds of 
relations with Russia as we enjoy with the United States or Germany or Sweden’5. 
On March 29, 2004 Estonia became an official member of NATO and on May 1st 
2004 Estonia was conferred membership in the European Union. While this 
concluded Estonia’s official integration into the West, it has been argued that 
Estonian-Russian relations did not reach the expected level of ‘normalisation’. On 
the contrary, there are voices arguing that since Estonia was conferred 
membership in these Western institutions, Estonian-Russian relations have even 
taken a more controversial turn (Mälksoo 2006: 279; Berg and Ehin 2009: 29). 
As demonstrated earlier, it is difficult to extract the temporal from the spatial in 
narratives of ‘normality’ as these perceptions also conflate. Europe as a temporal 
process for Estonia is evident in the ‘return to Europe’, which has been a perpetual 
process for Eastern Europe, even though it is geographically part of Europe 
(Mälksoo 2006: 276). This ‘Europe but not Europe’ (Wolff 1994 in Mälksoo 2006: 
                                                          
4 Opening remarks by Jüri Luik, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Estonia at the Estonian Foreign 
Service Annual Ambassadorial Conference, 11-12 September 1994, Roosta, Estonia; 
http://www.vm.ee/en/news/quo-vadis-estonian-foreign-policy (accessed 20.11.2015) 
5 Address by Lennart Meri, President of the Republic of Estonia at the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace 19 October 1995, Washington, D.C.; https://vp1992-
2001.president.ee/eng/k6ned/K6ne.asp?ID=9360 (accessed 20.11.2015) 
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276) has left an imprint on the foreign and security policies of the Baltic States 
and designates ‘Othering’ and exclusion of Russia (Mälksoo 2006: 277; Browning 
and Joenniemi 2004: 236).  
And the spatial perception of belonging to Europe can be seen as interconnected 
to the temporal process. Merje Kuus in her book ‘Geopolitics Reframed’ (2007) 
refers to the increasing importance of fluid categories in determining the 
boundaries of Europe. Kuus, writing shortly after the 2004 accession, argues that 
even after the enlargement, the notion of ‘East of Europe’ did not disappear and 
that in order to better understand the construction of ‘Europe’, the question 
rather remained as to how claims and assumptions about Europe and the East 
functioned in political debates and policy-making (2007: 21-22). She argues that 
Europe was bound up with a narrative of Eastern Europe being insecure due to 
external pressures while at the same time being a source of insecurity for Europe 
as a whole (2007: 22). The categories for defining East and West had become more 
fluid – reconfigured into an East-West slope of Eastness and Europeanness (2007: 
22). Kuus also states that the enlargement processes were fuelling a tripartite 
division of the continent into the European core; the accession countries, which 
are not yet fully European but in tune with the European project, and the Eastern 
peripheries of Europe, effectively excluded from membership (2007: 22). This 
division was also used by the accession countries to stress their insecurity and to 
shift the insecurity to Europe proper by inscribing Eastness further East. The 
double enlargement is therefore working in tandem with the notion of a 
multitiered Europe in which Europeanness declines as one moves east (Kuus 2007: 
22). Kuus also brings out that the notion that some places in Europe were more 
European than others (usually located either in the Western as opposed to the 
Eastern part of the continent) was still the commonsense container of the EU and 
NATO enlargement discourse (2007: 37). Using Estonia as an example, she focuses 
more on the ever-growing ambiguity of security claims in Europe. Again, the 
relevance of margins in constructing geopolitical discourses is accentuated. As can 
be seen from this study, in the case of Estonia, there has been a shift in how 
people there inscribe to Europeanness with the security issues having diminished 
and the economic, pragmatic aspects becoming more pertinent nearly a decade 
after officially ‘returning to Europe’.  
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Adding to the previously mentioned research regarding defining the boundaries of 
Europe, the ‘liminal’ character of Estonia is emphasised also by Maria Mälksoo. 
She states that ‘liminality is an especially appropriate notion for examining the 
historically peripheral Baltic States’ self-positioning in Europe’ (M̈älksoo 2009: 66). 
In an earlier publication, Mälksoo investigates the Baltic States’ self-positioning 
within the European foreign policy, by developing this notion of ‘Europe but not 
quite Europe’ even further and demonstrates that the existential politics in the 
Baltic States was far from becoming ‘normal politics’, defined in terms of 
desecuritisation (Mä̈lksoo 2006: 275).  
Different perspectives have surfaced, looking at the importance of security within 
the regionalisation theme (Browning and Joenniemi 2004), focusing on the 
receding threat emanating from Russia (Noreen and Sjöstedt 2004) or 
understanding the relevance of ‘societal security’ within the Baltic context 
(Löfgren and Herd 2001).  
Another study focusing on Estonia’s ‘return to the West’ is edited by Marju 
Lauristin, Peeter Vihalemm, Karl Erik Rosengren, and Lennart Weibull and titled 
‘Return to the Western World: Cultural and Political Perspectives on the Estonian 
Post-Communist Transition’ (1997). Using survey data they claim that Estonia 
somehow maintained elements of Western culture throughout the Soviet 
occupation and passed those sensibilities down through generations. However, 
they also point out differences between value structures in Estonia compared to 
other Western or Northern countries. Comparing values with Swedes in 1991, they 
found that health, world peace, family safety, true friendship and happiness were 
all equally important for the groups. However, at the same time the Swedes held 
high regard for so-called postmodern values such as honesty, freedom, fairness, 
mature love and internal harmony, while for the Estonians accomplishment, self-
realisation, wealth and power were important values Lauristin et al. 1997 in Realo 
2017: 63). This point is argued also by Kuus as she states that Estonia desires a 
‘return to the West’ and to be recognised as an integral part of the Western 
cultural realm was the driving force of its foreign and security policies (Kuus 2007: 
39).  
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The ‘return to Europe’ narrative defines not only what Estonia is but just as 
importantly what it is not (Feldman 2001: 10). Throughout the 1990s, a variety of 
contentious issues dominated Russian-Baltic relations, starting from the question 
of the withdrawal of the Russian troops and the status of the Russophone 
population and the Russian Orthodox Church to agreeing on trade and transit 
issues, definition of borders and the Baltic aspirations to join the EU and NATO, 
to name a few (Berg and Ehin 2009: 3). Berg and Ehin argue that one of the key 
sources for contention in the post-accession period (up to 2009 when the book was 
published) was the normative gap between an increasingly authoritarian Russia 
and the Western community of liberal-democratic states (2009: 7). This refers to 
a West understood in terms of law and order versus the chaotic and arbitrary East 
(Brüggemann 2007: 144). Kuus (2007) also highlights a similar point in stating that 
Oriental despotism, linked to the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union, was 
considered an essential attribute of the Russian mentality (Kuus 2007: 23).  
This perceived dividing line between the East and the West – or where Europe ends 
– was further consolidated in Estonia when Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of 
Civilizations’ was published in 1996. Huntington drew the line ending the Western 
civilization on the Narva River between Estonia and Russia, placing Estonia firmly 
in ‘Europe’. As Kuus (2007: 52) has pointed out as well, one cannot underestimate 
the importance of this work in Estonia – it formed the conceptual backbone for 
Estonian political speeches, policy analysis and academic research. Huntington’s 
work has been influential in further consolidating Estonian national-identity 
construction in terms of firmly placing Estonia within the European realm while 
providing a scientific basis for Othering Russia. It was translated into Estonian in 
1999 and had a foreword written by the Estonian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Kuus 
2007: 54).  
Going back to the wider geopolitical elements in understanding Estonian 
‘normality’, there remains limited ethnographic or bottom-up work done in this 
area, even though the need for such an approach has been acknowledged. In some 
of her later work (2010, 2011), Merje Kuus has emphasised the need for a more 
varied approach in understanding the geopolitical identities. She argues for the 
use of ethnographic methods in receiving a better understanding of the 
interconnections between geopolitical practices and the agents of these practices 
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(2011). One of the few contributors to the field of Estonian identity politics who 
conducted interviews for his research, is Pami Aalto. In his book ‘Constructing 
Geopolitics in post-Soviet Estonia’ (2003), which adds a subjective aspect of 
political space to this field of research, Aalto has suggested methodological 
pluralism in identity studies and uses Q-methodology to develop an understanding 
of the subjective viewpoints of Estonians and Russophones (Russian-speaking 
population) in relation to security and identity (Aalto 2003: 575-576). This 
research uses a slightly different method to also explore subjective viewpoints on 
dominant constructions of ‘normality’ (and ‘abnormality’) in a post-2004 context. 
Aalto finds that there is not only a single security/identity puzzle but many and 
that the connection between identity and security is neither loose nor tight but 
varied (Aalto 2003: 587-589). The multiple layers of inter-community identities in 
Estonia have also been addressed by, among others, Triin Vihalemm (2007), Raivo 
Vetik et al. (2006), David D. Laitin (2003).  
The interethnic relations or themes of minority rights in Estonia (discussed also in 
section 1.4) have received their share of academic attention (in addition to the 
already mentioned, see Smith 2002a, 2003b, Galbreath 2005, Lauristin and 
Heidmets 2002, Pettai 1995, 2000, 2001, 2006, Pettai and Hallik 2002, Pettai and 
Kallas 2009, Brosig 2006, Sasse 2008, Agarin and Regelmann 2012, Vihalemm and 
Masso 2003, 2007, Vihalemm and Kalmus 2009, Nimmerfeldt 2009, Sjöstedt 2018 
etc.). These studies take on a variety of issues related to national minority and 
interethnic issues in Estonia ranging from structural and institutional to political 
and cultural, but the topic can be said to have been of particular interest to 
scholars prior to Estonia joining the EU. However, within this wider debate, 
scholarly attention to Estonian language policy, as one of the main constitutive 
elements in Estonian national identity construction for integration continues to be 
examined in terms of education policy (Zabrodskaya 2015; Kemppainen, Hilton 
and Rannut 2015; Soll, Salvet, Masso 2015; Soll 2015 etc.), labour market and the 
already mentioned consumer practices (Leppik and Vihalemm 2015; Keller and 
Vihalemm 2005; Seliverstova 2009), and cultural events (e.g. Laulupidu) (Pawłusz 
2018) in a variety of academic fields. This research does not aim to contribute to 
the detailed accounts of interethnic relations in Estonia per se, but rather bring 
forward the perception of ‘normality’ through constructions of national identity 
and examine the possible variations within these understandings. Chapter 7 will 
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explore in more detail what constitutes ‘normal’ interethnic relations in the 
context of a ‘European’ Estonia still defined in relation to a Russian ‘Other’. 
However, it is not the only aspect discussed in relation to the more internal 
essence of Estonian national identity constructions. As this research 
demonstrates, it is important to move beyond the ethnic dimension, which has 
been dominant in studies of Estonian nation-building to date, and also explore 
other important themes and questions that have arisen post-2004. 
 
3.5 NEW LABELS AND LOOKING AHEAD 
In addition and conflated to a degree into the core themes of national identity 
constructions in Estonia of Othering Russia, conflicting history narratives and 
‘returning to Europe’, Estonia has had several labels attached to its self-
definitions: Baltic, Nordic, Western, ‘new Europe’, ‘not quite Europe’ etc. Some 
of them internally sought after and others externally attached.  
The ‘Baltic’ label used to be somewhat less appealing to Estonia and the rest of 
the Baltic States after regaining independence since it was seen as a continuation 
of Easternisation and as a part of the Soviet legacy (Lehti 2006: 72). However, 
since joining the European Union and NATO, the ‘Baltic’ label has regained its 
usage and is used rather in terms of forming a distinct interest group within the 
European Union (Lehti 2007: 144).  
The Baltic label has come back to demonstrate the new, adaptable innovative 
countries in the European sphere (Lehti 2007: 140). Also, Estonia has made the 
attempt to establish itself as an innovative country with its IT sector (Lehti 2007: 
140). This ‘attempt’ is still an ongoing process with the IT dimension utilised in 
Estonia as part of nation-branding efforts (see Jordan 2014; Tammpuu and Masso 
2018). This mostly internally attached image of E-stonia will receive some further 
discussion under the wider economic aspects of everyday lives discussed in 
Chapter 7. These economic aspects and what could be constituted as ‘economic 
normality’ in Estonia are especially relevant to explore in the context of the 
economic crisis. 
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As already discussed in Chapter 1, being a Nordic country was an appealing 
prospect for Estonia in the 1990s. Marko Lehti and David J. Smith have edited a 
volume ‘Post-Cold War Identity Politics: Northern and Baltic Experiences’ (2003) 
unfolding the spatial and identity politics of the Baltic States and Northern 
European area by focusing on regionality, boundaries and history. In general, the 
volume refutes essentialist theorising of identity-construction and gives 
interesting perspectives for understanding the relevance of ‘new’ Post-Cold War 
identities in the Baltic States and Finland. In the case of Estonia, the volume 
focuses on the branding of Estonia as another Nordic country. It brings out that 
even though the Nordic dimension had assumed prominence in the speeches and 
writing of Estonian political actors in the 1990s (Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Toomas Hendrik Ilves in particular), the narrative did not seem to correspond to 
the international reality in the eyes of the Estonian public (2003: 185). While co-
operation with the Nordic countries was seen as very important, this did not 
necessarily mean that Estonia was regarded as part of the Nordic grouping – a 
point of view that was shared by the Nordic countries (2003: 185).  
This notion of becoming a Nordic country can be said to have lost some of its 
relevance after Estonia’s accession to the European Union in 2004, since it was 
mostly used instrumentally to support the overriding aim of getting into the EU. 
In the post-accession period, it can be argued that it has remained a useful 
category but its function changed and is incorporated here from a slightly different 
perspective, looking at the Northern and Nordic dimension through Estonia’s self-
positioning in Europe (see Chapter 5, and also discussion in Chapter 7).  
However, the Nordic dimension in Estonian identity-construction has certainly not 
disappeared entirely. Anu Realo (2017), who has compared the values in Estonia 
and Nordic countries, has pointed out that the rational-secular values, which place 
Estonia within the Nordic group were dominant still in 2011. Individual freedom 
and the right to make one’s own choices were seen as core values. However, the 
emphasis was still rather on values related to survival than freedom of expression. 
Estonians had a lot less trust, tolerance and happiness than Swedes or Finns and 
emphasised more the fight against rising prices and maintaining order in the state 
rather than freedom of speech and the possibility to have a say in the country’s 
matters (Realo 2017: 63). Realo (2017: 63) describes this as Estonians having one 
81 
 
foot in the Nordic countries and one in the Soviet past. However, she (2017) also 
notes that the Estonian perception of the Nordic does not coincide with what the 
Nordic is envisioned to entail in these respective countries, especially in terms of 
socially caring world view, something certainly not promoted by neoliberal 
economic policies that the governments mostly carried in Estonia. A 
reconfiguration of the idea of Estonia being Nordic – the New Nordic - was put 
forward in 2015 by the liberal Reform Party who was in power at the time and 
their election platform at the time is a good indication of what Estonia as a Nordic 
country was envisioned to be. 
“This means a country that has achieved the Nordic standard of living and 
safety but continues to hold top positions in the world for personal and 
economic liberties. A country that is technologically more dynamic and 
flexible than the old Nordic countries. It is a country firmly defended 
through independent defence willingness and capabilities, and with strong 
alliance ties across the Atlantic. It is a country with the fastest economic 
growth rates and where personal liberties and grand narratives are 
prioritised. As a country where having three kids in the family is the new 
normality and the population is growing. The New Nordic is well protected, 
economically successful, guaranteeing equal opportunity, valuing family 
and carrying the European values. We are no longer balancing between the 
East and West, we have made our choice!” (Reform Party 20156) 
The perception of Nordic can be seen as framed by the neoliberal paradigm which 
goes against the socially caring world view but is in line here with the more 
specific nationalist neoliberalism in Estonia discussed in the following section. 
Another recurring term used along with several others in defining Estonia is ‘new 
Europe’. A volume edited by David J. Smith ‘The Baltic States and their region: 
New Europe or Old?’ (2005) represents an attempt to locate the Baltic Sea region 
countries within the European identity and as the title suggests, looks at the 
identity construction through the debate of ‘old’ versus ‘new’ Europe. As to 
Estonia (and Latvia), Marko Lehti in his chapter disentangles the central elements 
of identity construction in Estonia by looking, again, at the narratives of history. 
Lehti claims that this construction is being challenged by the idea of ‘new Europe’ 
in an effort to save the unity of the old West, which for so long had formed a state 
of ‘normality’ in Estonian and Latvian political discourses (Lehti 2005: 106-107).  
                                                          
6 Reform Party 2015 (https://www.reform.ee/uus-pohjamaa), accessed 03.01.2016 
82 
 
However, Estonia’s politicians have not been satisfied with Estonia being labelled 
‘new Europe’ and much less ‘false Europe’. This latter term is used by Iver 
Neumann (1996) in referring to Russia’s efforts to discredit the Baltic States in the 
eyes of the West. These terms have been regarded as tools of Othering or at least 
of marginalisation (Lehti 2006: 70). In another article by Lehti, he argues that 
there has been a shift in how the Baltic States define themselves. Rather than 
accepting external labels like ‘new Europe’ on themselves, they have started to 
aspire to a voice of their own (Lehti 2007: 128). Being in the EU has provided 
Estonian elites a stronger position to argue for the Europe based on their 
understandings of ‘normality’ (e.g. ‘more Western than the West’ in relation to 
understanding Russia (see Chapter 6) and ‘true’ Europe in terms of adopting 
austerity measures (see Chapter 5)).  
In Lehti’s view the answers to political goals are no longer as simple and obvious 
as they were in the ‘heroic age’ of struggle towards the West (Lehti 2007: 137). 
Whereas during the first fifteen years of independence, ‘normality’ for Estonia 
rested in European Union and NATO, then after joining these structures, the 
‘West’ has lost its significance for the Balts (Lehti 2007: 136). In fact, the old West 
which the Balts believed they were joining seemed simultaneously to be fading 
away (Lehti 2007: 138-140). Lehti’s point that Estonia joined the EU and NATO at 
a time when the West no longer appeared fixed, but rather as something ‘fluid 
and contested’ (Lehti 2007: 137-138) also supports Kuus’ argument on varying 
degrees of Europeanness (see section 3.4). This demonstrates the processual 
nature of self-identification, which cannot be solely examined on one level since 
it is never simply a country or community whose perception of identity shifts and 
cannot therefore be taken out of the whole system to be examined separately 
from it. This research therefore provides valuable insights into the discourses 
Estonia has deployed as it tried to customise a fluid Europe to fit its own 
requirements as well as how people understand the overall processes on an 
everyday level. 
As briefly stated earlier, a certain role in Estonia’s depiction within Europe is also 
played by the Russian Federation whose authorities have accused the Balts of 
being not only ultra-nationalistic and xenophobic but also hostile and Russophobic 
casting them outside the liberal and democratic values of ‘Europe’ (Lehti 2006: 
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76). Through that Russia was trying to increase Estonia’s ‘alterity’ within the ‘new 
Europe’ while reducing its own (see section 6.2.2).   
Lehti also emphasises the Baltic States’ allegiance to the United States of America 
and how the Euro-Atlantic space has become fundamental to Estonia’s self-
identification (Lehti 2007: 137). The East-West dichotomy has lost its relevance 
as the American perspective on the eastern border is not so important any longer, 
and what matters is the war on terror that has so far remained a distant issue for 
the Balts (Lehti 2007: 139). However, Estonia and the other Baltic States still had 
to contribute to the ‘war on terror’ because it is their ‘moral obligation to be part 
of the Western community’ (Lehti 2007: 139). Thus, the understandings regarding 
the West are not always congruent between ‘new Europe’ and the United States, 
even if this might appear to be the case at first sight (Lehti 2007: 139).  
 
3.6 THE NEOLIBERAL PARADIGM  
As already mentioned in the introductory chapter (section 1.6), economic issues 
have also played their part as a fundamental element of identity construction in 
Estonia. Estonia’s so-called economic miracle (Laar 2007) has been highlighted by 
the political elite and utilised to demonstrate the country’s uniqueness and 
acceptance by the West. The general consensus regarding neoliberal economic 
policy in Estonia certainly forms an important part of the national identity 
constructions with the pragmatic approach from this framework carrying through 
to its foreign policy – including relations with Russia. The unquestionable reliance 
on the free-market agenda has been a part of a top-down discourse of ‘normality’ 
shaped by the experience of the 1990s, but how is this internalised and negotiated 
by the wider population? This is one of the questions I explore in this thesis. 
Estonia’s superior economic performance during the first transition decade has 
generated much interest and a variety of different explanations (Norkus 2007: 23). 
Some explanatory factors for this success have included Estonia’s macroeconomic 
choices after independence (including the pressures from the international 
organisations), its economic structure upon gaining independence, Estonia’s 
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geographical position and proximity to Finland (see Norgaard 2000), its cultural 
and social capital accumulated during the Soviet era and prior to that (Norkus 
2007). It has been claimed that Estonians were more receptive to the neoliberal 
reforms implemented in the beginning of 1990s due to the cultural background 
stemming from the pre-Soviet era and going back as far as the 18th-19th century 
version of Protestantism, which has been viewed as a contributing cultural factor 
to how capitalism was consolidated in Estonia (Norkus 2007). While Lauristin and 
Vihalemm (2009) have analysed how the nature of interaction between external 
and internal actors can have some explanatory power in the changes that the 
transition period brought about, Feldman and Sally (2002), see Estonian 
exceptionalism and economic success to lie in the ‘bottom up’ or ‘home-grown’ 
reforms, rather than external pressure.  
Even though several issues are raised in the academic literature about Estonia’s 
economic performance, the Estonian media and general public have been 
generally supportive of the neoliberal reforms implemented in the beginning of 
1990s. The Estonian transition culture favoured individualistic values, economic 
success and competitiveness and the Estonian right-wing parties combined this 
with a populist nationalist appeal, which enabled them to secure their hegemonic 
position (Lauristin and Vihalemm 2009: 20).  
The common-sense of neoliberal hegemony has not been seriously tested or 
questioned in Estonia even after ‘successfully’ transforming into a Western market 
state and joining the EU structures over a decade ago. While the economic crisis, 
that hit Estonia relatively hard in 2008-2009, brought about protests and calls for 
change in the financial sector in various other European countries (e.g. Greece, 
Portugal, Spain), it had few significant political consequences in Estonia. Estonia 
adopted restrict austerity measures, which did not lead to any significant 
domestic unrest and, instead, the perception that Estonia managed a successful 
fiscal consolidation earned it the image of the shining poster-boy of crisis 
management (Kattel and Raudla 2013: 435). As Thorhallsson and Kattel point out, 
the political crisis in Estonia was relatively small, the public protest was almost 
non-existent (despite unemployment reaching near 20% in 2009), and the coalition 
that ruled Estonia into and throughout the crisis was elected back into office in 
March 2011, post-crisis (the coalition gained 56 seats out of 101) (2013: 94). The 
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consequence of the crisis can therefore be interpreted as strengthening the 
neoliberal and non-corporatist political paradigm (Thorhallsson and Kattel 2013: 
94). They provide several reasons for why it turned out as it did in Estonia: 
“First, the government was extremely successful in depicting the crisis as 
exogenous in nature and thus was able to argue that Estonia’s economic 
policy and political landscape essentially needed no changes.  
Second, the only substantial policy change foreseen by the government was 
to enforce the entrance into the euro zone, which, in turn, made massive 
fiscal retrenchment necessary. Thus, the government was able to offer one 
overarching aim and direction for political discussions during the crisis, pre-
empting and silencing any opposing voices in the process.  
Third, coalition politicians as well as members of the wider political elite, 
such as the president, stigmatized very early on any open political protest 
as unpatriotic and, in essence, as akin to violent street protest by Russian 
youth following the removal of the Bronze Soldier statue (commemorating 
World War II) from downtown Tallinn (the first violent protest since 1991) 
in April 2007. This effectively stigmatized any active public voicing of 
discontent.  
Fourth, as argued above, given the circumstances of Estonia’s economic 
and fiscal policy choices during the past two decades, and (non-)evolution 
of policy skills accordingly, the government had effectively cornered itself 
into a situation where it had only one option; to enforce euro adoption by 
any means possible. This had become the coalition’s guarantee of survival 
and, indeed, following the successful and widely lauded euro adoption in 
January 2011, the coalition won elections in March 2011.” (Thorhallsson 
and Kattel 2013: 95). 
The points put forward by Thorhallsson and Kattel encapsulate the recurrent 
tendency to securitise any kind of economic counter-narrative. This can be 
explained by the nationalist neoliberalism (see also section 1.6) that had 
developed in Estonia. Kattel and Raudla (2013: 442-443) have brought out the 
main characteristics of nationalist neoliberalism, which is reflected in a very open 
economy with governments looking for further ways for liberalisation and 
deregularisation, low personal and company income tax, relatively flexible labour 
markets, high level of direct foreign investments, relatively stable governments, 
increasing importance of the core executive with weak to non-existing social 
partnerships, increasing importance of external ideas and policies in the sphere 
of economic policies, and language and cultural policies favouring respective 
majority nations. They point out that somewhat ironically there are almost no 
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nationalist elements in Estonian (and other Baltic States’) economic policies but 
rather it is the functioning of the markets that is seen to deliver also national 
survival (Kattel and Raudla 2013: 443). This nationalist neoliberalism led to the 
emergence of decidedly simple polities in the Baltic states, which led to the 
evolution of specific institutional interactions and policy capacities and implicit 
politicisation of the executive branch in terms of their adherence to the basic 
tenets of nationalist neoliberalism (Kattel and Raudla 2013: 443). In Estonia this 
resulted in a specific elite building with a discernible esprit de corps and ‘wide 
policy goals based on some form of implicit social consensus, such as entry into 
the EU and NATO, played a crucial role in mobilising the emerging elite and 
justifying the beliefs and value systems reflected in nationalist neo-liberalism’ 
(Kattel and Raudla 2013: 443). However, at same time the role of social partners 
in policy coordination remained undeveloped (Kattel and Raudla 2013: 443). The 
dominance of the neoliberal paradigm in guiding politics in Estonia has been 
established by these studies. An interesting question becomes how this nationalist 
neoliberal paradigm frames relations with Russia after joining the EU and NATO, 
which, as demonstrated above, failed to ‘normalise’ the relations and themes of 
security still form a part of Russia as the Other in Estonian identity-building. 
The effect the neoliberal paradigm has had in relation to Russia has been 
elaborated by Agnia Grigas in her book ‘The Politics of Energy and Memory 
between the Baltic States and Russia’ (2013) where as part of the study she looks 
at how business interests have influenced the course of foreign policy making in 
all three Baltic States. She claims that Russian business lobby has been more 
marginal in Estonia than in the other two Baltic States which can be explained to 
a degree by the firmly rooted neoliberal economic policy. Grigas argues that there 
has indeed been a more general shift towards pragmatism in relations with Russia 
– a point which – as we will see – is supported by the research at hand. One has to 
keep in mind though that both Grigas’ argument and the data collected for this 
study predate Russia’s occupation of Crimea and the conflict in the Donbass 
region, which is seen here to constitute the start of a ‘new normality’ in Europe. 
However instructing and relevant for understanding Estonian national identity 
through the neoliberal paradigm, these different interpretations have yet to be 
explored through the grassroots perspectives, which is the aim of this research. 
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As the following analysis also shows, in a more nuanced manner, neoliberalism has 
become internalised in Estonia as a fundamental component of ontological 
security and ‘normality’. The neoliberal guiding principles – to which no 
alternative is seen in Estonia – are conflated with the previously discussed spatial 
and temporal dimensions of identity-construction and provide a complex context 
for negotiating various themes related to identity for people in Estonia.  
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
The chapter starts by providing some insights on ‘normality’ in relation to 
Estonia’s nation-building process starting from the beginning of 1990s. The wider 
over-arching concept of ‘normality’ has been furnished in this section with the 
various core themes of Estonian national identity brought forward by the bulk of 
research conducted on the topic since the 1990s. However, as also demonstrated 
throughout this chapter, the ethnographic and bottom-up approach has received 
fairly little attention and uncovering how ordinary people think about various 
identity-related themes in the post-EU context, deserves a more careful 
examination.  
The chapter situates the current study in relation to existing work on the question 
of national identity in contemporary Estonia and brings out the main themes 
explored in this field. These themes provide the context for addressing the post-
accession ‘normality’ in Estonia, and this research is guided by them. The thread 
running through this literature review demonstrate the spatial and temporal 
narratives in Estonian ‘normality’ mostly in the pre-accession era and addresses 
some of the changes within these narratives through previous research. First, it 
discusses the role of conflicting narratives of history with Russia and memory 
politics in general play in Estonia’s identity and how it frames the policy-making. 
Second, since identity is always constructed in relation to Other, the various 
Others of Estonia’s identity-building process are discussed. This includes the 
widely discussed threatening qualities of Russia as the Other, but also how the 
perceptions of Europe and the European Union guide Estonia’s self-positioning in 
the international sphere and how this in turn impacts upon people’s perceptions 
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of everyday life and through that ‘normality’ on a grassroots level. Third, it gives 
an overview of other labels attached, whether internally or externally, to 
Estonia’s self-definition. These include regional identification labels such as Baltic 
or Nordic, temporal concepts such as new Europe, and attempts to establish 
Estonia as the flexible, innovative and an economic success story within the new 
democracies of 1990s. Finally, the unquestionable neoliberal agenda which has 
been part of a top-down discourse of ‘normality’ in Estonia is discussed and a 
useful term of nationalist neoliberalism for understanding this paradigm in Estonia 
is brought explained to help frame the discussion around neoliberalism in the 
following empirical chapters.  
As demonstrated in the chapter, the ‘returning to Europe’, constructions of Russia 
as the Other in Estonia’s identity-building process and conflicting narratives of 
history emerge as the underlying themes, which have framed Estonia’s identity 
construction and shaped perceptions of ‘normality’. As stated earlier, these 
themes guided the methodology of this research, and this will be discussed next. 
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CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
At the risk of overemphasising the main premise of the methodology, the goal in 
this research is not to achieve objective reality, but to understand the Estonian 
post-accession ‘normality’ in relation to constructs of national identity by drawing 
upon multiple perceptions (Denzin and Lincoln 2008: 7). These multiple 
perceptions, or interpretations of these perceptions, are achieved in this research 
through conducting in-depth unstructured interviews. The interviews conducted 
for this research were not simply talk-based, but also incorporated a visual aspect 
- namely image elicitation. In this sense, the research at hand is not only 
significant for adding to the little-explored bottom-up perspective in the existing 
academic literature on Estonian national identity, but also for incorporating a 
novel approach in order to receive different, more expanded empirical data in 
comparison to what the more traditional understanding of a talk-based interview 
produces. The choice of images was guided by previous academic research and 
seen to largely depict the dominant discursive practices in Estonia on these topics 
and therefore provided a solid basis for exploring the relationship between the 
top-down narratives and everyday understandings. This was then supplemented 
by analysing the top-down media discourse in Estonia. 
This chapter provides an overview of how I approached the data collection stage 
of this research. It starts with developing an understanding of the strategic 
approach and outlines briefly the methods used for this research. It goes on to 
examine the theory behind conducting research interviews and provides an 
overview of the sample. It then continues with the discussion on how visual 
methodology can offer additional value to the data received through interviews 
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and provides a detailed overview of how the images were used for this particular 
research. It reflects on the interviewing process, provides insights into ethical 
considerations with this type of research and discusses my position as a researcher 
in this process. It also examines transcribing, translating and analysis conducted 
on the interview data. Since I used Estonian media to supplement the interview 
data, the top-down media discourse and its relevance for this research will be 
addressed in the last part of this chapter.  
 
4.2 STRATEGIC APPROACH  
Theory guides us in research and understanding how things fit together is 
fundamental to the research process (King and Horrocks 2010: 10-11). This 
research focuses on examining the thicker points of reference for ‘normality’ in 
relation to constructions of Estonian national identity and explores how these 
constructs have been produced, reproduced, internalised, contextualised and 
transformed by the people living in Estonia. The theoretical underpinnings for 
conducting this research are taken from the constructivist paradigm, discussed in 
the second chapter focusing on theoretical premises, which has firmly established 
its place in identity studies within the past two decades.  
Before delving further into the research methods used within the constructivist 
paradigm, I will first discuss the overall research strategy and methodology 
intrinsic to exploring the research problem at hand. Taking several steps back from 
the methods used directly for data-gathering and looking at the overall approach, 
then this research follows the abductive strategy of research which is peculiar to 
the social sciences (Blaikie 2000: 114). The abductive strategy as described by 
Norman Blaikie involves developing descriptions and constructing theory that is 
grounded in everyday activities and/or in the language and meanings of the social 
actors (Blaikie 2000: 91). It includes describing these activities and meanings and 
deriving categories and concepts to understand the problem at hand (Blaikie 2000: 
91). 
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Consistent with the social constructivist understanding and the abductive approach 
mentioned above, the theoretical premise for exploring the constructions of 
Estonian national identity comes from the ontological position that reality is not 
seen as something out there for people to interpret but it is rather created through 
interaction and intersubjective understandings of the social world.  
The social world is seen as the world interpreted and experienced by its members 
from the ‘inside’ (Blaikie 2000: 115) and should therefore be addressed on that 
level. Intersubjectivity is defined here as shared understandings of the social 
world. These understandings are developed in interactions with other members of 
the social world, and within the context of this research, the way these 
understandings are passed on to the researcher also belongs to the realm of 
intersubjectivity. It is the everyday beliefs and practices, mundane and taken for 
granted, which Norman Blaikie has termed unarticulated ‘background knowledge’, 
which have to be grasped and articulated by the social researcher in order to 
provide an understanding for these actions (Blaikie 2000: 115). Exploring this 
‘background knowledge’ or taken-for-granted perceptions is the basis for 
examining the points of reference of Estonian post-accession ‘normality’. 
Following the same logic, the epistemological premise of this study on Estonian 
national identity is the underlying idea that knowledge is socially constructed. This 
means that rather than objects having meaning in the world that exists 
independently from our conscious interpretations of them, our interpretations and 
representations construct objects (King and Horrocks 2010: 21). 
In short, in order to negotiate their way around their world and make sense of it, 
social actors have to interpret their activities and it is these meanings, embedded 
in language, that constitute their social reality (Blaikie 2000: 115). The aim here 
is to understand these social realities that have been produced and are 
continuously being reproduced. In order to develop insights into the Estonian 
‘imagined political community’, which is discursively constructed, and not 
completely consistent, stable and immutable, the bottom-up perspective taken in 
this study becomes a highly useful one in uncovering these complex social realities. 
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4.3 METHODS  
Following the theoretical underpinnings in Chapter 2 of how ‘normality’ is 
approached here and national identity constructed, the research strategy adopted 
here provides the best approach for gaining an understanding of the research 
questions explored in this thesis.  
How is 'normality' constructed and understood by people in Estonia in the 
post-accession context?  
- how did the relation between Estonia and the European Other 
change in constructions of Estonian identity during the first decade 
after accession to Western structures? 
- how did the mode of Othering Russia change in this new context? 
- how did people in Estonia negotiate the current ‘normality’ in their 
everyday perspective? 
However, there are several possible ways of obtaining data that would fit in this 
theoretical framework and the methods for approaching this highly complex 
subject play a crucial role in the final results achieved.  
As mentioned, I adopted a largely bottom-up approach for my research and 
utilised a combination of methods to answer the posed research questions with 
the aim of receiving complex in-depth data. First, secondary sources were used 
to provide a framework for how to approach my core questions. The main themes 
discussed in the bulk of previous research on Estonian national identity were 
extracted to help frame data collection from the ‘members inside this social 
world’ – i.e. the people in Estonia. 
The literature review in Chapter 2 provides a more extensive overview of the 
various themes in Estonian identity-building. Three wider themes were extracted 
from the previous research to guide my own data collection on the subject.  
▪ the often-repeated narrative of ‘return to Europe’;  
▪ Russia as the significant Other (with Europe as Other covered in the first 
theme);  
▪ conflicting history narratives. 
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These themes formed the basis for selecting certain key events, persons, objects 
generally seen as associated with these themes and the formed the grounds for 
choosing images from the media and other sources in order to provide a stimulus 
for discussion. While there are certainly other themes that have been addressed 
in prior research (as demonstrated in Chapter 3), these three have featured most 
prominently in the literature on Estonian national identity and, as said, were used 
to guide further data collection rather than an attempt to simply try to fill these 
with meaning through a bottom-up approach. Selecting images for discussion from 
the media and other sources based on these themes already provides a solid basis 
for exploring the relationship between the top-down narratives and everyday 
understandings.  
The second method I used was in-depth interviews with both Estonian- and 
Russian-speakers in Estonia. The data received through conducting interviews 
forms the most significant part of this research, with the other methods are 
supporting the preparation for the interviews and supplementing the analysis of 
these data. The interviewing process included a more novel visual component, 
which will be discussed in detail further in this chapter.  
Third, media analysis was conducted on Estonian daily papers to supplement the 
interview data in order to pull together a fuller picture of the top-down discourse. 
The media analysis serves an illustrative purpose for this research. I took certain 
key moments discussed in the academic literature and looked at how these were 
discussed in the Estonian media. The images drawn from the media and media 
texts themselves provided a good point of reference for analysing the results 
obtained from the interviews.  
Interviewing and media analysis will be discussed in this chapter with the main 
emphasis on interviewing and the visual methodology incorporated into the 
interviewing process. The already-mentioned themes emerging from the 
secondary sources will be addressed in more detail in the section on interviews, 
since this method provided a backdrop for preparing for the interviewing process. 
A method in a method in a sense. This chapter will also discuss the sampling 
process, issues with using three languages in research, reflect on my role as a 
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researcher in the interviewing process, and bring out some ethical considerations 
for conducting this kind of qualitative research.  
 
4.4 RESEARCH THROUGH INTERVIEWS 
In order to gain a better understanding of Estonian ‘normality’, the ‘inside’ view 
of the social world is explored in this thesis via in-depth interviews with Estonian- 
and Russian-speakers in Estonia. Following the ontological and epistemological 
underpinnings of this research, interviews provide a suitable means for addressing 
the research questions at hand, as the best starting point for understanding 
people’s constructions of reality is to ‘ask people and ask them in such a way that 
they can tell us in their terms and in depth, which addresses the rich context that 
is the substance of their meanings’ (Jones 2004: 258). 
The research interview is seen here as an inter-view where knowledge is 
constructed in the interaction between the interviewer and the interviewee (Kvale 
and Brinkmann 2008: 1). The interview is expected to elicit interpretations of the 
world, for it is itself an object of interpretation (Kvale and Brinkmann 2008: 163). 
However, these elicited interpretations of the world generate substantial data on 
key referents in national identity construction that deepen our understanding of 
the process and allow for more in-depth understanding of the Estonian post-
accession ‘normality’. 
The interpretation social actors have for their activities and meanings is 
embedded in language, so language has the potential to construct particular 
versions of reality, with each language constructing reality in its own way (Kvale 
1996: 43). The struggles of conducting research of this nature in three separate 
languages (Estonian, Russian and English), also considering the processes of 
translation and transcribing, will be discussed throughout the following sections 
of this chapter, as it can have a significant impact on research. 
Preparing for a research interview depends on the approach taken to the research 
question at hand. As discussed already, theoretically the principal idea behind the 
interviews for this research was to allow the respondents to discuss in depth the 
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various aspects of national identity in Estonia and through that explore their 
perceptions of ‘normality’. Most commonly in social research, a ‘look into’ the 
social worlds of the participants would be achieved through unstructured or semi-
structured interviews. For this research, I did not have a structured interview 
schedule, however, I used images to facilitate the interviewing process. The visual 
methodology and photo elicitation will be discussed in more length after I provide 
an overview of the sample 
 
4.5 SAMPLING 
Before starting the fieldwork, I had to consider who could constitute a respondent 
for this research. There are certain limitations to recruiting respondents in this 
case, but it is certainly not too restrictive. Within this qualitative paradigm and 
theoretical basis, a desirable respondent would be someone who has the ability 
to reflect on Estonia’s self-positioning and history, who is articulate, and who has 
the time and will to be interviewed (see Morse 1998: 73). I was looking for ‘rich’ 
data and possible different perspectives in Estonia. 
For drawing out similarities and possible differences and gaining the best possible 
explanations of the phenomena (Stake 1998: 102), I conducted 33 interviews with 
Estonian- and Russian-speakers in Estonia and Belgium (Brussels) between January 
2013 and January 2014. The interviews took place in various locations with people 
of different ages, occupations, background and gender, in order to gain a variety 
of perspectives. I deliberately chose a range of urban and rural locations, including 
some in a border setting. I conducted interviews in the border town Narva, which 
is predominantly Russian-speaking, did interviews in the South-Eastern Setomaa, 
which has a distinctive ethnic (Setos), linguistic (Seto language) and cultural 
setting, went to Muhu island in order to include the island perspectives with their 
distinctive culture and identity, and interviewed people in other rural parts of 
Estonia. As to the urban locations, over half of the interviews were held in Tallinn, 
where almost a third of the Estonian population is registered as living, and in 
Brussels with Estonian officials. The interviews with Estonian officials in Brussels 
were conducted with the expectation of incorporating a more top-down 
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perspective on Estonian ‘normality’ from ‘Europe’ (discussed in more detail just 
below). 
Out of the 33 
interviews, 14 were 
held in Tallinn with 
both Estonian- and 
Russian-speakers, 5 
were conducted in 
Narva with Russian-
speakers, 2 interviews 
were done in Central 
Estonia (Põltsamaa 
and Pajusi), another 2 
in Southern Estonia 
(Hellenurme), 2 interviews on Muhu Island (Liiva), 2 interviews in South East 
Estonia (Setomaa) and another 6 interviews were held in Brussels with Estonian 
officials there with the expectation of incorporating a more top-down view. The 
map in Figure 1 illustrates the locations in Estonia where the interviews took 
place. The interviews were recorded with a digital recording device. A consent 
form (see Appendix C) was provided to the respondents prior to recording. They 
were provided an information sheet (see Appendix B) regarding the aim the 
research, made well aware what the purpose of recording was and that they could 
withdraw from the process at any point. 
Reflecting on the data received through the interviews in Brussels, the previously 
expected top-down view was not achieved through interviewing Estonian officials 
there. In certain cases (e.g. related to the EU or perception of Europe) their 
position in Brussels appeared to have provided a more reflective view of these 
aspects. However, given the usually temporary nature of their positions there and 
how most of them related to personal experiences in Estonia in discussing the 
interview themes, then these data are analysed in a similar manner to other 
respondents whom I interviewed in Estonia. These possible differences in the 
nature of the data, especially regarding perceptions of Europe, will be reflected 
Figure 1. Map of interviews held in Estonia (Source used: 
Google Maps) 
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on further in the first empirical chapter, Chapter 5, along with the specific data 
from these interviews.  
As to demographics of the respondents, apart from two interviews in Tallinn and 
the five interviews in Narva, the respondents were Estonian-speakers. An overview 
detailing all the respondents is provided in Appendix A. The respondents were of 
different gender and their age varied from 22-77. The occupations included a 
variety of business sectors, state officials, pensioners, home-makers, students 
etc. When not specifically stated otherwise in the descriptions of respondents, 
then the interview was held in Estonian. Having a contextual background for the 
respondents provides a better understanding of how one or another might have 
approached the topic and therefore this overview forms a part of the 
methodological approach for exploring the grassroots’ perspectives.  
As can be seen, limited attention was given to representativeness. Rather than 
aspiring to statistical generalisability or representativeness, the aim was to reflect 
the diversity within the population (Barbour 2001: 1115). My respondents were 
people from different linguistic communities, rural and urban locations (seen as a 
key identity cleavage since 1991) and age groups. I was looking to talk to people 
who would have some interest in these issues, willingness to take part in this 
project and ability to articulate their views, in an attempt to gain a better 
understanding of how Estonian identity is perceived, how these perceptions guide 
people in their understanding of the world around them and how Estonian 
‘normality’ is in the process of being re-constructed through these understandings 
and perceptions. Reflections on the sample, e.g. how I recruited the respondents, 
some aspects relating to region and language will be discussed in further details 
in a section focusing on the interviewing process, since it is important to discuss 
a substantial feature I used in the interviews before reflecting on the course of 
the interviews.  
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, I incorporated an additional aspect 
to the interviewing process to elicit information from the respondents - namely I 
used images during the interviewing process. This approach brings about a 
significant alteration in data-collection through a research interview. The 
following section will provide a theoretical overview of utilising visual 
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methodology in social research, more specifically how it contributes to the 
research at hand and explains the practical implications for doing so.  
 
4.6 VISUAL METHODOLOGY 
From the methodological perspective, this research incorporates a relatively 
innovative method – photo elicitation. For the purpose of this study, image-
elicitation would be more accurate, since not all the pictures used during the 
interviews were photos, but similar theoretical grounds apply here as well. 
Although the amount of literature on photo elicitation has been growing steadily 
and the method is becoming more adapted into the realm of social and cultural 
research (anthropology, ethnography, sociology), the images used in the process 
of gathering data for this research serve a slightly different purpose than seen in 
most previous research utilising this methodology. This refers to the fact that most 
commonly photo elicitation interviews are based on the respondent taking the 
photos or the photos being taken in collaboration between the researcher and 
respondent. The following section will explain why a visual perspective has been 
included in this research and will then provide an overview photo elicitation, its 
role and implications in the interviewing process. 
Gillian Rose (2001: 6) has claimed that the visual has become a significant part of 
how people construct the social world in a contemporary Western society (TV, 
posters, journals, photos, technology etc.) and that much meaning is conveyed by 
visual images. However, the views that these images offer are never transparent 
windows on to the world – they interpret the world (Rose 2001: 6). The images 
can be used to help interpret the world of the participants (i.e. when they take 
the photos themselves) and the world is also interpreted through images (i.e. how 
the respondents interpret the images).  
Visual research methods are argued to be especially effective in generating 
evidence that other methods (e.g. interviews, surveys) cannot (Rose 2013: 28). 
Looking specifically at the interviews, it is claimed that things are discussed in the 
talk about visual materials that do not get discussed in talk-only interviews (Rose 
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2013: 28). Since the activity of observation is inextricably linked to our way of 
thinking, imagination, memory of past experiences and our ability to combine 
these elements (Stanczak 2007), exploring how respondents interpret certain 
images could have significant additional value to the data received through an 
interview.  
 
4.7 PHOTO ELICITATION 
In preparation and during the interviewing process, the concepts, and language 
and meanings attached to the themes brought into the discussion might be 
understood by respondents in a different way. The implications of whether the 
researcher comes from a similar cultural background can be helpful in grasping 
the meanings ascribed by people from the same wider community, but a 
difference will remain as to how a researcher studying a particular field and the 
respondents perceive various aspects of the social world and the meanings they 
attach to them. There are certainly challenges for the research process of coming 
from the same community, and the implications this had for the research at hand 
will be discussed in more detail in the section on the interview process.   
Photo-elicitation, or image-elicitation in this case, can help with some of these 
issues by providing a way to decentre the narrative and offer a way for the 
respondents to discuss various aspects more on their own terms, even though 
certain limitations still remain within this context (e.g. perception of what is 
expected of them, the choice of images).  
Although referring more to people who do not share a cultural background, 
Douglas Harper (2002) has highlighted the usefulness of photo elicitation in 
conducting social research in saying that: 
“there is the need, described in all qualitative methods books, of bridging 
gaps between the worlds of the researcher and the researched. Photo 
elicitation may overcome the difficulties posed by in-depth interviewing 
because it is anchored in an image that is understood, at least in part by 
both parties. […] If the interview has been successful, the understanding 
has increased through the interview process.” (Harper 2002: 20).  
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Harper also asserts that the ‘elicitation interviews connect core definitions of the 
self to society, culture and history’ and can therefore be useful for researchers in 
not assuming how audiences define hegemonic or other ideological messages – 
they must study how members of that audience themselves interpret (accept, 
contest or reject) their intended messages (Harper 2002: 13-19). In other words, 
images provided by the researcher can be a tool ‘to uncover, reveal and convey 
deeper aspects of habitus’ (Sweetman 2009 in Rose 2013: 28). In this way, visual 
research methods are often used to uncover the implicit knowledges in everyday 
practices as most studies with visual materials focus on the ordinary and everyday 
(Rose 2013: 28). 
In addition to images helping to uncover the ordinary and everyday knowledge of 
the social actors, images presented by the researcher during the interview can 
also elicit a different kind of information, as argued by Pretto (2015): 
“The photographs presented by the researcher are used as a basis for the 
interview and play a specific role in it, as they help the interviewees recall 
memories - or to reflect on various issues - that, without images, would not 
come to their minds (Banks 2001 in Pretto 2015: 172). This happens because 
‘the parts of the brain that process visual information are evolutionarily 
older than the parts that process verbal information. Thus images evoke 
deeper elements of human consciousness than do words; exchanges based 
on words alone utilize less of the brain’s capacity than do exchanges in 
which the brain is processing images as well as words. These may be some 
of the reasons the photo elicitation interview seems like not simply an 
interview process that elicits more information, but rather one that evokes 
a different kind of information.’ (Harper 2002: 13 in Pretto 2015: 172).” 
There are multiple ways in which photo elicitation can be utilised in socio-cultural 
research. The images can be introduced to the interviewing process by the 
researcher, they can be taken by the respondent, or the images can be created in 
collaboration between the researcher and respondent. Photo elicitation has been 
widely used to research children and marginalised groups and give them a voice 
to express meaning through this method. Usually the images used in these studies 
are either taken by the respondent or created in collaboration between the 
researcher and respondent. This research, however, follows a slightly different 
path as I as the researcher was the one responsible for choosing and introducing 
the images to the interview. Also, the images used in the process were not all 
photographs, but I also used cartoons from the media and other images which does 
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not alter the aim of the interview and follows the same theoretical foundations as 
photo elicitation. The rationale behind choosing the images will be explained in 
more detail below with introducing the images I used. The expectation was to 
receive different, more expanded empirical data in comparison to what the more 
traditional understanding of a talk-based interview produces.  
For this research, the images were utilised as a way to prompt discussion about 
the participants’ perceptions of Estonian ‘normality’ in relation to national 
identity. The images chosen for this research were, as Pretto calls them, based 
on the etic point of view of the researcher in a sense that they reflected 
‘constructs, depictions and analysis formulated according to the conceptual terms 
established by the scientific community’ (Pretto 2015: 170-171). The aim of 
sharing these etic understandings was to find out the alternative (or similar) 
meanings held by the interviewee i.e. to uncover the emic point of the 
interviewee, which Pretto defines as ‘the categories of thought of the ‘native 
subject’, his/her view of the world, the local/popular notions and concepts shared 
by his/her culture or by the human group that is being studied’ (Pretto 2015: 170-
171). 
 
4.8 IMAGES USED FOR THIS RESEARCH 
What needs to be addressed here, however, is the choice of images, which in itself 
already directs the themes and flow of the interview. As briefly noted in the 
introduction to this chapter, I chose the images based on themes in the existing 
academic literature on Estonian national identity constructions. Three larger 
themes were presented in some way through the images: the narrative of ‘return 
to Europe’; Russia as the significant Other; and conflicting history narratives. 
These themes were then complemented with images about themes that could 
contribute to further discussion on Estonian national identity – e.g. nation-
branding, possible impact of the economic crisis, perceptions of Estonian politics.  
The images selected for the interview process were taken from various sources. 
The cartoons depicting some of the core themes addressed in the academic 
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research and important events which might prompt discussion surrounding these 
themes were taken from an Estonian daily newspaper Postimees. The cartoons 
usually represent an exaggerated depiction of events or people for comic effect. 
The ones chosen for the interviews represented, in my view, the top-down 
narrative of the Estonian political elite and media in a relatively ironic way and I 
decided to use these images to try to understand whether and how the categories 
of thought on these topics differed among the respondents (and myself) and try 
to bring forward these expectedly complex understandings of national identity in 
a more nuanced to gain a better insight into Estonian ‘normality’. I searched for 
cartoons which would provide a relatively broad overview of the topical events. 
Postimees was not the only source I went through for this purpose. I also examined 
the cartoons from another Estonian daily newspaper Päevaleht and (not 
intentionally) ended up with choosing cartoons from only Postimees, which 
appeared to encapsulate broader political events in Estonia while the ones in 
Päevaleht were too focused on the specific daily news at the time to be used in 
the interviewing process. As explained in the section on media analysis, only 
Estonian newspapers were incorporated here, as they are seen to depict the 
dominant top-down Estonian ‘normality’ within themes of national identity and 
therefore provide a basis for exploring the relationship between the top-down 
narratives and everyday understandings. 
I chose three main timeframes for conducting the search for the cartoons. First, 
the timeframe surrounding Estonia’s accession to the EU and NATO to represent 
the ‘return to Europe’ narrative (01/04/2004-31/05/2004); second, the relocation 
of the Bronze Soldier to represent the conflicting history narratives with Russia 
(01/04/2007-31/05/2007) and facilitate discussion on Russia as the Other; and 
third, Estonia entering the Euro zone at the beginning of 2011 to represent the 
deepening integration with EU and the economic aspects related to this 
(01/12/2010-31/01/2011) which could help with uncovering the effects of the 
economic crisis on the national identity narrative in Estonia.  
I ended up choosing four cartoons to use during the interviews. I translated the 
texts in the cartoons from Estonian to Russian for the Russian-speakers and into 
English to present here. A brief justification for the use of each image is given in 
the textboxes.  
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Figure 2.Cartoon. Source: Postimees 11/05/2007 
 
Figure 3. Cartoon. Source: Postimees 05/05/2007 
This cartoon was 
chosen to facilitate 
discussion on 
conflicting history 
narratives (note 
‘liberate’ by Russia) 
and again themes of 
security. 
 
The cartoon was chosen 
to facilitate discussion 
on themes of security 
surrounding Estonia’s 
accession to the EU and 
NATO.  
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Figure 4. Cartoon. Source: Postimees 07/05/2007 
 
 
Figure 5. Cartoon. Source: Postimees 02/01/2011 
 
 
 
This image could help 
prompt discussion on 
the Prime Minister 
Andrus Ansip, the 
Reform Party and the 
events surrounding the 
removal of the Bronze 
Soldier.  
The introduction of 
the Euro and 
references to the 
economic crisis could 
be discussed with this 
image. 
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Figure 6. The Bronze Night looting. Source: Postimees 27/09/2009 
 
 
Figure 7. Liberty Cross. Source: Internet search 
 
The Bronze Night 
looting. This is the most 
iconic photo of the 
Bronze night incident 
from the Estonian 
media. It was used as 
an illustration for many 
articles touching upon 
the looting during the 
Bronze Night. 
Liberty Cross was 
installed in Liberty 
Square in the centre of 
Tallinn in 2009 to 
commemorate the War 
of Independence 1918-
1920. This image was 
used in connection to 
the conflicting 
narratives of history 
and the removal of the 
Bronze Soldier from the 
city centre two years 
earlier.  
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Figure 8. The political elite in Estonia. Sources: http://www.tallinn.ee; 
http://www.president.ee; http://valitsus.ee (accessed 20.11.2012) 
 
Figure 9. The political elite in Estonia. Source: http://www.president.ee 
(accessed 20.11.2012) 
 
Estonian political elite 
vol 2. Former Estonian 
presidents since 1992. 
On the left, Lennart 
Meri, and on the right, 
Arnold Rüütel. These 
images were chosen to 
facilitate discussion on 
Estonian politics in 
general and to elicit 
discussion on how 
people perceive the 
development of the 
country since the 
1990s.  
The political elite in Estonia in 2013. From the left, Edgar Savisaar, mayor of Tallinn and the 
leader of the main opposition party (Centre Party), Toomas Hendrik Ilves, the President of 
Estonia, Andrus Ansip, the Prime Minister, leader of the Reform Party. Placed in the 
interview with the idea to further discussion on Estonian politics in general. 
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Figure 10. Welcome to Estonia brand logo. Source: Internet search 
 
 
Figure 11. Estonian Euro coin. Source: Internet search 
 
Estonian nation-branding logo 
developed in 2002. This image was 
introduced to bring in some 
reflections as to perception (or 
desired perception) of Estonia from 
the outside. 
Introduction of the Euro. Chosen to 
facilitate reflections on the new 
currency adopted in Estonia in 2011, 
belonging to the Euro zone in 
general, the role of Estonian Kroon 
in national identity and any further 
economic issues the respondents 
might be reminded of. 
108 
 
Figure 12. Protests in Greece. Source: Internet search 
As discussed earlier, the images were brought into the interviewing process in 
order to facilitate discussion and were not intended to encompass the entire range 
of aspects related to national identity. The objective was to gain a more in-depth 
understanding of the respondents’ lived experiences of the depicted 
events/aspects and how the top-down constructions of these have been 
contextualised on a grassroots level to get a better sense of their ‘normality’. 
Before the start of the interview, I laid out the images usually on a table in front 
of the respondent and went over the information sheet about my research to make 
sure they understood what the aim of the research was (in general terms) and 
what their role in it was. No specific themes regarding Estonian national identity 
construction were discussed prior to the interview to allow the respondents to 
convey their thoughts and perceptions about the images and to try to limit 
directing the discussion according to my own point of view.  
It was not only the intrinsic richness of the data that I was interested in with 
introducing images into the interviewing process. From a practical point of view, 
I expected the images to support the whole process of conducting the interview 
by helping to facilitate asking questions and providing structure. The use of images 
in the interviewing process also provided focus for the respondents and lessened 
awkwardness through that.  
This image of the riots 
in Greece during the 
economic crisis was 
used to further the 
discussion on economic 
woes and how the 
European Union dealt 
with this. This image 
didn’t work as planned 
in the interviews, since 
most respondents 
thought it was taken 
during the Bronze Night 
riots in Tallinn. 
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In short, adding a visual perspective to the interviewing process can enable 
analytical differentiation, empirical expansion and can deepen our knowledge of 
the complexities of post-accession Estonian ‘normality’. Utilising visual materials 
in this research helped to open up internal worlds and interpretations of 
participants regarding issues that I might not have thought to probe, it facilitated 
asking questions and provided structure and focus for the interviews, which will 
be discussed next.  
 
4.9 STRUCTURING THE INTERVIEW  
As an interview is a conversation with a structure and purpose (Kvale 1996: 6), the 
structure plays a significant role in how the purpose is achieved. The interview 
structure for this research was largely based on the images introduced during the 
interview, which as stated earlier, principally followed the main themes brought 
forward in previous research. Follow-up questions were asked according to the 
topics addressed and responses received by the participants. The interviews can 
be described as unstructured since they were largely based on a few key questions 
I had prepared and followed the participants’ reactions and thoughts to the images 
laid out in front of them. For example, I inquired further about the effects of 
joining the EU and NATO; both in terms of internal developments in Estonia and 
external ones in the international community. Dependent on how the respondents 
brought forward relations with Russia, I asked about perceptions of Russia and 
about their understandings of present-day (2013) state of relations with Russia. 
These are just a few instances of broader themes and as said, the nuances of each 
interview were dependent on how respondents interpreted the images. The 
images provided some structure, but the questions were not predetermined, and 
the interview took the format of a discussion rather than a series of questions and 
answers. The interviewing process would follow the themes that the images 
elicited. The main intention behind using this format of interview was to allow 
the social realities of the respondents to come through as well and fully as 
possible. 
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4.10 REFLECTIONS ON THE SETTING AND PROCESS OF THE INTERVIEWS 
In order to provide more context as to how the interviews were conducted and 
also bring out some background for understanding the interview data used in the 
analysis, I will discuss and provide a few examples as to how I made contact with 
my respondents. Since I found this process to be informative for future reference, 
I will describe a couple of elements from this process in more detail. 
As one might expect, I attempted to prearrange interviews via email with 
respondents from the areas outside Tallinn (having found respondents through 
acquaintances and snowballing there), so I could visit these locations when 
suitable for them. I received the contacts for potential respondents from various 
sources. For example, I received a contact in Narva from my supervisor, Professor 
David Smith, for someone he had previously been in touch with during his own 
research visit to Narva.  
Another relevant example, which I will discuss in some more length here, is how I 
found respondents in Setomaa, in South East Estonia. Since I didn’t have any 
established contacts in this area, I got in touch with a head of a public institution, 
which cannot be named to protect their anonymity, in Värska in the hope that 
either they would be able to partake in my research or could direct me to someone 
who would be willing to do so. The information for this was publicly available on 
the website and I contacted them via email. I included the information sheet (see 
Appendix B) as an attachment to the email. Since I didn’t hear back from them, I 
sent an email to a different contact I found on the internet but failed to hear back 
from them as well. In the end, I decided to simply drive down to Värska and see 
if I could locate anyone willing to participate in my research.  
Being a native Estonian made it relatively easy for me to approach people there. 
I decided to try the same public institution that I had emailed and happened to 
come across the person who had received my email. As I introduced myself, they 
told me they had received the email, but were not really sure what they could 
possibly have to contribute on this topic and had not known how to reply. 
However, after meeting me and discussing the objectives of the research in 
person, they were happy to participate, even though I made it clear that there 
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was no obligation to do so and that I would be very grateful if they could simply 
point me towards some possible respondents within the area. This experience 
demonstrated that the impersonal email and the official information sheet with a 
foreign ‘Western’ university, University of Glasgow, header and the relatively 
formal language used in it, which I take full responsibility for, made them 
uncomfortable and was therefore not conducive to making an effective contact 
with a potential respondent. This raises several questions regarding the ethical 
procedures in preparing for the fieldwork and the formal requirements for the 
information sheet. 
One also needs to consider the impact this approach has on the respondents. In 
theory, the respondents should be provided with sufficient time prior to the 
interview to understand the aims of it, usually by reading the information sheet, 
and make ‘an informed decision’ about participating in the research. Whereas 
approaching people in person might place more pressure on them to take part in 
the interview – possibly demonstrated by the fact that only a few people said no 
to being interviewed when approached like this – and therefore create an ethically 
problematic situation.  
However, even when having contacted the then future respondents before and 
sent them all the necessary materials, I discovered at the beginning of the 
interviews that most of them had not read the information sheet and asked for a 
brief overview of the aims of my research. While doing this in person made the 
respondents seemingly feel more at ease with the whole process and made the 
setting of the interview therefore more conducive to gaining rich data from it, 
several issues should be highlighted here. First, the latter situation most likely 
placed the respondents under even more pressure, since they probably felt it 
would have been ‘impolite’ to withdraw their consent at this point (even though 
they were constantly reassured that they can do this before and at any point 
during the interview). Second, the information sheet I had for conducting this 
research appeared to fail in its task of informing the respondents meaningfully 
regarding the research objectives and should be reconsidered when conducting 
future research. In a way, the format used for providing this information caused 
ethical issues in itself, because it distanced the respondents from engaging with 
the substance of the research. Since the interview questions were not (usually) of 
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sensitive nature then the ethical implications of finding respondents in this 
manner are perhaps slightly more downplayed, but nevertheless significant within 
the qualitative paradigm. 
I argue that this was especially the case in rural areas, since I had fewer issues 
establishing contacts in Tallinn, even though most of the respondents there were 
secured through prior contacts and ‘snowballing’.  
Another element which deserves to be reflected upon is how the respondents 
themselves viewed my research, which helps develop further context for the data 
received from the interviews. At the beginning of the interviews, it was not 
difficult to see that many respondents had hesitations as to what kind of 
information to provide and understanding how their opinions and perspectives 
contributed to the research, even though this was explained in the beginning and, 
at times, during the interview. In this context, it is relevant to consider what the 
respondents understood as ‘research’ and how this might affect how they 
answered certain questions. To oversimplify the matter to an extent, many of the 
respondents appeared to struggle with the idea of talking about their thoughts 
and memories regarding the images, since they didn’t seem to consider these 
relevant enough to be included in ‘research’.  
Analysing this after conducting the interviews, I can posit two possible reasons for 
this. First, the societal constructions of what ‘research’ entails appeared to be 
perceived in quantitative terms. This means that the respondents’ perception of 
‘research’ can impact the answers they provide if they are consciously attempting 
to provide these in accordance with their understanding of quantifiable research. 
Second, and related to this but looking at the same issue more broadly, many 
respondents might have not considered their lived experiences interesting or 
relevant enough in general to discuss these in length (even though they were 
encouraged to do so). However, the longer the interview lasted, the more 
comfortable most of the respondents appeared to become with sharing various 
(relevant and, at times, also irrelevant) information with me.  
Regarding the previous description, and highlighting also some of the challenges 
of conducting interviews with Russian-speakers in Estonia while being a native 
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Estonian myself, I think it is valuable to provide an example of what I would term 
a ‘failed’ interview that took place in Narva and the possible reasons behind this. 
I met the respondent in Narva through the contact I had there. It was clear that 
she did not feel comfortable with the interview and had prepared her answers in 
advance (I had provided an information sheet for her in Russian a few hours before 
we agreed to hold the interview), reading them out and barely adding anything 
when asked follow-up questions. The interview lasted 15 minutes as opposed to 
the average of ca 1 hour. She appeared worried both about her factual knowledge 
and about saying something ‘wrong’. The latter appeared to me to consume the 
entire interview, even though all the respondents were always assured prior to 
the interview that there are no right or wrong answers here. My sense was that 
her unwillingness to share her opinions and attempting to provide answers she 
considered ‘neutral’ had to do with her understanding of what an Estonian-speaker 
might expect to hear, indicating that in her perception this difference existed, 
and since her perception of this had not been articulated in these terms in her 
everyday life (perhaps just a cognitive difference), she felt uneasy about adding 
anything to the prepared material.  
This was not the only case in Narva, where I could sense some precariousness in 
discussing the social and political aspects of Estonian national identity 
constructions. There were incidences where I could sense that the respondent was 
not expressing their opinion directly, because they were aware of the possible 
differences in political preferences reported in the media among Estonian- and 
Russian-speakers. For example, a couple of respondents clearly stopped 
themselves from saying anything negative about the then Prime Minister Andrus 
Ansip, even though their line of thought was directing towards it.  
 
4.11 REFLECTIONS ON MY POSITION AS A RESEARCHER 
Having already discussed some elements related to my position as a researcher in 
conducting the data collection (e.g. recruiting participants, case in Narva), this 
section seeks to provide further context for the data I received from the 
interviews.  
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Embedded within the research process are relationships of power and language 
that all researchers must face. No matter how hard one tries to prepare ahead for 
the interview process, the ability to adapt and reorganise requires time and 
experience, not to mention good background knowledge of the theoretical 
underpinnings, sensitivity to the general cultural, political and historical context 
of the respondent and sensitivity to the situation at hand. The power dynamics in 
an interview had some bearing on the interviewing process (especially the case in 
Narva highlighted earlier), but as stated above, the respondents in various regions 
in Estonia appeared relatively comfortable with engaging in discussion on these 
topics with me. Also, as indicated above, the images helped provide focus for the 
respondents and helped provide a more relaxed setting for the interview.  
However, a question that deserves further consideration here is language. The 
interviews were conducted (or at least offered to be conducted in two cases) in 
the respondents’ native languages – Estonian or Russian. Since Estonian is my own 
native language, this allows for greater flexibility and understanding throughout 
the interviewing process and makes it easier to ask follow-up questions according 
to the responses. However, the Russian-language interviews were somewhat 
hampered because my level of Russian is lower than my native language. 
Therefore, the interview data I received from the Russian-language interviews is 
at times less nuanced than the data I received through the Estonian-language 
interview, although the difference does not affect the analysis significantly. Here, 
the images were very helpful in allowing the respondents to discuss the themes as 
they viewed them in a relatively non-directive manner as opposed to answering 
questions where my understandings and meanings had been mixed with my 
constrained Russian language skills.  
 
4.12 TRANSLATING AND TRANSCRIBING THE INTERVIEWS 
To continue with the issue of language, another element, which deserves some 
discussion here, is translation. Since the data collected was in Estonian and 
Russian, and the thesis is written in English, the process of translation is relevant 
to understanding the outcome of this research. Translation in the classic sense is 
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the replacement of text in a source language by text in a target language 
equivalent in meaning. However, the transfer of cultural meanings, embedded in 
linguistic expressions, from one language to another constitutes one of the most 
challenging tasks of translation and it is basically impossible to achieve full 
equivalence of meaning in translation (Müller 2007: 207). Different languages 
structure the world in different ways and translations constantly suffer from not 
being able to convey the richness of connotations (Müller 2007: 207).  
For this research, I made the interpretations from the two languages used for 
collecting data and gave them the English equivalents. This process is deeply 
subjective and even though I was careful in my attempt to convey the connotations 
and meanings as closely to the original language as possible, at times, this was a 
difficult task. For cases, where I found it very difficult to convey the connotations 
of the original language, I placed the initial word/expression in brackets to allow 
for greater transparency in this process. 
I transcribed the Estonian-language interviews myself. On average, it took about 
8 hours to transcribe 1 hour of the interview audio. Even though this is a time-
consuming process, the process of analysis already somewhat starts from that 
point. Engaging slowly and steadily with the interview brought forward quite a 
few themes, wordings and subtleties that I would not have noticed and did not 
notice during the course of the interview. I used capital letters for louder voice, 
indicated slightly longer pauses in brackets and shorter ones with three dots. 
Sighs, body language and other non-verbal aspects were all included in brackets. 
The Russian-language interviews were transcribed by two Russian-speaking 
Estonians who had previous experience in transcribing research interviews. The 
transcripts I received from them were done in a similar manner to my own, and 
they had included comments about double-meanings, various expressions and 
other elements they deemed necessary to point out.  
The audio files which were forwarded to the transcribers did not include any 
indication of who the respondents were to protect the anonymity of the 
respondents. That was one of the reasons I decided to use two transcribers as 
there was a chance the first one might have recognised one of the respondents 
due to their profession. Since there is always a possibility of mistakes in 
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conducting precise transcribing, I checked the quality of the transcriptions with 
comparing them to the audio files. The transcribers also signed a confidentiality 
form (see Appendix D) confirming that the audio files will be deleted after the 
transcriptions are completed. 
 
4.13 ANALYSING INTERVIEW DATA 
Effective analysis is based on theorising about data using a consistent model of 
social reality (Silverman 2000: 151-152). Generally, I would be interested in a 
pattern of data, and this is where coding comes in. In order to find this pattern, 
a thematic analysis was conducted on the interview transcripts. Thematic coding 
aims at developing a theory starting from the distribution of perspectives on a 
certain issue or process (Seidman 1998: 100). It has to be said that themes are not 
something within the data to be revealed but depend upon the choices that I as a 
researcher make. Theoretically the transcripts need to be approached with an 
open attitude, seeking what emerges as important and interest from the text 
(Seidman 1998: 100), and this is what I attempted to do with the transcripts from 
my fieldwork.  
The analysis of the interview data was done using NVivo qualitative analysis 
software. In the first level of analysis, I was looking for larger repetitive themes 
emerging from the data and the focus was on cross-case aspect. These themes 
were coded into nodes in NVivo. The larger emerging repetitive themes were 
coded into parent nodes and a range of sub-nodes added to encapsulate the 
variety of ways and possible new angles that these topics were discussed in the 
interview data (see Appendix E for an example of the process). NVivo was a useful 
programme for doing the first-level analysis given the volume of the material 
analysed for this research. The second level of analysis was done on paper using 
the larger themes already established in NVivo to develop these larger themes 
into interpretive analytical frames which formed the basis for my empirical 
findings. 
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A danger with developing descriptive themes into interpretative themes is forcing 
the excerpts into categories already made up in one’s mind earlier and this does 
not allow for the themes to emerge from the experiences of the participants 
(Seidman 1998: 110). In conducting the analysis, I had to be conscious about 
noticing themes already established in the academic literature, aspects that I 
might have drawn more attention to myself during the interview process, 
statements which might be incompatible with my own political point of view etc. 
However, this does not mean that these issues are not of interest or relevance for 
the research.  
 
4.14 TOP-DOWN MEDIA DISCOURSE 
For the purpose of this study and its main aim of understanding constructions of 
‘normality’, I also analysed some Estonian media sources to pull out the top-down 
dominant discourse on the themes mentioned above in order to understand how 
the dominant discursive constructions related to national identity have been 
internalised on the grassroots level. 
As to the material used from the media, I searched for keywords ‘Europe’, ‘EU’, 
‘Russia’ and ‘values’ in the online archives of Päevaleht and Postimees, two widely 
read Estonian dailies. I only included the opinion sections of these dailies since the 
daily press releases and news stories were not the focus of this research – what I 
was looking for was how themes of identity were discussed. I did a similar search 
for Õhtuleht, the most widely read Estonian daily newspaper, but since it can be 
considered more of a tabloid, the search results provided little valuable for the 
present research, especially given that the primary data collection was through 
interviews with the media analysis supplementing this.  
For the online archive searches, I used the same timeframes as I did searching for 
the cartoons (01/04/2004-31/05/2004; 01/04/2007-31/05/2007; 01/12/2010-
31/01/2011), added a month from during the Georgian War in 2008 (01/08/2008-
31/08/2008) to look at the security dimension and the process of Othering Russia, 
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and two months in 2014 (01/05/2014-30/06/2014) for addressing the top-down 
discourse on the ten-year anniversary of Estonia belonging to the EU and NATO. 
Media analysis has a supplementary role in this research, it provides reference 
points for various aspects that the respondents discussed and is utilised mostly in 
the first and second empirical chapters (Chapter 5 and 6) as the everyday aspects 
discussed in Chapter 7 surfaced during the course of the interviews.  
 
4.15 CONCLUSION 
This chapter has provided an overview of the methodology adopted for addressing 
the main research questions at hand. The combination of methods used for this 
research include analysis of secondary sources, unstructured interviews 
incorporating an innovative visual aspect and media analysis to supplement the 
primary interview data and illustrate the top-down discourse on various themes 
related to national identity in Estonia. The chapter demonstrates how these 
methods are useful in bringing out the multiple perceptions for gaining an in-depth 
understanding of how post-accession ‘normality’ is constructed in Estonia. The 
interviews also incorporated a visual aspect as I used photo elicitation in order to 
receive different, more expanded empirical data. The choice of images, guided by 
previous academic research, was taken to depict the dominant discursive 
practices in Estonia on these topics and therefore provided a very useful basis for 
bringing out the complex relationship between the top-down narratives and 
everyday understandings. The interview data was also supplemented by Estonian 
media analysis which provided further evidence for fully engaging with the 
relations between the images of identity offered by political elites or the media 
and ‘everyday discourses’ about nations and national identities as discussed in 
Chapter 2. Examining these relations is the basis for bringing out the ideational 
collection of thicker points of reference which are seen to constitute the post-
accession ‘normality’ in Estonia. 
The chapter also discusses the theoretical and practical implications for utilising 
these methods, it explains the sampling process, and reflects on the processes of 
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doing the interviews and my position as a researcher within it as well as how the 
transcribing, translating and analysis were conducted for answering the research 
questions. This detailed overview of the methods and analysis is key to 
understanding how the data guides the following empirical chapters.  
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CHAPTER 5. ESTONIA IN EUROPE 
 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in Chapter 3, during the 1990s the ‘return to Europe’ was defined in 
‘classic’ collective security terms, as a way of underpinning the security of a 
sovereign Estonian nation-state, restored along inter-war lines (see Smith 2003a; 
Lehti 2006; Lehti and Smith 2003; Mälksoo 2009). Themes of security, and not only 
in the classical sense, remain an important aspect in the Estonian identity-building 
process, and this will be focused on in more detail in Chapter 6 when discussing 
Estonian identity-building in relation to Russia. However, this chapter is more 
about exploring how the internal essence of ‘Europe’ is understood and discussed, 
a decade after Estonia had become part of this entity. The underlying element 
that came across from the respondents interviewed for this research for 
understanding Europe a decade since joining the European Union appears to lie in 
the broad idea of shared values. This broad understanding echoes the official value 
discourse of the European Union and can be seen to come through in discussions 
on various elements when discussing belonging to Europe or being a part of the 
EU. However, the main argument in this chapter is that the idea of these shared 
values and belonging to Europe have been taken in without much self-reflection – 
demonstrating the taken-for-granted ‘normality’ of these shared values (see 
previous discussion in Chapter 2). By far the most significant finding in this area 
was how the benchmark for framing these values has shifted from glorification of 
the interwar period to the beginning of the 1990s and the early period of regaining 
independence. The data from this research demonstrates that there has indeed 
been a change in the temporal narrative of the model Eglitis proposed in the early 
2000s for understanding Estonian ‘normality’ (see Chapter 2, section 2.5). Another 
original and valuable finding from the evidence collected for this study shows that 
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a new North-South axis had emerged in perceptions of Europe in Estonia. This new 
discovery enhances our understanding of how spatial perceptions of ‘normality’ 
have also changed within Estonian identity-building processes following EU and 
NATO accession in 2004. 
The chapter is broken broadly into two sections – the idea of Europe and belonging 
to the EU - with threads of temporal and spatial ‘normality’ in Estonia running 
across them. Since accession to the EU provided an official validation for Estonia’s 
renewed belonging to Europe, many overlapping elements can be discerned in the 
ways that respondents talk about ‘Europe’ and the ‘European Union’. Yet, a 
relatively clear conceptual difference is also apparent in their use of the 
respective terms, and this is reflected in the title of this chapter. While ‘Europe’ 
is seen as more fluid category based on values, with boundaries drawn according 
to perceived cultural differences, the European Union is more commonly 
understood in terms of fixed rules and regulations applied to formal member 
states. This does not mean that these terms are completely separable from each 
other and occasionally when discussing the idea of ‘Europe’ the respondents would 
use them interchangeably. However, when asked about or focusing more on the 
EU, they did not conflate this with the idea of Europe. Therefore, a separate 
section will be dedicated to the perception of EU in the latter part of this chapter.  
 
5.2 ‘EUROPE’ IN ESTONIA  
In order to provide some context for understanding the Estonian population’s 
general approach to Europe and the relevance of these values, it is necessary to 
highlight the high rates of approval for the EU that dominate within the society, 
which as explained in earlier chapters (1, 2 and 3) officially validated Estonia’s 
place back in ‘Europe’. Broadly speaking, belonging to the EU is not challenged in 
the Estonian society. By 2013, when the interviews were conducted, Estonia had 
been a member of the EU for nearly a decade, and the approval rates for EU were 
among the highest in the union.  
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An annual survey commissioned by the Government Office in Estonia states that 
80% of the Estonian population supported the European Union in 2013 (2012 – 74%; 
2014 – 84%; 2015 – 78%). In 2013, only 10% of the Estonian population viewed the 
image of the EU as negative or fairly negative (34% positive or fairly positive and 
55% neutral), sharing a ‘first’ place within the EU countries with Lithuania and 
Poland according to the Eurobarometer 80 survey. In addition to that, support for 
the European common currency, the Euro, has grown significantly in the years 
since its adoption, reaching 83%, the highest among EU countries, in 2014-2015 
(rising from ca 70% in 2011) (Eurobarometer 80, 2013). Even though the 
Eurosceptic camp had some traction in the run-up to the EU referendum in Estonia 
in 2003 (33.2% voted ‘No’), Estonia has been one of the most pro-EU countries in 
Europe in recent years. These high approval ratings for the EU, and through that 
also for the ‘idea of Europe’, are not surprising and have several causes, ranging 
from themes of culture and history to economy and peace discussed in Chapters 1 
and 2. However, when examining specifically the idea of Europe, the respondents 
mostly appeared to have a perception of shared values as the basis for this 
construction. Shared values is a concept which in its broadness can encompass all 
of these themes and should be explored in more detail.  
 
5.2.1 THE OFFICIAL EUROPEAN VALUE DISCOURSE 
There appear to be several layers in how people perceive Europe and belonging to 
it. The value dimension that has been used to construct Europe from the top-down 
level has provided a framework for the respondents to negotiate in relatively 
abstract terms the political-cultural space within which Estonia should be situated 
and the respective Others who do not belong in the similar space. At the same 
time, the economic dimension through which Estonia’s national identity has 
been/is being conveyed since re-independence also provides a framework for the 
everyday constructions of national identity. As previous academic literature has 
demonstrated and the data gathered for this study shows, these frameworks 
conflate, but also occasionally diverge, to a degree to form a basis for how the 
people in Estonia negotiate various themes in their everyday lives.  
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So, what are these shared European values and how does Estonia fit within them? 
Values are the main element in the European Union’s founding principles and are 
constantly reiterated by various elites through numerous media channels. The 
official founding principles of the European Union list7 the values that the union 
is based upon as respect for human dignity and human rights, freedom, 
democracy, equality and the rule of law. In 2004, a day before Estonia became an 
official member of the European Union, the Prime Minister at the time, Juhan 
Parts, accentuated the value dimension of the EU:  
“This union is based on values such as respect for human dignity, freedom, 
democracy, equality, rule of law and respect for human rights. These are 
the joint values of member states in a society of pluralism, tolerance, 
justice, solidarity and non-discrimination. The goal of the European Union 
is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its nations.” (Juhan 
Parts, Prime Minister, Eesti Päevaleht, 30.04.2004). 
The idea of ‘Europe’ being based on these similar principles to the EU’s appeared 
to have been adopted by the respondents in their perception of what Europe 
means and even though there was little reiteration of the same values per se, 
subscribing to what are understood to be European values and what it means to 
be European could be seen throughout the interview data. In a sense, the 
respondents appeared to have internalised an understanding of what it means to 
be a ‘normal’ European country. The ‘idea of Europe’ as put forward by the official 
discourse was more clearly expressed in the interviews by some of the respondents 
in Brussels, who are exposed to this narrative on a more day-to-day basis.  
“I think Europe has clearly certain shared values. Even though we have a 
lot of different views regarding details, then in the bigger picture, looking 
at the whole world, it is still a unity with shared values. All that democracy 
and socially caring worldview. All these basic liberties included.” (Riina, 
33, Brussels).  
However, the articulation of these values did not seem to come through 
meaningfully in some other themes discussed during the interviews and the wider 
values listed above appeared still to be subject to interpretation dependent on 
                                                          
7 Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union: “The Union is founded on the values of respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to 
the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, 
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.” http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012M%2FTXT (accessed 10.05.2014) 
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the topic at hand. I claim here that one of the reasons for this is that the ‘return 
to Europe’ narrative had established a sense that Estonia already inherently 
embodied these European values and therefore little critical thought is put into 
how these values are reflected in the Estonian society, or in other parts of Europe 
for that matter. 
 
5.2.2 SO WHAT IS EUROPE IN ESTONIAN IDENTITY-CONSTRUCTION? 
As mentioned earlier, the ‘return to Europe’ narrative was embedded in the idea 
of achieving collective security, which emphasised Estonia’s belonging to the 
European value structures already during the interwar period. This has been one 
of the fundamental aspects of Estonian national identity construction since 
becoming independent again in 1991 and became formally validated in 2004 when 
Estonia joined the EU and NATO, as discussed in the literature review chapter (see 
section 3.4).  
It is not surprising that a loose term like ‘values’ appears to form a basis for how 
Europe is perceived in Estonia. ‘Return to the Western World’ had to be based on 
a more abstract idea since the Soviet period had dismantled all state structures, 
suppressed civil society and implemented a planned economy, which needed to 
be (re)built. However, the value dimension was not used simply as a means to an 
end. As mentioned in the literature review, Lauristin et al. (2007) have argued 
that Estonia somehow maintained elements of Western culture throughout the 
Soviet occupation and passed those sensibilities down through generations. 
However, they also point out some differences between value structures in Estonia 
compared to other Western or Northern countries (Lauristin et al. 2007) (see 
section 3.4).  
In order to understand how the respondents perceive Europe and Estonia’s place 
in it, it is important to differentiate between the top-down value discourse and 
the meaning attached to these values from the grassroots level. As said, the data 
from the interviews suggests some disparity between the top-down wider 
125 
 
discourse of ‘European values’ and how these values have been internalised on an 
everyday level.  
The idea of European values appears to be a relatively loose one and interpreted 
according to context. As joining the European Union was seen as an elite-driven 
project, then validating the belonging to the European value structure through 
formal accession seems to have provided a justification for viewing Estonia within 
it, while at the same time leaving room for interpreting specific issues as seen fit. 
The reiteration of these terms in defining Europe demonstrates that the broad 
top-down narrative of shared European values has been taken in by the people; 
however, certain contradictions remain in terms of the meanings attached to this 
wider understanding of European values. Analysing these contradictions provides 
a good basis for understanding the identity constructions on a more detailed level. 
In looking at how people negotiate the substance of one of the main themes of 
Estonian identity constructions, i.e. ‘return to Europe’, a more comprehensive 
account of the idea of Europe in Estonia is brought forward. 
The respondents appeared relatively uncritical in how these listed ‘values’ had 
been adopted in Estonia. For example, the idea of gender equality was utilised to 
reject certain cultures from the European space, but at the same time Estonia 
ranks highest among EU member states for gender pay gap with 26.9% in 20158. 
Me: “What are these European values?” 
Kaidi: “Well these that we have right now, the thing that we are doing 
here…” 
Me: “Can you name…” 
Kaidi: “Well, human rights of course. […] Suppressing women and this sort 
of – I can’t even imagine how this could have happened historically […] and 
also to this time actually here in Europe, what goes on here quietly [like] 
mutilation (lõikumine) of women. Human rights. Equality. There should be 
no corruption. Well everything that we have here, see…” (41, Brussels). 
Another respondent also highlighted how the idea of ‘European’ values is 
perceived through what it is not – Othered in terms of who does not belong or 
what European ‘normality’ is not. Her response also demonstrated the 
                                                          
8Second place is held by Austria with 21.7%, while the average in the EU was 16.5%. 
https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/databrowser/view/sdg_05_20/default/table?lang=en  
(accessed 21.10.2016). 
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interconnection of the perception of values and the European borders. 
Interestingly, it was the topic of women’s rights that was seen as the most obvious 
dividing line as several respondents brought up this up in distinguishing between 
cultural realms.  
“I am very much afraid of Islamism. It just won’t work for us. We are too 
different. I don’t understand them. And they understand us even less. […] 
The worst is if they bring us that line [of thought] that a woman has to 
serve and worship the husband. […] And the woman can’t eat at the table. 
She has to be on the floor. […] It’ll take a very long time before they 
[Turks] have this European appreciation and perception of people. That a 
woman is also a person.” (Aino, 77, Tallinn). 
While the quotes above form just a single example of this uncritical reflection on 
the values, it is also indicative of the wider approach to how belonging to the 
European value system can be interpreted as seen by the respondents as 
something that Estonia inherently belongs to without further reflexion – the 
implicit, common sense, taken for granted understanding which, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, forms a basis for everyday perceptions. These perceptions are brought 
to light more in the coming sections through people’s reflexion of what these 
European values are not – the Others to the perceptions of values – through which 
people’s constructions of their ‘normal’ values are more accessible for analysis. 
There are several possible explanations for this taken-for-granted perception. 
First, the official validation of Estonia’s place in Europe by accession to the EU in 
2004 demonstrated that all the necessary ‘boxes were ticked’ to return to Europe. 
This official recognition provides a background for the broader understanding that 
the European values, however they are interpreted by the respondents, are 
adhered to.  
Second, the European values are constructed based partly on the normative 
understanding of what would have been had the Soviet occupation not taken 
place. In other words, the idea that if Estonia had not been occupied by the Soviet 
Union, it would be a ‘normal’ European state already embodying these ‘European’ 
values. From another perspective, ‘return to the West’ was also defined in terms 
of what it was not, which meant anything and everything that was seen as ‘non-
Soviet’. So, on the one hand, intrinsically embodying these values already from 
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the interwar years of independence and having also fulfilled the official criteria 
in becoming an EU member state and therefore proving its rightful place within 
the European value system, there seems to be little room for critically addressing 
these issues. The quote above demonstrates how Europe is being defined by 
reference to Others, to what it is not – the practices not viewed as belonging to 
the European value space - without any critical reflection on what Europe actually 
is.  
Third, having had an ‘abnormal’ Soviet rule for half a century and still being a 
young, developing nation-state also provides protection from further criticism in 
these aspects. This period of isolation from Europe and the abnormal Soviet rule 
provide a unique perspective in Estonia on the current developments in ‘Europe’. 
Having had 50 years of Soviet rule can be viewed as giving Estonia an opportunity 
to avoid some of the ‘mistakes’ made by the so-called old European countries. 
This has been especially relevant in Estonia’s identity-building in terms of 
understanding Russia, which will be discussed further in the next chapter. In this 
sense, it has been argued, Estonia’s identity takes on a ‘more Western than the 
West’ (Berg and Ehin 2009) dimension. 
 
5.2.3 ‘TRUE’ EUROPEAN ECONOMIC VALUES 
The economic crisis, which hit Europe in 2008, had intensified the competition to 
define Europeanness, with, as I argue here, Estonia perceiving itself as ‘true 
Europe’ in terms of neoliberal market values from both the top-down dimension 
as well as on the grassroots level. Whereas the understanding of Russia in Estonia’s 
national identity has taken on a ‘more Western than the West’ construction, then 
in terms of perceptions of economic values, the interview data showed that 
Estonia’s identity-building had taken on a perception of upholding ‘truer 
European’ values, especially in reference to adopting austerity measures in time 
of crisis and countering the reactions in Southern European countries. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, the neoliberal approach can be seen as the leitmotif running through 
from the 1990s to present-day. The economic crisis provided an opportunity to 
reaffirm and reiterate these neoliberal principles, at a time when people might 
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have started to question their continued validity, and this has provided a strong 
continuation for the understanding that this approach is the only ‘correct’ way. In 
line with the neoliberal paradigm, and as can be seen from the analysis below, 
the blame for the financial crisis was placed on ‘someone breaking the rules’ – in 
contrast to Estonia’s austerity approach as the only right or ‘true’ measures to 
adopt - and the financial/economic system as a whole was not questioned again. 
Economic aspects have played their part as a fundamental element of identity 
construction in Estonia already from the 1990s. The so-called economic miracle 
was highlighted by the political elite in Estonia and utilised to demonstrate the 
country’s uniqueness and acceptance by the West (Lehti 2007: 140). The economic 
success Estonia has had justifies the neoliberal reforms introduced in the 1990s 
and has remained largely unquestioned by the respondents and the mainstream 
media. Even more so, being hailed as the EU’s ‘poster child’ for austerity 
measures, Estonia was largely viewed by the respondents as embodying the ‘true’ 
European values or being more European than especially the Southern European 
countries during and following the economic crisis.  
This perception has brought about a new division for Europe in terms of Estonian 
identity construction, counterpoising the calm and rational ‘North’ to the 
temperamental and irrational ‘South’ within Europe itself. This is an interesting 
new dichotomy that appears to have surfaced in Estonia with the context of the 
economic crisis and which exists alongside the continuing normative gap between 
an increasingly authoritarian Russia and the Western liberal-democratic states. 
 
5.2.4 NORTH-SOUTH AXIS IN ‘EUROPE’ 
The Northern or Nordic identity has played a significant role in Estonian identity-
construction since the beginning of 1990s. Even though - as discussed in Chapter 
2 - there have been attempts to depict Estonia as a Nordic country, the economic 
crisis and the effect it had especially in Greece, Cyprus, Spain and Portugal 
(Ireland mentioned to a lesser extent) brought about a new North-South axis in 
conceptually dividing Europe and provided a useful Other in further consolidating 
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Estonia’s Northern European identity aspect. This is looked at here from two sides. 
First, the positive framing of Estonia in light of the austerity measures adopted; 
and, second, how the respondents depict and oppose specifically Greece to 
Estonia during and after the economic crisis.  
The adherence to the ‘true’ European values in terms of adopting austerity 
measures has been a particularly important element also in the top-down 
construction of demonstrating Estonia’s European essence. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, 
in his Independence Day speech in 2014, shortly before Estonia celebrated its ten-
year anniversary of joining the European Union (1 May 2014, second quote below), 
highlighted Estonia’s strength and ‘toughness’ in demonstrating these European 
values during the economic crisis. 
“For the past six years Europe has been working on coming out of the 
financial and economic crisis. A crisis, which came about in the Euro zone 
due to insufficient toughness. The future structure and leadership of the 
European Union requires a whole new line of thought. Estonia, who in spite 
of the wear and tear of history (vintsutuste kiuste), has stood up and can 
offer a ground for such debates and develop the substance for future 
Europeanness.” (Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Postimees, 24.02.2014). 
“The latest economic crisis was sort of a touchstone (proovikivi) for the 
European Union. Estonians passed the test. We proved that little and ‘new’ 
can be responsible and lasting, and that ‘old’ is not always like that.” 
(Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Postimees, 01.05.2014). 
The reference to the superior ‘new’ also indicates the aspect of ‘fresh take’ on 
how to deal with these difficulties. While the austerity measures adopted were 
supposed to be temporary in getting through a few years of the economic crisis, 
this narrative has become internalised as part of the Estonian identity. Ilves 
appears to use the word ‘new’ slightly ironically, to make a point about the fact 
that Estonia has always been a part of Europe and it has perhaps mistakenly been 
placed in the category of ‘new’ – as something that would need to get used to or 
learn the ways of Europe. Here he asserts that Estonia knew much better what 
Europe was supposed to do and managed to achieve it, while ‘old’ might have lost 
its way or in a way has always been less part of it than Estonia. What he appears 
to be saying is that the ‘old’ might have lost the way gradually (with having an 
easier life) during the time Estonia was occupied and don’t see it themselves 
(reference in the first quote to ‘new line of thought’), but since Estonia has a 
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‘fresh’ look onto things having regained independence only in 1991, then its 
perspective is better aligned with the ‘true’ European values. 
The resilience and suffering narrative can be viewed as part of the collective 
perception of the Estonian nation state. Most of the key themes discussed below 
can be related back to this understanding. Being ‘more Western than the West’ 
implies having experienced the tragic and abnormal Soviet past and therefore 
having a more insightful understanding of Russian intentions than the West. As to 
being the ‘true’ Europe in terms of economic values and understanding the 
essence of Europeanness better than the ‘South’, there seemed to be little 
opposition to the austerity measures introduced in Estonia. The perception of 
historical suffering through various occupations and foreign rule has left an imprint 
on the Estonian mental map and has translated into taking pride in toughness and 
modesty during hard times. This is reiterated constantly through media channels 
and provides a background for better understanding the North-South dichotomy, 
which has developed as a result of the economic crisis. 
“We are one of the few European Union countries who has that experience 
in the memories of still living generations and who, due to that, can see 
European history and possible future scenarios from another angle than 
other EU states. Our natural modesty doesn’t allow us to perhaps see that 
role that we carry in Europe because of our experience. Those, who have 
travelled the world, can value how extraordinary, important and fragile it 
is, what Europe represents in the world, and how big is the part countries 
like Estonia which reside on border of the free and totalitarian world, have 
in this.” (Editorial, Postimees, 24/05/2014). 
These themes were mirrored in a variety of ways at the societal level in my 
interview responses. From a more general outlook, the Northern aspect of 
Estonian national identity appears to have taken on a different perspective and 
was seen more through opposition to the South. The notion of being a Nordic or 
Northern country was of particular relevance prior to 2004 as discussed in Chapter 
3, when it was mostly used to support the aim of joining the EU. After officially 
re-joining Europe, this dimension appears to be used by the respondents to 
counter the South in the aftermath of the financial crisis.  
One of the main features applied in differentiating the North and the South was 
related to perceptions of mentality. This is not an unexpected finding given that 
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the hallmarks of the Nordic mentality have been highlighted throughout the 90s, 
with Minister of Foreign Affairs, Toomas Hendrik Ilves in a speech in 19999 detailing 
why Estonia is in fact a Nordic country. In it, he claimed that: 
“Brits, Scandinavians, Finns, Estonians consider themselves rational, 
logical, unencumbered by emotional arguments; we are businesslike, 
stubborn and hard-working. Our southern neighbors see us as too dry and 
serious, workaholics, lacking passion and joie de vivre. […] Clearly the case 
is to be made that these Protestant, high-tech oriented countries form a 
Huntingtonian subcivilisation, different from both its southern and eastern 
neighbors. The long, dark and cold winter nihts [original spelling] of 
Yuleland, inhospitable as they were to our ancestors' lives in agrarian 
societies, have produced a similar mindset and a culture geared to the 
demands of a modern, globalised economy.”  
A similar perception was detectable in how the respondents’ claim that the 
‘southern neighbours’’ excessive ‘passion’ and ‘joie de vivre’ in protesting 
austerity had contributed to steepening of the economic crisis. Since the 
neoliberal economic paradigm was not questioned by the respondents and seen as 
strictly in line with European values, this indicated that the already historical 
pragmatic, unemotional and hard-working approach is in fact the ‘true’ European 
way for meeting the demands of the globalised economy. 
Quite a few of the respondents referred to these geographical factors to 
distinguish between the Southern temperament and the Northern calmness. The 
calmness, consensus, conformity and resilience that come from living in cold, 
harsh conditions are viewed as hallmarks of the Northern countries, including 
Estonia, and were mostly perceived as something to take pride in.  
“I think that our attitude towards life, our seriousness and complete 
emotionless at times have come from the living conditions in the Northern 
area.” (Tiina, 37, Brussels). 
Another respondent expanded on the perceptions of Northern ‘characteristics’ 
which appeared to be seen as a source of self-esteem for the Estonian people. 
Since these discussion of Northerness came up mostly in reference to the economic 
crisis, the idea of a Nordic country, that the respondents’ had, is in line with 
                                                          
9 Speech by Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Swedish Institute for 
International Affairs, 14 December 1999 (https://vm.ee/en/news/estonia-nordic-country, 
accessed 12.03.2018). 
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Realo’s (2017) point discussed in Chapter 3 (section 3.5) that the Estonian 
perception of the Nordic does not coincide with what the Nordic is envisioned to 
entail in these respective countries - especially in terms of socially caring world 
view, which is not promoted by the neoliberal economic policies in Estonia. And a 
reconfiguration of the idea of what an Estonian Nordic entails can be seen in these 
characteristics – since the respondents did not appear to have any contradictions 
between highlighting the Nordic mentality as source of self-esteem for upholding 
the nationalist neoliberal principles discussed in Chapters 1 and 3 (and can be seen 
as partly encapsulated by the New Nordic concept put forward by the Reform 
Party in 2015). 
Eveli: “Well… I’m too much of a Northerner (põhjamaalane) to appreciate 
these different kind of characteristics like that (she laughs).” 
Me: “What do you mean by Northerner?” 
Eveli: “That you keep your emotions inside. Because I’ve seen in life how 
being emotional can be okay in communicating on a personal level, but on 
the diplomatic level, it does not bring you any benefits (plusspunkte).” (48, 
Brussels). 
This understanding was highlighted further by discussing the protests against 
austerity measures in Europe. These protests were pitted against what the 
respondents appeared to consider Europe-proper related to the top-down ideas 
put forward by President Ilves (2014) and discussed earlier about how ‘insufficient 
toughness’ brought about the crisis in which Estonia managed to be responsible 
and lasting while the ‘old’ Europe somewhat failed this test signifying ‘true’ 
Europe.  
As one respondent explained: “They have a different temperament and all. Well 
we’ve seen all sorts of things on TV that wherever, even Germany, where these 
things [protests] can happen but…[…] here in this quiet harsh Nordic country [it is 
unlikely].” (Merike, 49, Muhu island). While the South, especially in reference to 
Greece, was seen as the negative Other in defining Europeanness, the latter quote 
also demonstrates that even the epicentre of Europe – Germany – had failed the 
test of toughness to a degree. The protest activity was seen to signify the lack of 
resilience needed to get through these hard times – which Estonia, having the 
resolve due to historical circumstances and the calm, calculating but conforming 
temperament of the North, is seen to embody. These features are referred to by 
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Ilves as well when he suggests Estonia could offer the ground for developing the 
substance for future Europeanness. Put in a nutshell, they constitute what is seen 
as the European ‘normality’ which appears to have gotten lost to a degree even 
in the ‘old’ European countries. 
The ‘abnormal’ economic irrationality in Greece was denounced by the 
respondents and the acts of protest seen themselves as something that hinders 
possible state progress and has little value on a personal level in line with the 
perception of how the passionate approach just does not fit the demands of the 
global economy, which Estonia, having gained the image of the ‘shining star’ 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, could express from a higher pedestal at that point. 
The protest actions fuelled the respondents’ understandings of the Southern 
European ‘temperament’ and gave it negative context.  
“Well all these protests – they don’t make life any better, do they. But 
well, if they are so hot-blooded people, I guess they have to let their steam 
out.” (Eveli, 48, Brussels) 
“How could they possibly protest? I understand it from the human point of 
view – when all those benefits are taken away from you. Oh my god they 
had unbelievable things (imepunktid) what [I read from] newspapers or 
[saw] on television.” (Aino, 77, Tallinn).  
The quote above from Aino demonstrates the perceptions of ‘normality’ on a 
collective level juxtaposed against the individual perspective. The implication 
here appears to be that the expectation of what is provided to you by the state 
ought to be lower, again reflecting the individualistic, limited state intervention 
neoliberal paradigm, which shapes perceptions of ‘normality’ in Estonia (even if 
there are contradictions in this as to how things should be run in Estonia). A similar 
point regarding personal versus collective approach was reiterated by a much 
younger respondent as he interpreted the discrepancies in perceptions between 
the North and South:  
“It has been surprising, but also given a good understanding that even 
though we’re in Europe, the cultures are so different. Which is a good thing, 
and I don’t want it to be similar everywhere. But how… I as a bystander 
swore and said that ‘how do you not understand that you need to make 
these cutbacks and stuff? That we cannot go on like this. How do these 
people not understand that? […] But at the same time, when I took the 
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other point of view and put myself in a similar situation, then I would have 
probably been on the streets with them.” (Tarmo, 27, Tallinn).  
The data supports the understanding that the Soviet experience has been and still 
remains central to shaping understandings of Estonian identity. At the same time, 
and as discussed above, this suffering provides a source for virtue and self-esteem 
– that the Estonians understand best what it really means to be European, and 
have the toughness to carry it through. In this sense, the European identity 
becomes an extension of national identity, of the Self, to be customised according 
to one’s own needs and understandings.  
“Because the Estonian people are used to suffering (she laughs). Estonian 
people are modest. Also that nobody has this craving to go… well… rioting. 
All of our strikes are actually calm and peaceful. An Estonian is just not 
that kind of a person. (S)he will not go to riot. Or even more so to fight or 
something.” (Katrin, 32, Tallinn). 
“But as to Greece, well the Greeks are emotional people and they are 
terrible (hirmsad) protesters. And they have been living above their means, 
but I still think that they will struggle (rabelevad) out of this [crisis].” 
(Leeni, 73, Tallinn).  
The quote just above demonstrates that the perception of the Estonian approach 
being the only ‘true’ way – modest spending, balanced budget, limited benefits – 
appears to have been further consolidated by the financial crisis. The Greeks, who 
have been ‘living above their means’ had to find this out the hard way. 
The fact that Estonia as a member state of the EU also contributed to the financial 
assistance of Greece was highlighted. The financial aid provided for Greece 
through the Economic Adjustment Programmes which Estonia participated in was 
seen as very unfair to the respondents in Estonia, where drastic austerity measures 
were introduced and silently endured by the people. One of the possible 
explanations for this relates back to the idea of suffering in the past and the 
perception that the ‘older’ EU member states that were seen as still richer would 
rather have an obligation to assist Estonia.  
“Her pension is ten times bigger than mine, and I’m assisting her?” (Aino, 
77, Tallinn).  
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However, and I argue, even more so, this sense of unfairness can be attributed to 
the understanding of how austerity had become essential to demonstrating and 
thus defining ‘Europeanness’ in 1990s. The economic transition had become 
central to Estonians’ understanding of what a ‘normal Europe’ is. The quote below 
demonstrates how the perception of austerity was rooted more in present-day 
perception of - us being responsible after the crisis and them not – and the recent 
past - Greeks having been irresponsible for years - than it is in any longer-term 
historical narrative of injustice and suffering. 
“I also feel that it is actually unfair to Estonians that we had to make 
significant cutbacks and we had to be the responsible ones, and at the same 
time Greece has been, well, irresponsible for years. […] On the 
governmental level we have had this honest approach that ‘Yes, we have 
to make those cutbacks now, we’ll make them and we will all make them 
together.’ [But] in Greece they’ve simply been lying in the Euro zone - lying 
for years about their data. This cannot be acceptable.” (Tiina, 37, 
Brussels).   
The austerity measures appeared to be universally adopted as the ‘true’ European 
way of dealing with the crisis. However, the contestation of what it means to be 
European was also evident in the data. As can be seen below, with the reference 
to ‘acting as they do in Europe’, which does not coincide with the essence of 
Estonianness seen and therefore seen to represent rather the ‘abnormal’ than 
‘normal’ Europe that Estonia was returning to. 
“For some reason our [press] (meie omad) is so for this [protesting]. That 
our media [suggests] that [we] go out to the streets and the teachers went 
to the streets and the doctors went to the streets – ‘Go to the streets and 
protest!’. I think it is lame (nõme) that we are provoking this all the time 
[that] ‘Act as they do in Europe!’ For what? An Estonian is modest, (s)he 
manages to talk things through, (s)he doesn’t need to go out there and 
shout: “Ansip is stupid! Ansip is stupid!” or take some posters there.” 
(Leeni, 73, Tallinn). 
The following quote brings together the essence of how Estonianness was 
perceived in relation to the economic crisis and through that an understanding of 
what a ‘true’ Europe should also be. The Estonian is depicted here as a rational, 
balanced person who puts the future ahead of short-term gains. The respondent 
makes an interesting point with reference to the collective good ahead of the 
individual gains through talking about how protest activity hinders an already 
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bankrupt state. In this sense the state is still clearly placed ahead of the 
globalising individualistic motivations for material well-being. 
“Throughout time, an Estonian is used to live for what (s)he has earned. 
(S)he is not used to living in debt. This means that when you have more 
money, you can live a little freer, but at the same time you save up for 
rainy days. When times are tougher, then you don’t go out very lightly to 
spend at the expense of your future, at the expense of your children or 
grandchildren. […] When your own country is on the verge of bankruptcy, 
there is no money left for anything, and then you’re going to have a strike 
action on top of that, then this means that the bankruptcy will deepen.” 
(Mart, 50, Brussels).  
While this section discussed Estonia’s self-positioning within Europe in terms of 
economic elements which have been a core identifying feature for Estonia since 
regaining independence in 1991 and provided an insight into the perceived 
divisions of North and South through that prism (entangled in the complex web of 
other Estonian national identity narratives), another key perception of Europe that 
needs to be addressed is how the respondents drew spatial boundaries to the idea 
of Europe through the value dimension.  
 
5.3 WHERE EUROPE ENDS?: SPATIAL BOUNDARIES AND OTHERING  
As to the spatial boundaries of ‘Europe’, the significant Others when discussing 
the value dimension were Russia and Turkey, with larger implications of what is 
considered Islamic culture. As discussed earlier in relation to how European values 
were defined in terms of what they are not, so too were the spatial limits of 
Europe drawn according to where this value field appeared to end. Othering Russia 
within the European value dimension will be discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. This is a highly relevant aspect of Estonia’s identity construction and 
deserves to be dealt with in detail. However, when discussing the spatial 
boundaries of Europe and possible future enlargement, Turkey was also referred 
to as marking the ‘cultural border’ of Europe and was Othered/orientalised in that 
context.  
“We’re just too different [with Turkey]. It’s the same as taking Afghanistan 
into the EU.” (Toomas, 39, Tallinn).  
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“There should be similar values. How they treat women and all that. I think 
that [to include] Russia and Turkey – it would no longer be European Union. 
Russia is not Europe. […] Then it would no longer be [Europe] then it would 
be the Soviet Union. I think that Russia and Turkey don’t belong here.” 
(Kaidi, 41, Brussels). 
In addition to the previously mentioned perceived value disparities within themes 
of equality and women’s rights, the Turks were orientalised mostly within the 
religious discourse, but explanations were also taken from history. Turkey seemed 
to be depicted as clearly outside any notion of European space. This might be due 
to understanding ‘Europe’ in more rational terms and representing Turkey as 
inherently emotional in a negative sense. 
“The Turks, the old evil [ones]. All these things learned from the Turkish-
Mongol times, how the Turks tortured… For some reason with Turks, I felt 
that when Turkey was announced as the country where Estonians go to 
holiday most often, then I thought that why on earth do they going to 
Turkey? […] I have a feeling that they are sort of evil. They shouldn’t come 
then. […] If I had to vote now, I would vote no. […] I wouldn’t want an 
Islamic country [in the EU].” (Aino, 77, Tallinn). 
The reasoning behind this line of thought was based largely on religious aspects 
and the potential threat of Islam mostly in the sense of cultural preservation 
rather than a direct security threat.  
“I am very much afraid of Islamism. It just won’t work for us. We are too 
different. I don’t understand them. And they understand us even less. […] 
(Aino, 77, Tallinn).  
“I can see here that this [integration between Muslims and European] 
doesn’t really happen and [this] creates problems. All these incidents that 
we’ve had here, well pretty rough ones, like criminal ones, have 
unfortunately been initiated by the Muslims. […] What’s common there, 
isn’t [common] here in this community and this causes tensions.” (Eveli, 
48, Brussels).   
While most respondents viewed the inclusion of Turkey into the European Union 
as having possible negative effects then there were voices arguing that the 
cultural differences might bring additional value.  
“I think it would be fun – let them have their community here. If we have 
the right to have our embassies and Estonian Houses and communities in 
every country then why shouldn’t they? If we are in the European Union 
then moving within the European Union should be completely open in my 
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opinion. […] Well from outside as well, but I think that there wouldn’t be 
quite as many. Well there are some – we had the Filipinos who wanted to 
come [and] in my opinion many of them didn’t want to stay. They actually 
wanted to move on from here.” (Piret, 37, Tallinn). 
Even though a relatively firm mental geographical line was drawn in the South-
East, the European boundaries were not perceived as fixed in the East and the 
possibility of including some former Soviet Union republics such as Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia was left open, even if some reluctance can be seen in 
accepting the eastward expansion of European Union to include these countries. 
In a sense, these countries were framed as ‘not quite Europe’, as Estonia had been 
before officially validating its place within it in 2004.  
“They have this rather unstable internal politics. Although at the same time 
joining the European Union might bring some stability to them. But I still 
feel that one needs to sort internal issues out before joining the European 
Union, so that they wouldn’t bring problems down to all other European 
Union countries. Although I am all for it that they would join the European 
Union, because that would make things better and bring solidarity.” 
(Tarmo, 27, Tallinn). 
“Well Ukraine is likely. Well the political situation is as it is there currently 
[July 2013], but with their mentality and state [of mind] Ukraine would be 
a much more European candidate than Turkey.” (Brussels, man, 40). 
Since economic issues have been dominating the discussion on Europeanness as 
highlighted in the previous section, this became an important element in framing 
Europe spatially as well. 
“Ukraine should first become a capitalist country, then it could make this 
shift. It just doesn’t fit at all right now. […] I viewed Georgia in a very 
positive way for a while and I had such high hopes for Georgia, but it’s going 
to take a long time still before it’ll be fit for Europe. It’s night and day. 
Black and white. We are just so different. […] But Moldova? Let them 
develop a bit more is what I think.” (Aino, 77, Tallinn). 
Some residual feelings of solidarity going back to the Soviet past could be detected 
in the responses for this reluctance to include these countries in the European 
space. People related to the situation of Ukraine (in 2013), Moldova and Georgia, 
and even though there was mainly economic concern that the EU ‘can’t take care 
of its poor already’ (Eveli, 48, Brussels), there was general agreement that if these 
countries fulfil the requirements the EU sets for them, then they could, just like 
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Estonia, become member states. In this regard, the EU requirements were seen to 
coincide with the understanding of Europe. 
“I’m thinking that if we are [in the EU] then why shouldn’t the other former 
Soviet republics be there, like Georgia or Moldova, but I don’t know if they 
should. Then again, if they were, I wouldn’t mind. […] I don’t have these 
sorts of preferences.” (Piret, 37, Tallinn).  
“Of course they could [join]. Georgia could certainly (täielikult) [join]. I’ve 
heard somewhere that Moldova is the poorest now and well it’s small also. 
[…] Does Moldova even want to join? I don’t know.” (Leeni, 73, Tallinn) 
Defining the spatial boundaries of Europe through EU membership provides a good 
transition to the next section focusing on how Estonia is perceived within the EU. 
While ‘Europe’ is seen as more fluid category based on values, with boundaries 
drawn according to perceived cultural differences, and the EU occasionally 
conflated within this idea, then the next section addresses what the EU means for 
the respondents and how they perceive Estonia within this framework nearly a 
decade after accession. 
 
5.4 ESTONIA IN THE EU 
Whereas in the 1990s, becoming a member state of the EU was equated to 
restoring Estonia’s natural place in the Western world, then a decade after the 
accession, the ideational and emotional understandings were being overshadowed 
by more pragmatist (capitalist/neoliberal) way of thought. This shift could have 
been expected with having had time to ‘settle in’ and position itself within the 
EU. However, it also provides interesting new grounds for exploring how the 
people in Estonia perceive their country and the Union itself. 
Before going into the conceptual analysis of what European Union means for the 
respondents in Estonia, it is necessary to highlight that similarly to the uncritical 
reflection on the European values, the wider concept of the EU is not something 
that the respondents appeared to reflect on a day-to-day basis, and this should be 
kept in mind during the following discussion.  
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So what does the EU mean to the average Estonian? As the Eurobarometer 80 
survey conducted in autumn 2013 demonstrates, the meaning of the EU for 
Estonians lies mostly in the possibilities to travel, study and work abroad (71%), 
but also in sharing a common currency, the Euro (31,4%) and in the overly 
complicated bureaucracy (21,1%). The next aspect mentioned in the 
Eurobarometer list is peace, with 17,2%. However, the relevance of peace in the 
EU contexts seems to gain relevance with age, as only 12,1% of 15-24 year-olds 
marked it as a meaningful aspect of the EU and 23,3% of 55 and older. While the 
statistics seems to depict a roughly similar understanding compared to the 
interview data, the relevance of these numbers in everyday life should, not be 
overstated, and how these ‘meanings’ are framed deserves a more careful 
consideration. 
As to the merging of the terms, when discussing who belongs to Europe, the EU 
was used by the respondents as the official measure for validating a country’s 
Europeanness, although a number of non-members were also depicted as having a 
good foundation for becoming a ‘true’ European country, as discussed in the 
previous section. This interpretation is rather self-evident and based on how 
accessing the EU was seen as the official recognition of Estonia’s own ‘return to 
Europe’. Some concern, however, could be detected over further enlargement 
regarding the EU’s integrity. The following quote from an Estonian official in 
Brussels brings out quite a few interesting elements regarding how a respondent 
perhaps somewhat more exposed to the themes of Europe in her everyday life 
viewed Europe and Estonia’s place in it.  
“But it’s too soon to expand because we need to deal with the 2004 
enlargement first. The gap between the so-called old and new has not 
entirely disappeared and when you listen to statements, then there is still 
talk about old and new or East and West. That gap needs to be overcome 
(ületada) first of all. And I think that the average European citizen is 
somewhat tired of the enlargement. [We] need to get the current system 
working now before we look any further. At the same time it’s good (õige) 
that we are cooperating with the Eastern countries for economic reasons, 
but also in the sense of values. The European Union has a very clearly 
pronounced policy that we would like our neighbourhood to be… That it is 
easier for us to live and cooperate and do business, if we share similar 
values. But to share similar values, one does not certainly need to be a 
European Union member state. That is not the only way. Now we have the 
eastern partnership, southern partnership and then the strategic partners, 
USA and Russia. That is just another way of cooperation. In the long run, 
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this enlargement theme will come up but well, now on the 1st of July [2013] 
Croatia joined, so let’s just wait and take them in properly (võtame nemad 
korralikult oma rüppe) and get these things and decisions working more 
smoothly.” (Tiina, 37, Brussels). 
There are several possible explanations for this seemingly inherent inconsistency 
of perceiving certain countries as part of Europe but at the same time being 
reluctant to validate their Europeanness through EU membership. First, the threat 
perception and themes of security are embedded in the value dimension and in 
this sense validating further post-Soviet countries’ place in Europe and thereby 
removing them from possibly belonging to Russia’s ‘sphere of influence’ serves 
the purpose of protecting Estonia’s own security. Second, but also related to the 
theme of security, having more former Soviet countries in the European space 
with strong ties to the European Union is regarded as having allies with a similar 
historical background, who would (hopefully) share a similar perspective 
especially with regard to Russia and would therefore support a firmer stance 
against Russia (this idea of ‘more Western than the West’ is addressed more 
specifically in the next chapter). Third, and a counter-argument for a wider 
integration with the EU lies in the economic perspective. Even though Estonia is 
perceived by many respondents as superior to some other EU states in terms of 
economic values as discussed in the previous section, it is still a beneficiary of the 
EU structural funds10. This can be seen as justified in the suffering narrative and 
EU’s moral obligation to support Estonia as briefly stated earlier. 
One could argue here that including poorer countries in the EU might diminish the 
amount of support Estonia receives (which will also be discussed below in terms 
of responsibility Estonia is seen to have in the EU) and therefore the respondents 
frequently tried to negotiate these perspectives when discussing possible EU 
enlargement. When asked about what the EU means, the use of structural funds 
was one of the first things the respondents referred to. This was particularly the 
                                                          
10 According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Estonia, in 2007–2013, Estonia was allocated 
3.4 billion euro in structural aid. In addition to structural aid, Estonia was granted other 
supports and funds (cohesion policy, agricultural and fishery subsidies, rural development 
fund). In seven years (2007–2013), Estonia received a total of 4.764 billion euro or a little 
more than 500 euro per person per year in EU support. In the next period (2014-2020), Estonia 
receives 5.86 billion. Estonia pays around 1.4 billion euro into the EU budget. Hence, Estonia 
will receive 4.5 billion euros more from the EU than it pays in the following seven years. 
(http://www.vm.ee/en/estonia-5-years-european-union, accessed 20.05.2016) 
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case with older respondents in the more rural areas for whom the dimension of 
working and travelling abroad was not as relevant. 
“With Europe, it’s that we can travel everywhere we want in Europe. We 
have the common currency (raha). The fact that we have received funds 
from the European Union (she laughs).” (Kaili, 70, Central Estonia). 
 
5.4.1 THE IDEATIONAL ‘SECOND ESTONIAN REPUBLIC’? 
 When addressing Estonia’s own place specifically within the EU, several 
interesting elements emerged from the interview data. Moving on to the temporal, 
as opposed to spatial dimension of national identity construction, the period 
between regaining independence in 1991 and joining the EU and NATO in 2004 was 
at times referred to as the ‘Estonian Republic’ (Eesti Vabariik), indicating that 
the sense of hard-won independence has diminished with joining the EU and 
instead of drawing on the Estonian Republic of the interwar period as a foundation 
for the present-day Estonian identity construction, the basis for comparison in 
regards to belonging to the EU, especially in economic terms, came from what can 
be termed in this context the ‘Second’ Estonian Republic (1991-2004). This term 
is used here simply as an ideational temporal point of reference for Estonian 
identity construction surfacing from the data analysis. There appears to be a shift 
in how the term ‘republic’ (vabariik), which is rooted in the top-down narrative 
of legal continuity of the first interwar period of independence of the Estonian 
Republic, marking state sovereignty and independence, and from the 1990s also 
breaking away from the Soviet Union, is perceived by the respondents. While 
Estonia would certainly be viewed as a republic if asked directly, the full term 
(Estonian Republic [Eesti Vabariik]) is hardly ever used by the respondents when 
discussing present-day issues. The respondents would mostly talk about Estonia 
(Eesti) in that context. However, it is utilised to refer specifically to the pre-
accession period (1991-2004) when discussing the EU. Addressing the hardships of 
the economic crisis, one respondent said: “It is very difficult [right now] in the 
sense that in the last years of the Estonian Republic life wasn’t as hard as it is 
now.” (Kaili, 70, Central Estonia).  
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The basis for this perception can be traced back to several possible factors. The 
anti-EU campaign in the lead-up to the EU referendum in Estonia focused heavily 
on the ‘joining another Union’ narrative. This reference to having belonged to the 
Soviet Union, a significant negative ‘Other’ firmly rooted in the foundation of 
Estonian national identity-building since the beginning of the 1990s, laid out a 
wider negative context not only in terms of distribution of power, which will be 
discussed below, but also emotionally. This narrative of going from one union to 
another, which was prevalent among the Eurosceptic camp in the pre-accession 
period, had become relevant again, especially in light of the economic and the 
related ‘value’ crisis discussed in the previous sections.  
“We were in one union and [it looks like] it’s turning into the same union 
in the end, because here in Europe, they want to turn everything into one 
and the same. In the end it’ll turn out to be just like that [the Soviet Union]. 
Within time [that is]. […] They are just centralising and centralising and in 
the end we’ll have the Soviet Union back.” (Priit, 49, Tallinn).  
“It’s like the Soviet Union used to be. That there were 15 republics. Now 
it’s all the same. […] I mean, let me tell you how we were taught in school 
when still in the Soviet Union. Our music teacher taught us that when you 
have 15 republics – that one branch breaks easily, but when you have 15 of 
them, you can’t break them quite so easily. That we should be in a union, 
but well the union’s just changed now. Let’s just say there isn’t much of a 
difference.” (Toomas, 39, Tallinn). 
Attached to this wider narrative is the perceived decrease of Estonia’s 
independence and decision-making powers after joining the EU structures 
accompanied by the general disillusionment with the EU in light of the economic 
crisis, which helps to consolidate this understanding further.  
“Since I was not around myself […] then I think that the fear of losing our 
independence [she meant not regaining independence] was even bigger 
[late 80s and early 90s]. […] Now in one respect […], losing independence 
has more to do with the fact that we are in the European Union. That 
perhaps now it’s this large union and country.” (Siret, 22, Southern 
Estonia).  
“And people think that in a way we don’t have our proper state any longer, 
our own decision-making and our own backyard. [We do] but everything is 
coming from Brussels and our word doesn’t count for anything anymore, or 
well it does, but it’s all down to the officials [we have there].” (Mart, 50, 
Brussels).  
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Even though quite a few respondents were critical of the EU structures, the level 
of dissatisfaction can be seen more as coming from within the general framework 
of belonging to the EU rather than longing to exist independently of it. Belonging 
to the EU with all of its imperfections is still considered the lesser evil compared 
to being outside it. 
“The fact that a lot of youngsters say that ‘oh we’re just hanging on 
(sabarakk) to Brussels and we do everything Brussels wants us to’, but our 
little Estonia, we alone, life has shown it, can’t exist. We don’t have the 
strength, can’t manage on our own.” (Leeni, 73, Tallinn).  
As can be seen from the quotes above, the people in their late 30s, 40s and 50s 
used the late Soviet period as a benchmark (and grumbling about constraints on 
sovereignty), while those in their early 20s have no direct memory of the USSR. 
Older people who can remember the Stalinist and immediate post-Stalinist period 
appeared to be more hesitant to draw a direct comparison between the EU and 
USSR, or, as seen from the last quote, seemed to be more inclined to think there 
is no other option but to be part of the EU. 
An important element in Estonia’s general identity-building narrative emerges 
from here. The idea of Estonia as a small but sturdy state is accompanied by the 
narrative of suffering and unfairness, which will be discussed more in Chapter 7 
discussing everyday life. This line of thought is also evident in how the respondents 
discussed themes of equality and EU’s regulations and norms that have been 
imposed on Estonia during the last decade.  
The decision-making powers, or rather the lack of these was discussed in terms of 
formal equality in rights of member states. The relative equality of member states 
within the EU has been highlighted in the Estonian top-down discourse, but the 
substance of equality was questioned among most of the respondents who 
remained sceptical about the ability of Estonia to influence European Union policy 
centrally.  
“It’s always like that, that on paper we can be all equal, but there is a 
difference in the equality.” (Priit, 49, Tallinn).  
“I do [see Estonia as an equal partner in the EU]. I think that it’ll rise even 
higher and become more equal than it is now. There is always someone 
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more equal than the others. I think that we will go far. People want to and 
will is such a big thing.” (Anna, 65, Tallinn). 
Even though in the last quote she reiterates the formal clause of equality between 
member states, the rest of the quote goes on to discuss the opposite to that. The 
lack of equality is seen as translating into Estonia’s interests not being represented 
and, consequently, the complexities of the state not being accounted for when 
EU policies and regulations are devised. The EU is seen as enforcing broad-brush 
policies without regard for the regional, cultural or most importantly, the 
economic differences between EU member states. The perceived unfairness and 
disregard for Estonia’s smallness and economic development by the EU becomes 
especially prevalent and from this perspective there is the sense that the 
European Union is seen at times as more of a hindrance than a benefit to it.  
“We would fit there if only the regulations and all that politics would be 
different. One can’t take a small country and nation like us as an equal 
partner with the other big ones. It’s just not conceivable. […] The demands 
from us should be smaller or equivalent to the size and capabilities.” (Aino, 
77, Tallinn).  
“It’s all these goals that the European Union sets for us – that we all have 
to go [along] with the European Union. But they have no regard for our own 
country and how small we are, and what suits us better. […] Like their 
demands are so high for our small Estonia. I think that they are too high. 
That they want everybody to be more like Europe but at the same time not 
[everybody is]. Well the salaries – they aren’t. Look at the salaries in 
Europe, but we don’t have those. But at the same time they want to set all 
the taxes and all those things according to Europe. That is wrong.” (Linda 
34, Tallinn).  
Another important element emerges from the last quote. Here, she is referring to 
economically more advanced European states with the term ‘Europe’, which 
demonstrates the complex approach to this and how, in the mind of this 
respondent, in practical economic terms Estonia has yet to fulfil the imagined 
self-set criteria for becoming European. In this sense, the term ‘Europe’ still has 
an economically aspirational aspect to it.  
The EU’s regulations and quotas set for Estonia were especially highlighted by 
people in rural areas, where local agricultural producing and livestock farming has 
become more difficult. The respondents blamed EU regulations for the 
disappearance of the informal market and smaller businesses, which were 
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considered essential elements of Estonian rural life. In this sense, the EU is framed 
as a ‘threat’ to the traditional way of life. Yet, at the same time, the benefits 
from being in the EU are seen to outweigh this threat. 
“We are very bounded and still very attached to the European Union. That 
perhaps there are things that Estonians would like to do but simply cannot 
[because we are in the EU]. […] I was thinking in the lines of agriculture. 
[…] At one point people just stopped keeping cows. And because a lot of 
people had the problem that they could no longer give the milk anywhere, 
unless they started to do that officially. Those small households just 
disappeared.” (Siret, 22, Southern Estonia).  
“In the [cafeteria] kitchen we need to measure the temperature of the 
refrigerators on a daily basis. That is actually rubbish. […] I would say 
unreasonable use of working hours (tööaeg). […] It was also in the papers 
that some of our laws are written in too much detail, that some of them 
could just be plain reasonable (üldinimlikult mõistetavad).” (Laila, 55, 
Setomaa).  
The slow working processes and excessive bureaucracy of the EU were opposed to 
the understanding of Estonia’s flexibility and ability to achieve more rapid 
reforms. This was explicitly discussed by one Estonian EU official. 
“Well as an authentic Estonian – we like these relatively, let’s say quick 
and concrete decisions and not these endless discussions, but here [in 
Brussels] they have a lot of this endless discussion. […] It can happen that 
things don’t get decided because some countries’ opposition is so strong 
and we can discuss an issue for 5 or 7 years and not get anywhere. I don’t 
think that this is very encouraging. […] Looking at it through the media […] 
then European Union is seen as establishing new additional annoying 
standards. But well the average person has no idea how they get to these 
specific standards. […] That yes, the European Union is perhaps this 
annoying establisher of control and rules. […] We fulfil all the European 
Union laws and directives on the dot (punktipealt). The others don’t do 
that.” (Riina, 32, Brussels). 
There was a level of dissatisfaction detectable with not only the regulations, 
norms and requirements set by the EU, but with how Estonia has been fulfilling 
these.  
“I mean, I thought that Estonians are a conscientious people. And all these 
directives were taken too literally (üks ühele). Even the great politicians 
have said that you go to Brussels and there aren’t these types of 
fastidiousness or demands that have been placed on us, and this has killed 
off these lovely small places like cafeterias or something.” (Signe, 70, Muhu 
island).  
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On the one hand, this ‘poster-boy’ image is used to highlight the ‘true’ European 
values as discussed in the previous section and perceived as something to take 
pride in. On the other hand, a level of disgruntlement is evident when discussing 
some of the ‘unreasonable’ requirements set by the EU, which Estonia’s 
government fulfils to the letter in part to maintain this image and demonstrate its 
deep-rooted belonging to the EU structures and European values. It can be argued 
that sustaining the normal ‘good European’ state image is a matter of ontological 
security for Estonia. Pēteris Timofejevs Henriksson uses this concept to describe 
the Latvian quest for ‘Europeanness’ explaining that it is useful for suggesting that 
states might ‘feel’ the need to follow a coherent state narrative in their actions 
for not only the domestic and external audiences but also to sustain a consistent 
Self and ensure the credibility and predictability of their respective countries 
(2017: 222). This applies similarly in the case of Estonia. 
However, there appears to be a difference in perspective with people on the 
ground, who are more focused on everyday issues and tangible material benefits. 
Maintaining this image may have an adverse effect locally, where EU regulations 
were seen by the respondents as detached from the everyday practicalities and 
therefore distanced themselves from not only the already distant EU decision-
making processes but also from the state-level politics. While fulfilling all the 
targets set by the EU in the pre-accession period was seen as a necessity by the 
respondents, the unconditional implementation of EU norms and directives has 
come under criticism having gained a decade of experience in the union.  
Piret: “But I don’t know why they [the Estonian political elite] wanted to 
go there [into the EU] so badly. Perhaps we could have gained a bit in 
prosperity for a year or two and then join. That we were in such a hurry to 
get there, but well maybe it was a correct [decision], because the faster 
we got in, the faster we got our road constructions and all sorts of projects 
going.”  
Me: “Who do you mean by ‘them’? 
Piret: “Well Estonian state, the government […]. They organized it all – that 
the GDP and everything would be in order. And that we’re not going to raise 
that tax, we’ll raise this, or that or the third one, so that for god’s sake 
everything would be within the norm.” (37, Tallinn).  
The EU was seen as sharing responsibility in case of any financial problems, but 
interestingly Estonia was not perceived as contributing to this shared 
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responsibility (as also seen in the section discussing the North-South division in 
Europe), which demonstrates how the respondents relate to the role of Estonia 
within the EU and the EU itself. While the assistance received from the EU was 
seen as a positive aspect of joining, this almost appears to be deserved for having 
suffered through the Soviet occupation and fulfilling the accession criteria. The 
respondents appeared to shift the responsibility for the functioning of the EU to 
larger and wealthier member states.  
“Well let’s just say that I didn’t get much out of it when we joined the [EU] 
and if we break from them. Well let’s say about the common money, about 
the Estonian kroon – when something had gone really wrong, then there 
would be nobody to palm them off to. In that sense, Euro is the Euro. Before 
Estonia had to keep the kroon on a certain level. Now, let’s just say, it is 
no longer Estonia’s problem.” (Toomas, 39, Tallinn).  
One might question here that perhaps the equality discussed earlier is not sought 
for as this would also increase Estonia’s responsibility within the EU? A possible 
explanation could be that having so-called ticked all the boxes and ‘suffered’ 
through the 90s to reach the admission into the EU, there was an expectation of 
some leniency in terms of filling all the norms and regulations discussed above.  
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, almost a decade within the EU, the security dimension of belonging 
to the EU had lost some of its relevance and economic themes had started to 
prevail. This can be explained with the recent economic crisis and relatively stable 
security situation within the area for some time. Since then, and with Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing war in Donbass area, there has been 
a shift in this perspective, but at the time of conducting the interviews, I would 
argue that the expected European ‘normality’ had settled in to a degree. The 
sense of firmly belonging to the value structures, and even surpassing the 
dwindling regard for ‘true’ values of Europe by Southern European countries, had 
become evident. The chapter demonstrates that there has been a shift from the 
Othering of anything Soviet/Russian to a more nuanced positioning of Estonia as 
North in the spatial perceptions of Europe. 
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Apart from opposing the North and South in ideational ‘Europe’ for the 
respondents, this construction of spatial ‘normality’ can have further, likely 
unintended consequences. Shaping the perception of ‘Europe’ according to 
understandings of ‘true’ European values embodied by Estonia might cause further 
divisions in the mental mapping of ‘Europe’. Perhaps some disillusionment with 
the idea of ‘Europe’ can also be seen as a possible factor for the rise of support 
for the anti-EU national conservative party in Estonia in recent years. 
The chapter also demonstrates how a new temporal benchmark for Estonian 
identity-construction can be seen to lie in the beginning of 1990s rather than the 
inter-war period. This can be attributed both to generational change, but also to 
inherently perceiving Estonia as a sovereign state, even if constrained at times by 
EU regulations, without the need to rely back on the narrative of state restoration 
- in a way having ‘returned to Europe’ - achieved ‘normality’.  
  
150 
 
CHAPTER 6. RUSSIA AS THE OTHER  
 
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, what lies at the very heart of identifying 
oneself either individually, as a family, a community or a state, is the need for 
the Other. In the present thesis, Estonia’s national identity is seen as constructed 
through the reflexion of several Others (Europe, Russia) in a complex and at times 
contradictory manner. Focusing on Russia as the perennial Other in Estonia’s 
national identity construction, this chapter brings out the complex perceptions of 
Russia that existed in the aftermath of the economic crisis, in order to facilitate 
a more in-depth understanding of the Estonian identity-building process. Since the 
‘abnormality’ of the Soviet Union Estonian identity is set against (see Chapter 2) 
also refers to post-Soviet Russia, which refuses to accept the foundational 
narrative of Estonian statehood and is seen as neo-imperialist and a security 
threat, it is essential to explore this relationship of Othering in order to gain 
deeper insights into post-accession Estonian ‘normality’. Not surprisingly, the 
academic literature has to date mostly focused on the threatening qualities of 
Russia as the Other in understanding Estonian national identity. However, while 
issues of security did not lose their relevance in Estonia’s relations with its Eastern 
neighbour (i.e. ‘normalisation’ of relations has not occurred within the decade 
following the accession to the EU and NATO), certain new non-securitised aspects 
emerged which need to be addressed in order to understand the post-accession 
‘normality’ in Estonia. The first part of this chapter focuses on the securitised 
nature and threatening qualities of Estonian-Russian relations while the second 
part looks at the non-threatening qualities within Othering Russia in Estonian 
identity-building process.  
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In the first section of this chapter I will explore the idea of ‘normalising’ relations 
with Russia, the role of conflicting historical narratives and cultural Othering 
within the relations with Russia and in constructing Estonian national identity vis–
à–vis Russia as discussed previously in Chapter 3. The second part of the chapter 
brings out an interesting more recent development emerging from the interview 
data, which frames the more pragmatic approach in strengthening economic ties 
with Russia within the wider national identity construction. More specifically, the 
interviews revealed that relations with Russia were conceived in terms of the 
neoliberal economic narrative that had taken hold during the EU accession period 
and which is used to position Estonia within the framework of the enlarged EU (as 
previously discussed in Chapter 5). On the basis of the interview data, I argue 
that, with Estonia having spent almost a decade in the EU and NATO in a security 
situation characterised by relative calm, a certain normalisation – different to that 
which had been articulated as a goal in the 1990s - had been achieved in relation 
to Russia and that pragmatic economic themes had become more relevant in 
people’s everyday perceptions.  
 
6.2 SECURITISING RUSSIA 
6.2.1 NORMALISING RELATIONS 
At the centre of the Estonian national campaign since the late 1980s has been the 
assumption that Estonia forms part of the West, as opposed to the ‘crisis’ zone of 
the East. The notion of securing a ‘return to Europe’ – and, more broadly, a ‘return 
to the Western World’ (Smith 2003a: 156) has been one of the dominating features 
of the national narrative in Estonia (as previously demonstrated in length in 
Chapter 5). Addressing the core of Estonia’s foreign policy within this national 
narrative, integration to the West was depicted as a necessary prelude to the full 
‘normalisation’ of relations with Russia (Smith 2003c: 66) but, what did this mean? 
As mentioned in the literature review, Jüri Luik, Estonian Minister of Foreign 
Affairs (1994-1995), in his speech ‘Quo Vadis Estonian Foreign Policy?’ in 1994 put 
forward an equation of Security equals Integration plus Normalisation. President 
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Lennart Meri in 1995 added to that that: ‘Normalisation for us means establishing 
the same kinds of relations with Russia as we enjoy with the United States or 
Germany or Sweden’. It has been rightly claimed that among the reasons for such 
a construction was the hope that membership in Western organisations would 
reconstruct the relationship between Estonia and its Eastern neighbour, forcing 
Russia to abandon its post-imperial manners and treat Estonia as a ‘normal’ 
country, not a part of its ‘sphere of influence’ (Berg and Ehin 2009: 3). However, 
if one looks more closely at this construction, it can be argued that there might 
in fact have been less ‘real’ expectation that the relationship with Russia would 
be fully reconstructed and become ‘normalised’ through the integration with the 
Western structures than meets the eye in the first place.  
The standstill in Estonian-Russian relations post-2004 can be attributed to 
conflicting identities, where in this case, Estonia is constructed as a ‘normal’ 
Western state, ready and willing to engage with Russia on the level of European 
postmodernist values while Russia, as an imperialistic, backward and more 
traditional country in its security logic, proves itself impossible to have ‘normal’ 
relations with. This is not to say that improvement in relations with Russia was 
not genuinely expected or that a change in relations did not take place. But what 
would happen if the relations did indeed ‘normalise’? Since Estonian Europeanness 
can be seen to be contingent to a degree on the ‘Othering’ of Russia, ‘normal’ 
relations with Russia would remove one of the core features of Estonia’s current 
claim to Europeanness. That being said, if relations were to ‘normalise’ (which is, 
at the time of writing, a task much further away than it was in 2013), it would 
also remove the very need for Estonia to assert its Europeanness since the 
underlying need for security through belonging to European and Euro-Atlantic 
institutions would disappear. Plus, as can be seen in other regards, after nearly a 
decade since accession to the EU and NATO, there appears to be enough self-
esteem and confidence in its acceptance as a ‘European’ country that people 
perceive Estonia to be an even ‘truer’ Europe in terms of economic values as 
demonstrated in the previous chapter (Chapter 5). This dynamic of normalising 
Estonian-Russian relation is certainly complex, and as can be seen from 
international events in recent years, perhaps full normalisation is a futile 
hypothetical to pose, but exploring this complicated idea of normalisation gives 
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us an understanding of the wider identity-constructions in Estonia as to what 
‘normality’ entails in relation to Russia.  
Indeed, there are several complex layers in the idea of ‘normalising’ relations 
which come out in my analysis of interviews and deserve to be addressed in order 
to better understand the wider connotations of this approach. The interview data 
revealed that the underlying securitisation of relations with Russia is still evident. 
It is difficult to disentangle the various themes running through the interview data 
regarding continuous securitisation of Russia as these are conflated at times. 
Nevertheless, I will first provide an overview of the role that conflicting historical 
narratives play within present-day national identity constructions. This is followed 
by the discussion of Russia as the Other from the perspective of Estonia within the 
international structures of EU and NATO, inclusion into which was supposed to 
‘normalise’ relations with Russia as put forward by the official discourse in the 
1990s. Finally, I look at what had indeed become ‘normal’ in understanding 
relations with Russia after nearly a decade within these organisations.  
 
6.2.2 CONFLICTING HISTORY NARRATIVES 
One of the underlying elements to include in order to analyse how the process of 
Othering Russia impacts Estonian national identity constructions is the role of the 
conflicting history narratives within the domestic and international context. As 
previously discussed in the literature review (Chapter 3), the conflicting history 
narratives have been explored at length by various scholars, especially in the 
aftermath of the relocation of the Bronze Soldier monument in 2007. The essence 
for this conflict lies in the fact that Russia maintains the stance that the Soviet 
takeover of Estonia did not amount to an illegal occupation, which is the basis of 
the dominant EU discourse. The previous chapter demonstrated that the interwar 
period has lost some its relevance in how people on the ground negotiate 
belonging to Europe and that the 1990s have gained traction as a benchmark for 
this identity construction. However, when it comes to relations with Russia, the 
interwar period and the ensuing Soviet occupation still form a significant element 
in shaping people’s perceptions. The independence Estonia had prior to the 
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occupation and the politics of the Soviet era, create an us versus them dichotomy 
in Estonia’s identity construction (see Onken 2007). The following statements by 
interviewees illustrate this very well: 
“Even though I think that Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania do not pose any sort 
of a political or military threat to Russia, then the Russian minority topic 
and of course the Second World War are completely different for Estonia 
and these approaches are so different that to find some sort of mutual 
understanding here – that takes time. New generations need to come. As 
long as the people who remember it all from both sides, who fought on a 
specific front, are alive… From the Russian side the ones who fought in the 
Great Patriotic War and from the Estonian side the ones who were forced 
to fight on the Russian front or the Forest Brothers, or the ones who were 
deported before or after the War. This anger and this difference in world 
view is so great that I don’t know whether it’s even possible to overcome 
in this artificial manner. Perhaps it’s time that will solve this issue.” (Tiina, 
37, Brussels). 
The understanding that ‘normalisation’ of relations is a matter of time (‘new 
generations need to come’) suggests that for this respondent, there is no 
fundamental difference that couldn’t be overcome in the relations. This 
perception is supported to a degree by the new temporal benchmark for Estonian 
‘normality’ shifting to the 1990s rather than the interwar period of independence 
as already discussed in Chapter 5. Another respondent, a slightly older and from 
a mixed Estonian-Russian background, indicated rather that the resolution to this 
issue is for Russia to finally come to terms with the dissolution of the Soviet Union 
and accept Estonia as an independent country. 
“We have the Soviet time behind us (selja taga). And as long as nobody 
talks it through on either side, this attitude will remain sharp (teravaks). 
Their government, their Putin - he said that the biggest mistake has been 
allowing the Soviet Union to disintegrate. […] We are an independent 
country. And they will inevitably have to accept us like that. Whether they 
want to or not. Well, I understand that they don’t want to, but there’s 
nothing they can do about that.” (Anna, 65, Tallinn). 
As can be seen from the excerpts above, and again in line with previous research, 
the interview data provided supporting evidence for the understanding that 
Russia’s expansionist interests had not disappeared with Estonia joining the EU 
and NATO. Russia’s nostalgia for the Soviet Union becomes evident in the Estonian 
political discourse and the notion that Russia still sees Estonia in its sphere of 
influence constantly reconstructs the securitised nature of Estonian-Russian 
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relations. How the respondent below discussed the events surrounding the Bronze 
Soldier incident (‘it has not gone anywhere’) demonstrates her clear perception 
that the relations have failed to ‘normalise’.  
“We have been conquered and we have been treated badly. Very badly 
indeed, take the Siberia topic – the Estonian will never forgive that. […] 
Even if I myself or my grandparents weren’t taken to Siberia, then I’m still 
mad about all of this. And it’s because the Russians themselves haven’t 
changed their attitude. As they were shouting during the Bronze Night - 
we’re back! This all demonstrated that it has not gone anywhere. From 
both sides. […] It hasn’t buried these thoughts for sure. This can be seen 
here and there, where they use their people… Like Georgia or Belarus or 
anywhere. It can be seen that it hasn’t buried their thoughts that we would 
all belong there.” (Katrin, 32, Tallinn). 
The conflicting historical narratives constitute one of the main sources of Russia’s 
drift in the anti-Western direction (Fofanova and Morozov 2009: 26). And 
understandably this creates tension in Estonian-Russian relations as well as 
Russia’s relations with the West. The battle of historical narratives is also 
embedded in the assertion of Europeanness. As discussed in the literature review 
(Chapter 3) both Estonia and Russia seek to assert their own Europeanness while 
denying the Europeanness of the other (Mälksoo 2009: 69). In this sense there is a 
clash of identities at both the domestic and international level as both constructs 
deny the legitimacy of the other (Kasekamp and Brüggemann 2009: 51) casting 
one another concurrently into the category of ‘unclean’ or ‘false’ Europe (Mälksoo 
2009: 69; Morozov 2003, 2005). Therefore, it can be argued that Estonia would 
not need to assert its own Europeanness quite as much if the relations were to 
indeed ‘normalise’. As stated before, there are two sides to this ‘what if’ scenario 
which is today much further away than in 2013 – if relations were to ‘normalise’ 
as put forward in the 1990s, Estonia would indeed lose the Russian Other for 
asserting its Europeanness, but on the other hand, there would be less need to 
assert Europeanness if Russia did not constantly try to undermine this by asserting 
that Estonia belongs to its sphere of influence. 
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6.2.3 POST-ACCESSION ‘NORMALITY’  
Looking at the ‘normalisation’ construct from another perspective, the idea of 
‘normalising’ relations with Russia during the 1990s can be seen as bound up with 
the strategic goal of joining the EU and NATO. Desecuritising Russia on the 
condition of joining the EU and NATO can be viewed as incentivising the 
international community to include Estonia into its structures in order to stabilise 
the international political landscape and remove Estonia from possibly being 
considered by Russia to be under its sphere of influence. At the same time Estonia 
was able to demonstrate its rightful belonging to the Western value system by 
emphasising its readiness to develop ‘normal’ relations with Russia. As Estonian 
Foreign Minister Toomas Hendrik Ilves stated in 1996, the normalisation of 
relations with Russia will be difficult to achieve as long as Estonia is unable to 
relate to Russia as ‘a normal Western state, free and confident of its independence 
and not as a former colony or oblast’ burdened by complexes and doubts (cited in 
Smith 2003c: 64). In the domestic context, this discourse helped demonstrate the 
necessity of belonging to the Western structures, with Russia viewed as an 
existential threat conditioned on the accession.  
Estonia’s official integration to the West was validated in 2004 with the accession 
to the EU and NATO. However, Estonian-Russian relations did not reach the level 
of normalisation argued for. On the contrary, there are voices arguing that since 
Estonia joined these Western institutions, its relations with Russia have even taken 
a yet more controversial turn (Mälksoo 2006: 279; Berg and Ehin 2009: 29). Prior 
to the accession to these organisations emphasising images of threat emanating 
from Russia was not advantageous for the prospect of joining the EU and NATO, 
due to their cautious attitude vis-à-vis Moscow (Noreen and Sjöstedt 2004: 741). 
However, once EU and NATO membership had been achieved, Estonia and other 
new member states felt a lot more secure in expressing their ‘true’ position. 
While the idea of ‘normalisation’ introduced in the 1990s remains elusive a decade 
after joining the EU and NATO, the discursive construction of ‘normalisation’ has 
in itself been influential in the Estonian national identity-building process. Since 
the idea of ‘normalisation’ has played an important part in Estonian identity-
construction especially towards Russia, the process of striving for ‘normalisation’ 
157 
 
can be seen as contributing to establishing an alternative ‘normality’ in relations 
with Russia. ‘Normalisation’ of relations or rather the lack of ‘normal’ relations 
with Russia is referred to here in the more general idea that the portrayal of Russia 
as a perennial ‘Other’ as an imperialistic, backward and a more traditional country 
in its security logic, fails to meet the standards of ‘normalisation’ put forward by 
the Estonian political elite in the pre-accession period (as seen through the quotes 
of President Meri and Foreign Minister Luik, and also of my respondents as 
discussed above). That the perceived differences in worldview and values, the 
chaotic, arbitrary and lawless behaviour of Russia, do not coincide with the 
Estonian idea of ‘normality’. Europe and Estonia within it constitute the 
‘normality’ for Estonia and ‘normal’ relations would thus be possible if Russia 
would embrace the same values and accept that Estonia can no longer be seen as 
belonging its sphere of influence.  
“I don’t know what made [the relations] bad to begin with. Is it really only 
the fact that we became independent or has the fact that we joined the 
European Union and NATO caused the resentment on the Russian side? I 
couldn’t tell. I think that they perhaps also don’t like that we joined 
another union. […] I think that [relations] with other countries are very 
much okay. I think that the only ones who have any problems are the 
Eastern neighbours. As to the others, the countries surrounding us and the 
ones further away – I think that the relations are very good.” (Piret, 37, 
Tallinn). 
The constant process of trying to achieve ‘normal’ relations can therefore be 
regarded as a ‘normality’ in itself already. The process of ‘normalising’ relations 
has become a wider part of Estonian identity constructions and hence guiding 
foreign policy decisions more broadly rather than simply a separate policy goal as 
seen in the 1990s. However, again, one needs to keep in mind the pre-2014 
context here. 
My interviews showed that this top-down discourse of ‘normalising’ relations had 
also left an imprint on how the respondents discussed relations with Russia. The 
understanding that joining the EU and NATO would alter the relationship with 
Russia and provide security came forward during the interviews especially with 
Estonian-speaking respondents.  
“My fears have not disappeared and I’ve also noticed that our state fathers 
(riigiisadel) have not lost that fear. Really. Although I have to say that I 
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was really looking forward to the European Union (euroliitu).” (Aino, 77, 
Tallinn).  
“I would like to keep living in an independent country (she laughs). […] 
Let’s hope that our political leaders are smart enough not to create some 
pointless (kanakitkumise) argument or any kind of a sharp situation. Yes, 
we are small, we are tiny. I have thought about this a lot that we are so 
small that if Russia wanted, it could do whatever it wanted with us (she 
laughs). And very quickly, even if we are [a member of the European Union 
and NATO].” (Merike, 49, Muhu island). 
However, as seen from the quotes above, this expectation of ‘normalising’ 
relations had not materialised with joining the international structures, and the 
threat perception regarding Russia was still evident in 2013. Another expected 
thread running through the interview data is the depiction of Estonia as a small 
state. Mindaugas Jurkynas (2014: 114-115) claims that the size and lack of 
resources (see discussion in section 6.3) of Estonia (and the other Baltic states) 
sharpen the security anxieties and prompt the Baltic States to remind the EU and 
NATO of these concerns. On the other hand, he also brings out how joining these 
international structures was part of alleviating the effects of smallness, and 
through a variety of regional cooperation (especially with the Nordic countries) 
the relevance of ‘smallness’ as a security factor has diminished (Jurkynas 2014: 
118-123). Even so, the threat perceptions of Russia still came through most of the 
Estonian-speakers’ interviews. 
“Of course it would be nice to live without fear, but they, Russia can often 
conduct itself in a pretty beastly (tõpralik) manner with its threats, 
demands, without giving up, fighting without (finding) any agreements.” 
(Aino, 77, Tallinn). 
When discussing the topic of whether the EU and NATO have played a part in 
Estonia’s relations with Russia, a respondent from Tallinn brought out relevance 
of joining the international structures very clearly, but also noted that the security 
matters related to Russia had not vanished with the accession. 
“Yes, of course they play [a part]. European Union was perhaps a sort of a 
victory for Estonians in front of Russians – ‘see now we’re in the West, don’t 
you… Now you need to look at us from the same level, not top-down’. And 
well NATO, I think Estonians considered NATO to be even more important 
than the European Union. For the sake of security. Russia is still perceived 
to be this sort of a threat from the East.” (Tarmo, 27, Tallinn). 
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As one might expect, however, a different perception of threat emanating from 
Russia surfaced from the Russian-speakers’ interviews. 
“I do not see any danger from Russia. Because there is no point just to be 
afraid of Russia. It's just overblown. This is already coming from the 
military, from these [military] exercises. And they are already starting to 
blow up some problems from this. There, near the border between Latvia 
and Lithuania, Russia and Belarus had their exercises, near the border of 
the European Union. Well, what’s wrong with that - the Baltic countries 
had their exercises in Estonia. There is nothing wrong with that. This is all 
blown up from nothing, just like that. If there would have been problems, 
they would have surfaced a long time ago. But, at the moment there are 
no problems. Especially now that the border treaty is signed, almost 
signed.” (Aleksey, 52, Tallinn). 
Another Russian-speaking respondent in Narva reiterated a similar point although 
she appeared to choose her words very carefully in how she communicated her 
stance on the matter to me. 
“Well, Estonia now feels support, I think, the European Union and, as it 
were, is not afraid (she laughs) of Russia. But Russia, how to say, I think 
that ... but ... (thinks for a long time), Russia has a lot of its own problems, 
to be still engaged in some sort of such problems with Estonia. For Estonia, 
I think Russia, well, I do not know, I do not even know how to say - Russia 
is not an enemy, but it's hard to say.” (Nina, 20, Narva). 
The failure to fully ‘normalise’ relations as put forward in the 90s, does not 
however suggest, that joining the EU and NATO had little effect in Estonia’s self-
positioning towards Russia. The existential threat Russia posed had diminished 
(‘fears have not disappeared’) and there had been a general shift in the framework 
of how Russia is discussed in everyday politics. In demonstrating Estonia’s 
intentions for normalising relations with Russia to the Western structures, the 
failure for this normalisation was placed on Russia, therefore denying its place in 
the Western world while simultaneously reaffirming Estonia’s rightful belonging 
to these value structures, which is seen to constitute Estonia’s ‘normality’. Estonia 
positioned its foreign policy firmly within the Western structures regarding any 
contentious issues with Russia, and has taken the stance of ‘more Western than 
the West’ in terms of understanding Russia’s true intentions, which has become 
part of the identity-construction within the EU and NATO, and a certain degree of 
securitisation belongs within this dimension. The difference in the quotes from 
Estonian- and Russian-speakers demonstrated that the Russian-speaking 
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respondents suggested that for them there was a lack of understanding of Russia 
within the Estonian elite.  
An example of a top-down construction of simultaneously placing Estonia within 
the Western value structures while denying Russia’s place within it can be seen in 
a statement by President Ilves during the Georgian War in 2008:  
“In a situation where they [Russia] want to demolish the democratic order 
and European values, it is a priority that the European Union and NATO 
preserved its solidarity and support to other democratic countries.” 
(President Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Eesti Päevaleht, 26.08.2008).  
This thesis is in no way trying to claim that these concerns are not valid, especially 
given the events in 2008 that triggered this statement. The aim here is not to 
remove meaning from the speech acts but to analyse these acts in a wider context, 
in order to provide a more in-depth understanding. 
 
6.2.4 SPHERE OF INFLUENCE 
The interviews with Estonian-speaking respondents suggest that the Russian-
speaking populations within the former Soviet republics were viewed as a tool for 
Russian expansionist interests and exerting its influence in these states. These 
concerns were expressed in a two-fold manner – Russia’s interference in Estonia’s 
domestic affairs and the external image mostly referring to the Western world 
that this creates as well. The respondents sensed that this perception of Russia’s 
influence over Estonia was also relevant outside Estonia. As discussed in Chapter 
2, while self-esteem is driven from within it is also contingent on how Others view 
Estonia and any Russian influence over Estonia does not fit how the respondents 
wanted Estonia to be seen from the outside. This is an image that Estonia has tried 
to rid itself of as it relates both to security and cultural realms of its identity-
construction discussed in this chapter. 
“Inevitably we are seen as, oh Russia, that Estonia – oh that’s Russia. I’m 
sure that this way of thought exists (või seostub, et) that we are like 
Russia’s pendant.” (Greta, 52, Tallinn). 
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The interethnic relations in Estonia will be discussed in more length in the next 
chapter focusing on everyday perspectives, and this section will focus more on the 
external elements of national identity construction although also related to the 
Russian-speaking minority in Estonia. The events surrounding the relocation of the 
Bronze Soldier were perceived to depict Russia’s constant readiness to assert its 
influence over Estonia. As discussed in the literature review, Russia has still not 
accepted that Estonia does not belong to its sphere of influence. 
In a sense, the Russian-speaking population in Estonia was viewed as under 
the influence of the Russian state. However, a more complex dynamic of the 
ethnic relations will be addressed in the next chapter and the selected quotes 
here should be viewed in connection to other complementary understandings of 
relations with Russia (e.g. economic). But within the theme of security, a 
relatively explicit and perhaps expected approach could be seen in the responses. 
Russia’s exploitation of the Russian-speaking populations in Estonia for the 
purposes of its expansionist foreign policy came through in the respondents’ 
discussions regarding the removal of the Bronze Soldier in 2007. 
“I think that, well, removing the Bronze Soldier was one reason, but it 
certainly wasn’t the main reason. This process, the riot against removing 
the Bronze Soldier, today we know that this was planned long ahead. The 
rioters were so-called recruited. They were brainwashed and funded. This 
is another example of Russia’s foreign policy and how it still doesn’t want 
to let go of Estonia or probably also Latvia and Lithuania. That it still has 
this thorn in its side (okas hinges).” (Tiina, 37, Brussels). 
“But I think that the support came from outside, the compatriots support 
programme.” (Greta, 52, Tallinn). 
The same events surrounding the relocation of the Bronze Soldier provided a good 
ground for how the Estonian-speaking respondents perceived Russia’s constant 
readiness to assert its influence over Estonia. Russia’s means for ‘subjecting’ its 
neighbours to its control (see quote below) were seen as anything from the direct 
use of force (references to Georgia) or more covert (references to the compatriot 
programme, economic influence over Armenia). Russia’s foreign policy conducted 
through means of ‘twisting something out’ and ‘creating a mess’ places Russia 
firmly outside the ‘European’ value dimension discussed in the previous chapter 
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and makes any ‘normalisation’ of relations unfeasible unless there’s a significant 
change in its approach. 
For instance, when asked about what she meant by ‘explosive’ relations between 
Estonia and Russia and physical danger to the country, one respondent said:  
“Absolutely, the same Bronze Night shows that Russia is very well aware of 
its actions. As they went into Georgia, how they rolled over it (üle käima) 
and murdered people. This can actually happen in Estonia as well. […] The 
reasons didn’t lie in the Bronze Soldier or the fact that it was relocated, 
but again [this had to do with] demonstrating where the Estonians stand 
(koha kätte näitamine). That you [can’t touch] our Bronze Soldier! It was a 
good opportunity to create this mess (tohuvabohu) here. Because why else 
were the people provoked and agitated to go out. Well, perhaps the 
Russians wouldn’t have gone to rebel on the streets had they not been given 
an order. I think this was very well organised by Russia again.” (Katrin, 32, 
Tallinn). 
Again, the understanding that people were ‘provoked and agitated’ to go out and 
‘ordered’ to ‘rebel on the streets’ was seen as a reason for the riots rather than 
any interethnic internal tension. 
Russia’s imperial interests regarding the former Soviet Union area were still very 
much part of how Russia’s intentions were interpreted by the Estonian-speaking 
respondents. In addition to references to Georgia in the previous quote, the 
respondents brought up examples of Russia’s desire to hold on to or increase its 
influence in the region. 
“How I see it is that all large countries would like to be even bigger. All 
neighbours should be subject to (alluma) them whether directly or so that 
they are a separate country but (käpp peab peal olema) it has control over 
it. This is a problem with large countries and we are here next to a large 
country and always will be (elu lõpuni). If we want to have different politics 
from them, then they’ll always find something. For example that there are 
a lot of Russian people here and something can be twisted (kruttima) out 
of that. It’s always like that. Not exactly the same thing [happening] next 
to Russia – I have some Armenian acquaintances and they tell me that 
Armenia is totally under Russian control (käpa all). As soon as some 
[problems] arise, they turn off the electricity (kraanid) and that’s it. It’s 
just how it is. If we want to live well, then we will have to bow towards 
them until we die, as they say. A large country (suurriik) is a large country.” 
(Priit, 49, Tallinn). 
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However, again, a clear differentiation was made between the state and Russian 
people when discussing this topic. In addition, the respondents attributed the 
failure to normalise relations with Russia to the political elite dominating in 
Russia. The Yeltsin era was seen as building a path towards normalising relations, 
while Vladimir Putin coming to power was seen to have derailed this process of 
‘normalisation’ and seen as contributing to the opposite.  
“I think that the relations have gotten somewhat worse than they were at 
the beginning of Estonian Republic simply because the president is 
somewhat different there compared to Yeltsin, but I can’t comment any 
further than that.” (Raul, 22, Tallinn). 
As can be seen again in the quote above, a comparison is made with the beginning 
of 1990s, and the ‘Estonian Republic’ as discussed in Chapter 5 has become a point 
of reference for this younger respondent within the theme of relations with Russia 
as well. This is a potentially significant finding which builds further on the 
argument made in the last chapter on how the 1990s, which was supposed to be a 
transitional phase leading to a ‘normal’ future, has become a reference point for 
‘normality’ in its own right.  
Nevertheless, and again in line with the wider idea of demonstrating willingness 
to establish ‘normal’ relations with Russia, but at the same time not ceding 
national self-esteem, there were voices arguing for improved relations with 
Russia. Again the ‘abnormality’ of Russia is placed on the elite, and not on the 
state as a whole. This line of thought appears to contrast the official discourse, 
which posits neo-imperialism as a basis for this ‘abnormality’. One could argue 
here that perhaps the perception of 1990s Russia with Yeltsin as the president has 
altered as well in today’s changed context. 
“It seems like they are getting better. I think that they should be better 
now that Ansip is going over to visit Russia. Seems like things are getting 
better – that people can overcome this. I think that the relations with Russia 
are what they are because of their [current] elite there, because at some 
point when Yeltsin was in charge (pukis) and so, then things were 
completely normal. I think that right now this has more to do with Putin, 
who won’t or doesn’t want [to have normal relations]. I can’t imagine 
where this defiance comes from – why they don’t want to let go of Estonia 
or get along somehow, even though you should get along with your 
neighbours.” (Piret, 37, Tallinn). 
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To provide a broader understanding of how the respondents discussed relations 
with Russia, an example is provided in the textbox below from an interview with 
a woman in Tallinn who brought forward several points analysed above and some 
which will be addressed in the following section. The negotiation between several 
themes (normalisation of relations, ‘more Western than the West’ aspect, Russia 
as incomprehensible (Orientalising), the negotiation between security and lack of 
voice in the EU) that came through in the interviews regarding Russia and how 
they intertwine can be seen in more detail here. 
Excerpts from an interview with 
Greta, a 52-year-old Estonian-
speaking woman held in Tallinn. She 
was working as a mid-level manager 
in retail and had a higher education 
degree. We held the interview in her 
workplace in a private office. She 
was very open, talkative and seemed 
comfortable in expressing her 
opinions during the interview. 
“I’d very much like it to be, but well 
it should be like that in the bigger 
picture, but I don’t know, I do hope that they can do it in a little bit more subtle manner. 
Diplomacy, diplomacy, diplomacy and all these sorts of things. But well, what man to 
man (referring to the cartoon)? We don’t say anything any longer, it’s the European 
Union who says. Estonia is a nobody (tühi koht) for Russia. A complete nobody. It’s 
rather the European Union, and what stance the European Union takes. What the 
European Union allows to be done to us and what not, right? But well, undoubtedly, if 
you ask whether the European Union or not European Union, then definitely European 
Union.”  
Looking at how being a member of the EU and NATO has affected relations with Russia, 
she said: “You know, it certainly has had an effect, but if you ask me how, then I’d like 
to hope that Russia has pulled back a bit. But at the same time I feel that I still cannot 
understand them. But it is like that, that many don’t understand it. [Also] at the same 
time I’m quite angry with the European Union at times. That they hunch down in front 
of Russia like that, you know. There’s constantly this feeling that more could be done 
[by the EU]. And I am not sure if they, if they… Well we know about this, the situation 
a lot better than anyone else. Do they take us as seriously [as they should]?!” 
“Well it is clear, life and history have shown, that it’s not the small countries who make 
history, it’s the large ones.” When asked whether Estonia’s position is heard at all in 
the EU, her response was: “No, definitely they do [take it into account]. […] Or at least 
Figure 13. Cartoon. Source: Postimees 11/05/2007 
 
Figure 13. Cartoon. Source: Postimees 11/05/2007 
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it seems to me as an ordinary person (tavainimene), that they occasionally do. But I also 
think that if Latvia and Lithuania join [our stance], it’ll be even better. And who do we 
have backing us at the moment? Well Poland is a strong partner, a large country. […] In 
a word, in a sense that they take us more seriously perhaps when three countries are 
saying the same thing about let’s say Russia.” 
Based on the above, a clear interconnection can be brought out within the security 
aspect in Estonian national identity construction. In terms of Russia, the threat 
emanating from there was still perceived as real although diminished. At the same 
time, this threat is utilised on two layers of the EU/NATO sphere. First, the 
respondents expressed concern over EU/NATO’s ability to see Russia for its real 
intentions, which, with Russia’s various actions and statements, can only be seen 
as a true concern. This concern provides a ground for underlying the security 
aspect on the EU/NATO level and therefore along with the threat perception from 
Russia creates the identity construction of ‘more Western than the West’ i.e. 
having a truer understanding of and attachment to the Western values and the 
need to defend them. The past experiences in the Soviet Union and the wider 
narrative of suffering/victimisation also provide a backdrop for this approach. 
Another important aspect, which emerges from the excerpts above is the 
depiction of Russia as incomprehensible. There appear to be two interlinked 
narratives in place at the same time – given the historical background and 
experience the Estonians understand Russia better than the ‘West’, but at the 
same within the construction of Estonia belonging to the Western value system 
and Othering Russia from that level, Russia is seen as incomprehensible within this 
frame of thought. On the international level this translates to Estonia 
understanding how truly unpredictable Russia is, and that this needs to be taken 
on board more fully by the ‘West’. These competing narratives can be looked at 
from different layers, which I argue, all have a degree of validity to them. The 
deeper insight into the workings of the Russian state is certainly considered 
legitimate by the respondents and the political elite in Estonia. However, there 
remains a degree of inexplicability attached to Russia’s motivations and actions 
placing it outside the realm of European values, which would be required for 
‘normalisation’ of relations. This next section addresses these so-called 
Orientalising practices in more depth. 
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6.2.5 RUSSIA – THE CULTURAL ‘OTHER’ 
As Darieva and Kaschuba (2007) have pointed out, emphasising contrasting 
ideologies, geographies and histories as part of a process of ‘escaping from Russia’ 
plays an important role in Estonia’s self-narration. Orientalising Russia has 
remained one of the core element of Estonia’s national identity construction in 
the post-2004 period. In line with Merje Kuus’ (2002) argument, I argue that Russia 
continued to be Othered post-2004 (up to 2014), and even though the security 
dimension has been retained in this to a degree, an emphasis has been placed on 
a different, cultural way of Othering. Becoming a ‘normal’ European country (prior 
to 2014) implies that the security concerns have diminished and Russia was 
Othered more in terms of European values than any specific threat Estonia might 
face as a country. There were indications that this type of cultural Othering was 
already present during the Soviet period and in this sense it falls back on long-
held understandings. 
“When we came to live here in 67’ then I came up with two women right 
outside this window. They were Russians. […] They made a lot of noise and 
said that ‘we came to bring culture to the Estonians’. I stopped and she 
said ‘what? Did you not understand? We came to bring culture to you’ 
(mockingly).” (Aino, 77, Tallinn). 
This depiction of a whole different culture - that the Russians were there to ‘bring’ 
- and also in terms of how she described the attitude of the people making these 
statements about bringing culture (an indication that Estonia had no culture, 
conveyed in a condescending manner, or at least a different kind of culture) - was 
completely incompatible with what the interviewee saw as Estonianness (‘they 
made a lot of noise’). The respondent used this example to specifically draw out 
the differences between the Estonians and Russians who came to Estonia during 
the Soviet period. In this sense the culture (and through that also value system) 
was seen as incompatible with the Russian/Soviet one.  
Because of the higher standards of living in the Pribaltika region, Estonia (and 
Latvia and Lithuania) became known as 'our West' in the Soviet Union (Brüggemann 
2007: 149), supporting the understanding that Estonia was repressed by an 
externally-imposed regime holding it back economically. This view is further 
supported by the success Estonia had after regaining independence. 
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“I think that it [Russia] is a little bit hurt (natuke solvuma pani) by the fact 
that Estonia started to develop so quickly. I think that this pose (referring 
to the caricature) of this slightly disappointed and a little bit hurt bear is 
completely justified here.” (Mart, 50, Brussels). 
The comparison between Russia’s economic stagnation compared to Estonia’s fast 
development after regaining independence was also highlighted by a respondent 
from nearby the Russian border in Estonia. 
“The Russian tourist says that it is like their current life that we show in 
our museum [in Setomaa]. [There is] the wealthier household of the 
beginning of the 20th century at the museum – that this is their present-
day life.” (Laila, 55, Setomaa). 
The cultural Othering is reflected both in the mainstream media (see below) and 
in how most of the Estonian-speaking respondents related to various topics 
regarding Russia. However, there again seem to be several interconnected aspects 
to this identity construction. Russia was called ‘a land of wonders and surprises’ 
by some respondents, while others stated that trying to understand its motives is 
‘mystifying’ (see quote on page 168), which can be interpreted as a way of 
distancing themselves to a degree on a state level from the so-called Eastern 
mind-set which Russia is perceived to occupy. 
“I think that perhaps in some sense we can feel safer now. Because Russia is 
a land of wonders and surprises. I like it in the sense that we, with our backs 
against the border, that we have this border. Fewer pickpockets (pesuvaras) 
get through to here (jõuab siia) than before.” (Laila, 55, Setomaa). 
On the other hand, however, it appears to be balanced again with the narrative 
of ‘understanding Russia’s real intentions’ better on a European level. As stated 
earlier, the negotiation of Europeanness constitutes a constant background in the 
Estonian-Russian relationship, with both denying the legitimacy of the other. This 
can be seen in the top-down discourse with an example drawn here from an 
Estonian daily paper editorial during the Georgian War in 2008.  
“Since Saakashvili is a democrat (or at least on his way there), then we can 
support him, advise him, but if necessary, also criticise him. Democrats can 
[do that] between one another. A crook is a crook and it would make no 
sense [to do that] with them” (Editorial, Eesti Päevaleht, 15.08.2008).  
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This Orientalising discourse was reflected on also on a grassroots level. Quite a 
few Estonian-speaking respondents referred to Russia as a backward and 
unpredictable country, whose actions are based on a framework inaccessible for 
the Western democratic understanding. This approach was utilised by the 
respondents to distance themselves from the ‘Eastern’ mentality and reaffirm 
belonging to the ‘Western’ value system.  
“[…] I think that this our neighbourly relationship is surely not one of 
rationality. It is emotional. And for me it is emotional of course. There is 
this constant thought (mõte) at the back of the head that Russia cannot 
ever be 100% trusted, I think. Because they are so unpredictable in their 
behaviour. And since it’s such a large country, I don’t think it’ll ever give 
100% up on its expansionist ambitions. And in that sense joining the EU and 
NATO is a security guarantee (tagatis), according to my personal opinion.” 
(Tiina, 37, Brussels).  
Examples of this distancing came through particularly when discussing the 
reasoning behind the Bronze soldier incident. The chaotic and incomprehensible 
Eastern mentality was seen as contributing to the events that unfolded at the end 
of April 2007.  
“One of the explanations for why they reacted to the Bronze Soldier as they 
did, is […] that it’s, I don’t know, it’s in their genes. It’s mystifying, but to 
draw any conclusions from that… We will never understand this. […] Such 
disbelief, this kind of disgusting and unbelievable, because vandalism has 
always been repulsive (vastu käinud) to me – it’s unpleasant. I was watching 
it on TV […] and it was unbelievable that something like this is happening 
[in Estonia] because we have always considered ourselves to be this kind of 
reserved and intelligent country and now something like this which was 
totally mystifying.” (Eveli, 48, Brussels). 
As can be seen from the quote above, the actions contributed to the Russian-
speaking population in Estonia during the Bronze soldier riots in 2007, are 
separated from the so-called Estonian mind-set (‘reserved and intelligent’ vs 
‘vandalism’) and framed in a primordial and unchangeable manner (‘it’s in their 
genes’), to a degree that is completely inconceivable (‘totally mystifying’). The 
Bronze Night events clearly provide an exaggerated context for Othering Russian-
speakers and for generalising the perception of Russian mentality for the Estonian-
speaking respondents. This understanding, however, was not shared by the 
Russian-speaking respondents, who placed little emphasis on the differences 
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between the countries or people living there or were perhaps reluctant to discuss 
these with me. 
“I see all of them as the same – both Russians and Estonians. It’s the 
mentality that is obviously different. The Estonians are quieter.” (Aleksey, 
52, Tallinn). 
Following from here the shift towards more pragmatic line of thought in relations 
with Russia will be addressed. 
 
6.3 A NEO(LIBERAL) NORMALITY IN RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the first free parliamentary election in 1992 brought a 
right-centre coalition to power who supported the radical marketisation and 
Westernisation of Estonia’s economy and implemented ‘shock-therapy’ (Lauristin 
and Vihalemm 2009: 9). The popular support for these reform policies was high 
during the transition period and one of the main elements guiding this transition 
was breaking free of Russia’s economic influence and achieve economic 
sustainability. The common-sense of neoliberal hegemony has not been seriously 
tested or questioned in Estonia even after ‘successfully’ transforming into a 
Western market state and joining the EU structures over a decade ago. While the 
economic crisis, that hit Estonia relatively hard in 2008-2009, brought about 
protests and calls for change in the financial sector in various other European 
countries (e.g. Greece, Portugal, Spain), it had little significant political 
consequences in Estonia. The consequence of the crisis can therefore be 
interpreted as strengthening the neoliberal political paradigm (Thorhallsson and 
Kattel 2013: 94). As already discussed in the previous chapter regarding Estonian 
self-positioning in Europe and relations with the EU, this neoliberal paradigm has 
shaped the understandings of respondents with regard to national identity also in 
relations with Russia.  
“Our threshold for suffering and economic capability is still so small. We 
are dependent on a lot of export. […] Actually I’d say that the economy is 
the very basis for everything – when our economy is doing fine then we are 
all fine, but when it’s doing poorly, we are all doing poorly. Now they call 
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this diplomacy – to find the markets and opportunities, but well…” (Tõnu, 
57, Central Estonia).  
The pragmatic line of thinking was seen in other Western countries, which in itself 
also provided a justification for arguing for better economic relations with Russia. 
Although, as can be seen in the quote below, the balancing between values and 
economic pragmatism is not straightforward and there is detectable concern that 
perhaps too much emphasis is being placed on profitability, which could prove 
problematic in terms of undermining shared values and security. This frame of 
thought, prior to the Russia’s invasion in Ukraine in 2014 and before economic and 
political sanctions were implemented on Russia, can be seen in this quote:  
“It can be seen elsewhere, where Russia has actually attacked that the 
Western countries, USA and Germany, don’t want [to intervene]. They have 
their gas pipes and that matters more. […] Well you could see with the 
Bronze Night how politics comes into play. One thing is politics, another 
thing is business and money, and you can’t fight (tülli minema) with Russia 
on that. Nobody wants to get into a fight, not a single country because of, 
I don’t know the important goods that are moved around here… You could 
see during the Bronze Night that nobody really wanted to speak up. 
Germany didn’t want to say anything. I am not too certain that it would 
come to help.” (Katrin, 32, Tallinn). 
The aim here is not to provide an explanation as to the reasons behind the relative 
economic success or refute the claims that the combination of factors contributed 
to Estonia’s economic progress, but to provide a background for understanding 
how the respondents have internalised this ‘economic success’ and what impact 
this has on their understandings of the Estonian national identity.  
Additionally, what should be kept in mind and will be further discussed in the next 
chapter focusing on everyday perspectives, is that the security dimension within 
the Estonian national identity construction in relation to Russia, is still pertinent, 
but almost a decade since accession to the EU and NATO, this construction has 
lost some of its relevance. 
“I don’t think that [people] in Estonia (seal Eestis)… that there has been 
too much worrying about security in everyday life. Perhaps leaving aside 
1991 when we had the tanks visiting, then everything else has been ... [just 
fine]. Well, there is always this subconscious [thought, feeling] that one 
cannot make 100% long plans, considering the geographical position Estonia 
has. But I don’t think that anyone would constantly worry about something 
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[like that] before going to bed at night and falling asleep. I very much doubt 
that. […].” (Mart, 50, Brussels) 
The very quick transformation that occurred from national development goals to 
individualistic values and consumerist orientations with limited criticism of this 
neoliberal paradigm by the people in Estonia is certainly something that deserves 
to be analysed alongside the security-related Othering of Russia discussed in the 
previous section. Looking at how the respondents discussed relations with Russia 
through this prism, a different, little-explored perspective emerges. 
Even though people in Estonia demonstrated a high level of contentment with 
‘shock therapy’ reforms, which has been attributed to the specific features of 
hegemonic liberal ‘transition culture’ (Lauristin 2009: 613) and there was almost 
no public unrest during the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, a certain amount of 
fatigue could be detected when the respondents discussed economic issues. In 
2006, the then prime minister Andrus Ansip spoke about taking Estonia into the 
five top richest countries in Europe („Viime Eesti viie jõukaima Euroopa riigi 
hulka!”) as part of the 2007 Reform Party general election campaign. While in 
2006 this might have been perceived as somewhat plausible given the double digits 
economic growth at the time, the same statement quickly became a subject of 
irony in the media and general public during and after the economic crisis 
demonstrating the shift in the expectations of further economic development. 
This shift translates into various themes related to national identity, one of which 
is how relations with Russia were perceived by the respondents. 
 
6.3.1  ‘YOU SHOULD GET ALONG WITH YOUR NEIGHBOURS’ - RATIONALISING 
RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA  
During the economic crisis, austerity measures were widely accepted in Estonia 
and, as discussed in the previous chapter, this approach is utilised in the public 
discourse to Other Southern European countries while simultaneously constructing 
an idea of ‘true’ Europe. However, when looking into Othering Russia, an 
interesting aspect of identity-construction emerges in regard to the economy. The 
general acceptance of Orientalising Russia on a political level has left its imprint 
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on how the economic relations with Russia are perceived on a grassroots level, but 
the unrealistic expectation of economic growth and the following disappointment 
has resulted in ‘rationalising’ improving relations with Russia for possible 
economic development.   
This issue is approached relatively carefully by the Estonian-speaking respondents 
and is at times conflated to a certain degree with security dimension of Estonia’s 
identity-construction vis-à-vis Russia. However, the underlying neoliberal 
principles, which have been highlighted throughout the independence period and 
have become an important part of Estonia’s national image, were utilised by the 
respondents to detach the economic relations with Russia from the 
political/security related elements discussed in the previous section. Emphasis 
was placed on a globalised economy, the importance of economic welfare in the 
present-day world and ‘rational’ relations to the extent of separating out politics 
from more personal trade relations across the border. In this regard, the 
respondents maintained the national esteem of Estonia by not giving any 
concessions to Russia while at the same time remaining firmly within the 
pragmatic neoliberal framework, one of the positive national identity-
construction features in Estonia. 
The three aspects through which economic relations with Russia were framed by 
the respondents were: 1) the challenges of a globalised economy; 2) the 
practicalities of cooperating with the ‘next-door neighbour’; and 3) separation of 
people from the state in relations with Russia. This almost apologetic and 
rationalising approach was evident in both language groups interviewed, even 
though the reasoning behind it could be argued to differ to a degree. 
The importance of good economic relations in a globalised world and especially in 
the aftermath of the economic crisis comes through in the interview data. The 
previously mentioned exogenous nature of economic crisis has been embraced in 
how economic matters are discussed. As one respondent said: “and we also 
certainly don’t want to be affected again by the world economic or god knows 
which other effects” (Tõnu, 57, Central Estonia), again implying that any possible 
problems could be created by the ‘outside world’ solely, almost separating Estonia 
from the ‘globalised world’ in any negative sense. In this sense, the understanding 
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of Estonia as a small, open, export-oriented and competitive economy being 
vulnerable and unable to dictate external trends (Jurkynas 2014: 121), could be 
seen in the interview data. However, the capitalist market values and the path 
Estonia had chosen in this regard were not questioned and provided a background 
framework for processing relations with Russia as one of the complex identity-
constructing elements. 
“Such a small region economically, time has shown that we can’t manage 
without connections. We don’t have everything – we need to import. We 
need to [export] agricultural products. We can’t consume all of these 
ourselves (if we work hard). This was evident already in the Soviet time 
when the collective farms [here] supplied and fed Moscow and Petersburg. 
So what if they did? At least they got to give away their products right? They 
didn’t give it away for nothing either. So in that sense there I haven’t heard 
of anyone having any animosity here against the Russian people or the 
Russian state.” (Martin, 69, Setomaa).  
Similar points were also made by the Russian-speaking respondents. The economic 
issues, however, are seen as a uniting element for the Estonian- and Russian-
speakers since this is perceived relatively separately from the history narratives 
and detached from the more emotional realm of identity-construction. Although 
the reasoning behind it can be interpreted slightly differently. Very simplistically 
put, the Estonian-speaking respondents saw that with emphasising better relations 
with Russia through an economic prism, they would not be undermining the 
political agenda; at the same time, Russian-speakers (in Narva specifically) felt 
generally more comfortable criticising Estonian economic policy and depicting 
Russia in a more positive light via economic arguments since this was seen 
separately from the more contentious matters of security for example. 
"We must live in a modern world somehow. And, that means that with 
Russia it is necessary to be friends, to be on good terms economically (в 
плане экономически дружить). And it's very useful and very profitable ... 
and, I do not know, but only stupid people do not understand that. Because 
you can get a lot from Russia. And it would be profitable for Estonia. But, 
apparently, there is some national resentment, which prevent our Estonian 
politicians from improving the relations." (Dmitry, 27, Narva). 
The implication from the quote from an interview held in Narva is that in his view 
Estonia’s prosperity depends on improved relations with Russia. With the Estonian 
respondents the implication appeared to be that Estonia as an open, forward-
thinking globalised economy highly dependent on trade should seek to engage 
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equally with all potential partners – the particular situation with Russia means 
that possibilities are extremely limited, but at least Estonia is trying to engage 
with Russia on these terms.   
Another ‘excuse’ which emerged from the interview data was depicting Russia 
simply as a neighbouring country, and following the capitalist understanding of 
maximising profits, it was claimed that Estonia ought to utilise the past experience 
and proximity to its benefit.  
“We need Russia as a trade partner, well because they’re our neighbours 
and nothing can be done about that. One has to adapt (mugandada) oneself. 
And Estonia has plenty of privileges since a lot of Estonians speak Russian 
very well. In reality we should take advantage of this situation. Much more 
than we’ve done so far. It is our curse and blessing (she laughs).” (Eveli, 
48, Brussels). 
The economic element has been almost removed from the more emotional 
national identity elements like history, although it was also brought in as a 
supplement to the main rationale of upholding the free market values with one 
respondent referring to Estonian historic roots and using a proverb to explain why 
the relations should be improved:  
“There is this proverb [which says] that you don’t choose your neighbours, 
you have to get along with your neighbours.” (Tõnu, 57, Central Estonia).  
A third aspect highlighted by respondents from rural areas in particular was the 
local and more personal nature of trading with the Russians living in the border 
areas. This was seen as a mutually beneficial arrangement which was separated 
from the state level politics. Plainly put, people from or living in rural areas would 
have liked to see the border dispute (referred to in Chapter 1) solved and the 
border more open for trade, but at the same time are not willing to compromise 
on any other level. In this sense the economic rationalisation is hidden behind a 
façade of national self-esteem.  
The practicalities of being able to move across the border and sell produce on the 
Russian side were discussed by several respondents in mostly Central and 
Southeast Estonia. Several respondents from these areas spoke about the former 
benefits of economic trade with Russians from the bordering areas during the 
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Soviet times, and through that highlighted the possible benefits that Russia as a 
neighbouring country has to offer. Although the conflicting historical narratives 
with Russia surrounding the Second World War are a prominent feature in Estonian 
national identity construction, another view into a shared or common history 
within the Soviet Union brings out the experience of having beneficial agricultural 
trade relations with Russians, which could possibly be utilised again.  
“I was placed to work in Võrumaa when I was young. In Obinitsa, which is 9 
km from Pechora, the Russian border. At the time the border was open. 
There was no ESSR/ENSV – oh there was one sign where the ESSR started. 
Pechora was a much bigger and important city for the Estonian people living 
on the border than Võru or some Tartu was. People didn’t go to those 
places. Everything was done in Pechora. All of the eggs and milk was taken 
by bus to Pechora in the mornings and sold there at the market. Eder, what 
they drank there all of the time, was bought in Pechora. […] I think that 
this Estonia-Russian problem has more to do with this border. […] So I would 
say that in general Estonian-Russian relations are not that bad. But for some 
reason poor Paet has to struggle because Lavrov withdrew his signature. 
There’s something wrong with the preamble again.” (Aino, 77, Tallinn). 
While on the top-down level there seems to have been little real expectation of 
normalising relations with Russia when joining the EU and NATO, this expectation 
is still reflected somewhat on a grassroots level. The fact that contentious issues 
remain a part of the political agenda is not surprising, but a certain amount of 
blame for not normalising the economic trade with Russia is also placed on the 
Estonian political elite. This conveys a growing distance from the elite, which has 
become more and more apparent across the wider Europe, and will be discussed 
in more detail in Chapter 8. From how the economic relations were discussed in 
the rural areas, there seems to have been the expectation that the economic 
relations will ‘normalise’ in the sense of trading more freely with people living in 
Russia. Some of the respondents appeared almost apologetic in their desire for 
improved economic relations with Russia, provided explanations based on personal 
experiences and distanced the Russian people living in the border areas from the 
state level relations.  
“I don’t think that the relations are good with Russia. All this border affair 
which is closed down. Let’s take our own county. […] Our Peipsi region, 
which has been left in a poor state. In the old days, when the border [was 
open] – well when we could still go to Russia – people grew cucumbers and 
trade was simple with Russia. From right here in Pajusi people used to take 
cucumbers to Russia and people used to work late at night… But they 
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wanted to go and this was all allowed and they got paid for selling their 
product there. Trading was easier, but now they made it so difficult. Why 
couldn’t trading be better? Of course I don’t know about the larger transits 
and what not, but in the ordinary countryside… The Peipsi regions used to 
live so well, they built houses, but now this is all being neglected (unarusse) 
thanks to the fact that they can’t take anything across the border.” (Kaili, 
70, Central Estonia). 
In this sense, it was the Russian state, which was still depicted as ‘chaotic and 
arbitrary’, but the Russian people as sharing similar economic values to the ones 
in Estonia. The relations with Russians in the border regions were seen as rather 
friendly and beneficial for both sides, not only individually but also for regional 
development.  
 
6.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter explored Russia as the Other in Estonian national identity 
constructions and brought out the role it plays in Estonian ‘normality’. It looked 
into the idea of ‘normalising’ relations with Russia by examining the conflicting 
historical narratives and Orientalising practices. While securitisation of Russia is 
still evident in how the respondents discussed the relations between the two 
countries, the chapter demonstrates that an emphasis has been placed on a 
different, cultural way of Othering. Becoming a ‘normal’ European country implies 
that the security concerns have diminished (prior to 2014) and Russia had become 
Othered more in terms of European values than any specific threat Estonia might 
face as a country.  
The second, and no less important development emerging from the data was 
framing the more pragmatic approach in strengthening economic ties with Russia 
within the wider national identity construction. Since the beginning of the 1990s 
and the introduction of the shock-therapy reforms, economy has played a 
significant role in Estonia’s national identity constructions. Improving economy 
and through that people’s well-being in Estonia and the radical reforms that the 
political elite undertook at the beginning of the 1990s was constructed as a higher 
national goal which had to be endured in order to achieve the success envisioned. 
This has been a successful rhetoric, which is demonstrated by how the respondents 
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discussed Russia through an economic lens. The interviews revealed that relations 
with Russia were conceived in terms of the neoliberal economic narrative that had 
taken hold during the EU accession period and which is used to position Estonia 
within the framework of the enlarged EU. Having spent almost a decade in the EU 
and NATO in relatively calm times in terms of security, the chapter demonstrates 
that a certain normalisation – different to that which had been articulated as a 
goal in the 1990s - had been achieved in relation to Russia and that pragmatic 
economic themes had become more relevant in people’s everyday perceptions. As 
to reconciliation of the pragmatic understanding related to the neoliberal agenda 
and the emotional historical elements of national identity construction, the year 
2014 demonstrated why relying more on the pragmatic perspective can have 
possibly dangerous consequences when dealing with Russia. 
Turning towards the everyday aspects in Estonia, and from the ‘external’ 
perspectives to the ‘internal’ ones, the following chapter will explore everyday 
life in Estonia more detail. It will look into how people discuss life and work in 
Estonia including the already much debated issue of societal integration. 
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CHAPTER 7. LIVING THE ESTONIAN ‘NORMALITY’ 
 
 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The first two empirical chapters explored post-EU accession understandings of the 
Estonian Self from the standpoint of its relationship to two (distinct yet also inter-
related) external Others - the positive and the negative, Europe and Russia. This 
chapter focuses on the understandings that emerge from how people talk about 
everyday life and work within Estonia. While it is hard to draw a clear distinction 
between the internal and external in all this, the primary focus here is on the 
internal essence of Estonia as a state in all its dimensions nearly a decade on from 
EU accession. The issues to emerge from the interviews based on the key events 
discussed are: societal integration, impact of economic changes on everyday life 
and nature of the political system. Similarly to the framework introduced in the 
last chapter, the everyday experiences of the participants will be analysed here 
from the standpoint of the dominant neoliberal paradigm underpinning 
constructions of Estonian ‘normality’ as well as from the more emotional, 
securitised angle in terms of the interethnic relations in Estonia.  
The chapter is broadly divided into three sections based on the key issues that 
emerged from the interview data. The first section looks at societal integration 
through the topic of language and how the role of education has contributed to 
the wider discussions on integration. It also brings out the perceived cultural 
differences, which are partly related to perceptions of what constitutes ‘normal’ 
Russian behaviour. It looks into how salient are ethnic divisions and if so, then to 
what extent. The second section focuses on how pragmatic economic terms were 
utilised to discuss interethnic relations in Estonia. I argue that the reconciliation 
between the pragmatic understanding of economic necessity and the more 
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national emotional element is pertinent in understanding interethnic relations in 
Estonia a decade since joining the Western structures. 
The third section addresses what understandings of the political community have 
emerged amongst Estonia’s residents. It looks into how the respondents discussed 
the wider political landscape and certain prominent political actors in Estonia in 
order to gain a better understanding of their perceptions of this ‘normal’ European 
country and its political ‘normality’ nearly a decade after formally becoming one. 
This chapter thus explores the internal essence of Estonia as a state in all its 
dimensions, in order to complement and provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of the various aspects related to Estonian national identity 
constructions and through that perceptions of ‘normality’ in post-accession 
Estonia. Jutta Weldes has explained the relevance of domestic roots in how states 
present themselves on the international arena and says that only looking at the 
external i.e. treating the state as a black box whose internal workings are 
irrelevant to the construction of state identity and interests, is bordering on 
‘anthropomorphisation and oversimplification’ (Weldes 1999: 9). She explains that 
the meanings that objects, events and actions have for states are the meanings 
they have for the individuals who act in the name of the state, and they approach 
international politics with an already quite comprehensive and elaborate 
appreciation of the world, and of their state’s self-positioning in the international 
system (Weldes 1999: 9). This appreciation comes from the collective meanings 
constructed at least in part in the domestic political and cultural contexts (Weldes 
1999: 9). These contexts have been discussed to a degree in Chapter 2 and this 
chapter aims to further the already existing understandings with adding a 
perspective from the ground-up.  
Looking into the internal essence of Estonian state can enhance our understanding 
of how the Others discussed in the previous two chapters are intertwined in this 
process of imagining their nation through a variety of more meaningful everyday 
local themes. While looking at the internal in terms of aiming to achieve a better 
understanding of how people in Estonia perceive ‘normality’ forms the 
centrepiece of this research, the previous two chapters have dealt with how they 
see Estonia’s self-positioning in the international context and why that may be. 
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This chapter looks into the related but more local relevant themes that are 
intertwined with the perception of Others discussed earlier but adds value in 
terms of bringing out other complex points of reference for constructing 
‘normality’ in post-accession Estonia.  
As said, the relevance of the international system and norms is not extracted from 
the domestic level; rather the domestic and the international are viewed here as 
mutually constitutive for gaining an understanding of the process of constructing 
Estonian national identity. This means that taking a closer look at the frames in 
which themes of societal integration are approached, a highly important political, 
economic and cultural issue in Estonia as highlighted by the extensive research 
referred to in Chapter 3, can reveal a lot about the constructions of national 
identity and through that the perception of ‘normality’. This chapter also 
discusses how larger goals or projects related to national identification and 
attempts at branding are framed by the respondents. It also brings to light how 
the respondents discussed the wider political landscape and certain prominent 
political actors in Estonia in order to help understand the perceptions of the 
internal to complement the external elements discussed in the previous empirical 
chapters.  
 
7.2 SOCIETAL INTEGRATION 
The situation of Russian-speakers in Estonia has been discussed thoroughly through 
a variety of platforms. This subject was of particular of interest for scholars in the 
1990s and appeared to have lost some of its relevance with Estonia ‘ticking the 
boxes’ in 2004 with EU and NATO accession. However, the formal adherence to 
the conditions relating to minority rights in Estonia has not resulted in an ideally 
and meaningfully integrated society. As one might expect, the relevance of ethnic 
and ethno-linguistic boundaries has not disappeared in the Estonian society. But 
how do these boundaries manifest themselves in the way that people talk about 
everyday life? Have these dividing lines in the society become the ‘normal’ and to 
what degree is this understanding internalised also by the Russian-speakers in 
Estonia? The existing divisions do not seem to only follow an ethnic dimension but 
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run through an array of various social segmentations with understandings of ethnic 
separation as part of this complex web of societal relations. This section looks into 
these perceptions on the ground and brings out the more subtle picture of the 
relations between Estonian- and Russian-speakers after nearly a decade in the EU 
and in the aftermath of the economic crisis.  
As discussed in Chapter 4, in order to explore these relations, I conducted 
interviews with both Estonian- and Russian-speakers in Estonia. The interviews 
were normally held in the first language of the participants – their domestic 
language. Most of the interviews were held in Estonian, but I also did four 
interviews in Russian and one in Estonian with Russian-speakers in Narva, a town 
bordering Russia in the North-East of Estonia where the ethnic Estonian population 
is only 3.75%11. Additionally, two interviews in Tallinn were held with Russian-
speakers (one respondent was of Belarusian background with Russian as his 
domestic language).  
The interview data suggest that the Estonian-speaking respondents viewed 
accession to the EU as a signal of approval of state policies relating to national 
minorities by the existing EU member states. Having allegedly ‘ticked the boxes’ 
for membership appeared to provide validation for how respondents perceived the 
still prevailing general attitudes towards how integration with the Russian-
speaking minority should be processed i.e. Estonia has done all that is necessary 
for successful integration and any persisting integration issues were perceived to 
be come from the Russian-speaking community in Estonia not doing their part.  
From the interview data, there still appeared to be a generalised understanding 
that Estonia should be consolidated as a nation-state rather than a multi-national 
civic society and that the Russian-speaking population should ‘integrate’ 
according to the terms set by the majority, core nation. This coincides with the 
vision of ‘normality’ set in the late 1980s and early 1990s, which appears to 
continue to serve as a ‘thicker point of reference’ for perceptions of national 
identity in the post-accession context. The interview data also suggest that 
limited emphasis was placed upon the formal requirements (e.g. in terms of 
gaining citizenship) and that more general attitudes towards the state and society 
                                                          
11 Narva City Population Registration Office; Ethnic composition of population as of 01.01.2014 
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(e.g. in terms of language, culture and education) were accentuated as the most 
relevant to the integration process.  
 
 “IF YOU LIVE IN ESTONIA, YOU SHOULD LEARN THE LANGUAGE!” 
Language has been a controversial issue in the integration process in Estonia. In 
2008, the UN Human Rights Council published a special report on Estonia, which 
stated that members of the Russophone community expressed the view that the 
most important form of discrimination in Estonia is not ethnic, but rather 
language-based. In particular, it affects directly the Russian-speaking persons who 
either migrated or were born in Estonia during the period of the Soviet occupation 
(UNHRC report12, 2008, p 15). It is not surprising that the issue of language was of 
core importance among the respondents when discussing relations between 
Estonian- and Russian-speakers. The language issue was intertwined in various 
topics (e.g. history narratives, education, economics/job market) and will also be 
addressed throughout these themes.  
“They can easily be here, there is nothing bad about that. It’s just that if 
they live in Estonia then they should like know Estonian and I think that 
that is correct if they learn Estonian and not that they go to Russian 
nurseries and such. […] Well fine, let’s say that the schools at least should 
be Estonian. Fine, Russian nurseries, I can understand that, but then at 
least the schools should be Estonian not like Russian. I think I want an easier 
life, my thinking is too simplistic (she laughs).” (Linda, 34, Tallinn). 
The quotes above and below demonstrate that while learning the language if you 
live in Estonia is non-negotiable, then as said, it relates more to the attitude 
towards learning it i.e. that there is the respect for the local language and the 
willingness to learn it, that appears to be of key importance.  
“Some Russians are very good (tublid), we get along very well, there is no 
problem. They learn the language and I always like it when (s)he has 
learned the language and speaks with an accent like that (she smiles), but 
                                                          
12 UNHRC Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Mission to Estonia, 2008 
(https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/117/59/PDF/G0811759.pdf?OpenElement; accessed 
08.01.2016) 
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(s)he wants to talk, and even if (s)he doesn’t come into contact so much 
with Estonians, (s)he still tries to speak, with hands and legs… But then 
there are people who say on principle ‘I will not speak Estonian’. [...] We 
have one here in the countryside – now (s)he already passed away – [lived 
here for] decades and speaks a couple of words. (S)he simply doesn’t speak 
[…] and doesn’t want to speak. For her/him the Estonian language is 
nothing, (s)he only thinks about her/his own language. But there are also 
very very nice (mõnusaid) people. I haven’t come across anyone who would 
be like against and doesn’t want to speak.” (Kaili, 70, Central Estonia). 
Some resonance can be also seen in the quotes above with the foreign policy 
objectives of the 1990s and normalisation of relations with Russia narrative (i.e. 
having relations as with any other country in Europe). However, this seemed to be 
articulated by the Estonian-speaking respondents in terms of rationalising the 
emotional nationalistic understanding. It was usually added as a subclause to the 
main argument of ‘if you live in Estonia, you should learn the language’ which is 
firmly rooted in the idea of an Estonian nation state. This can be attributed to 
enhancing the self-esteem of a nation in relation to dismissing any claims by Russia 
who tries to hold on to its perceived sphere of influence.  
“Well I personally think that if you have the opportunity as a child in school 
to learn different languages then you should take advantage of that – 
including Russian. If you take a radical stance that I will not learn Russian, 
then you lose out on that whole cultural space or the opportunity to use 
the language yourself and consume culture in that language, in the original 
language which is always better than consuming it through translation, 
through mediation.” (Tiina, 37, Brussels).  
One of the main events signifying problems of integration in Estonia was the 
Bronze soldier incident in 2007. An image of the looting and a cartoon of the Prime 
Minister Andrus Ansip at the relocated monument was used during the interview 
process. While discussing this event with the respondents provided a more 
conflictual layer to how they viewed ethnic relations in Estonia and should be 
viewed in this context, it also contributed to opening up the respondents’ still 
prevalent perspectives on the topic, even if heightened to a degree. 
Not surprisingly the Bronze soldier incident received a strong reaction from the 
Estonian-speaking respondents while the Russian-speakers were somewhat 
reluctant to discuss this issue with me. How the Estonian-speakers addressed the 
incident is looked at here through three different but connected themes, which 
184 
 
were viewed as impacting the integration process: conflicting perceptions of 
history, cultural differences and educational system.  
First, as could be expected, the conflicting historical narratives were perceived 
as immutable and non-negotiable. From an Estonian-speaker’s angle, the 
contradicting view of the Second World War within the Russian discourse was seen 
as irreconcilable with the Estonian perspective.  
“Utter hopelessness. That we will never integrate with the Russians. Never. 
Probably. I don’t think that my generation. Perhaps my children, perhaps 
they will integrate, but they also constantly hear that… “Russians”. And 
sometimes you need to control yourself – that little kids go to kindergarten 
and say “Russians” (she laughs). Perhaps even the next generation won’t 
integrate. Maybe someday it will be forgotten, but… [currently] the feeling 
of hopelessness.” (Katrin, 32, Tallinn). 
A degree of Orientalising the Russian-speaking community in terms of Second 
World War history narratives came through in the interviews with Estonian-
speakers. There appeared to be a generalised understanding within this topic that 
an ‘insufficient’ amount of time has passed for the Second World War or the 
following Soviet occupation to lose its significance in the everyday discourses. The 
implication of this is that nothing could be done about addressing these 
differences now - it is merely a matter of letting time take its course, and future 
generations will have a different attitude to the past whereby ‘normality’ will be 
attained. However, this was related back to only the Russian-speaking community 
and not seen as factor for the Estonian-speakers, which appears to cut against 
how ‘integration’ has been presented in Estonia since 2000, as something implying 
attitudinal shifts in both communities, rather than just one.  
“[The Russian] hasn’t developed this type of patriotism towards the 
Estonian state. At least that generation, who was out there on the streets. 
[…] I hope it [the patriotism is an option] is, it probably is, but it takes such 
a long time. The generational change will need to happen and then I think 
that things will start to proceed faster. It’s just that the gap is too big right 
now. Too many sufferers are in it. Everybody knows what happened 20 years 
ago or well, before that.” (Tarmo, 27, Tallinn).  
The integration process related to the conflicting historical narratives and the 
cultural Othering was seen as possibly changing through shifts in the attitudes of 
the Russian-speakers in terms of education and learning the Estonian language. 
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Even though this does not coincide with the concept of integration as put forward 
by the EU, there were no voices among the respondents suggesting that this 
process was seen in any way outside the ‘normal’ frames for dealing with this 
complicated issue in the country, considering the historical experince it had had 
and the claims that Russia is making. The aspirational quality in having a ‘normal’ 
society can be seen in how the respondents negotiated this issue, but this society 
appeared to be more inclined towards the understandings of a nation-state put 
forward in the 1990s rather than a multi-national civic one. 
The matter is more complex since Russia uses the tensions over history and 
language to create further divisions in the Estonian society and reinforces the pre-
existing domestic norms that do not coincide with European minority rights 
standards (Schulze 2010: 361). As has been pointed out, Russia has used a variety 
of mechanisms (military, economic, propaganda, disinformation campaigns) to get 
the Estonian government to adopt more accommodative policies toward its 
Russian-speaking minority (Schulze 2010: 362), which can be interpreted more in 
terms of trying to hinder Estonia’s claim to Europeanness and also attemps to keep 
it as part of its sphere of influence as discussed in Chapters 3 and 6, rather than 
the genuine desire for more inclusive policies for the Russian-speaking population 
there.  
The quote below demonstrates the complexity in how a young Estonian-speaking 
respondent expressed his opinion on the topic. The Soviet era repressive migration 
policies and Estonia’s suffering under the oppressive rule are brought forward, 
and in this sense, requirements for learning the language and participating as a 
‘normal’ person in the Estonian social world is seen as meeting ‘half-way’ by this 
Estonian-speaker. 
“I think it’s 50-50. There are 50% of those who still persevere (jonni ajama) 
and 50% accept the fact that they no longer live in the Russian Federation 
but they live in Estonia (Eesti riigis). […] I think what they hold against the 
Estonian state is the fact that we don’t have Russian as an official language 
and so on, that they have been like royalty here (kuningaseisuses) and since 
that no longer exists, then I think that all things related to Estonia make 
them angry. […] There are a lot of Russian (vene rahvusest) people [here] 
who are very nice and understand and learn the language but there are also 
the kind of people who’ve lived here for centuries and don’t learn the 
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language and think that they can just slide (liugu laskma) through [at others 
expense] and are allowed to do anything [they want].” (Raul, 22, Tallinn). 
The second aspect that came through the interviews in the context of the Bronze 
Soldier incident with Estonian-speakers was the cultural Othering of Russian-
speakers in Estonia. The cultural differences were seen as both incomprehensible 
and immutable at the same time. Again, as mentioned in Chapter 5 (Othering 
Southern Europe) and Chapter 6 (Othering Russia), the so-called ‘temperament’ 
was seen as the main difference between the ethnic groups in Estonia.  
“For the Russian the Second World War is such an important thing that you 
can […] talk to them as much as you want, but they will stick to that. […] 
Just like it was on Discovery the other day, that in reality 2000 women got 
raped by the Soviet army in Germany during the Second World War. This is 
all written down but not discussed. But try to say that now to a veteran. 
You’ll get told you’re a fascist and that’s it because they’ve been brought 
up like that. In my old position, there were a wife and husband working. It 
was very difficult to discuss these issues with the husband, but the wife 
said that “don’t talk to him, he is the son of a soldier”. You can tell him 
what you want but he’s been raised since a child with certain convictions 
and you won’t change him. You can say what you want. […] The regular 
person (as opposed to the soldiers) is more understanding.” (Priit, 49, 
Tallinn). 
The perceptions of what constitutes ‘normal’ Russian behaviour came through 
from the interviews. Understandings of what is perceived as an inherently Russian 
approach to various aspects of life and that what otherwise could have constituted 
as ‘normal’ people, have been ruined by the ‘abnormal’ education, and home 
environment which has probably gone through a similar path (further exacerbated 
by Russian media campaigns). This can be viewed as Othering not in terms of 
ethnicity per se but rather in terms of assigned belonging to a kind of ‘underclass’ 
– the ones who don’t understand Estonian ‘normality’ (see discussion below up to 
page 190). 
“It was the year after, the monument wasn’t there any longer, and it was 
9th of May again, the Victory Day and can you imagine, right here [near the 
St Nicholas church] a young woman is [walking], [she’s] over 20 and has a 
small child, who hasn’t heard of the ‘Great Patriotic War’ (isamaasõda) or 
nothing, carrying red carnations and walking towards the monument [where 
it used to be]. I was thinking that, dear me (santa klaara küll), how is it 
that people who know nothing about the war – by whom and how have they 
been raised, that they go there, right.” (Greta, 52, Tallinn). 
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Another young respondent from a rural Southern Estonian village related the 
Bronze soldier incident to the ‘Russian soul’ referring to more primordial, inherent 
characteristics rather than cultural differences. Her quote brings out the complex 
nature of the interethnic relations with difficulties understanding this mentality 
even within her own family.  
“It’s funny to think that this type of thing happened here. […] Where does 
it come from? Well, this Russian stuff doesn’t really sit with me. I thought 
like it was okay that they removed it from there. […] When I think about 
my family, then we came to Estonia in the beginning of the 60s. We came 
from Russia to Estonia. My grandfather came. But in this sense we are still 
Estonian. […] My grandfather still has this sort of a Russian soul. He still 
reads the Russian-language newspaper. Well, he speaks nice Estonian. But 
[…] it’s very complicated to talk to grandfather about these issues. He says 
that he cannot understand why they did that, why they had to remove [the 
Bronze Soldier]. That the Russians didn’t mean anything bad. So it’s funny 
that in my own family this [is happening]. I am more like against these 
things. It doesn’t sit well with me that … well the Russians should learn 
Estonian in school and … why are they even living here then. But well, I 
don’t know, maybe I’m half racist or something (she laughs).” (Siret, 22, 
Southern Estonia). 
The theme of language appeared to still have a significant place in the integration 
issues, which in this context could have been heightened due to discussing a 
controversial and emotional issue such as the conflicting history narratives through 
the Bronze soldier incident. Especially since, as demonstrated below, the more 
pragmatic elements of economic necessity have become another key dimension in 
perceptions of integration. However, the continued emphasis on language 
demonstrates that the holistic process put forward by the current integration 
programme was yet to receive in depth reflection by the Estonian-speaking 
respondents in 2013. Russian-speaking respondents appeared to have accepted 
this understanding in ‘temperament’ or ‘soul’, and one Russian-speaking 
respondent referred to the perceived differences by saying:  
“I see all of them as the same – both Russians and Estonians. It’s the 
mentality that is obviously different. The Estonians are quieter.” (Aleksey, 
52, Tallinn).  
As stated the Russian-speaking respondents were in general less inclined to discuss 
the relocation of the Bronze Soldier monument with me. It appeared that they 
might have not felt comfortable sharing their opinions because of their perception 
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of Estonians’ understanding of the matter. However, a woman interviewed in 
Tallinn from a mixed background (Russian-Estonian) provided a more complex 
approach to the relocation and the aftermath of it.  
“I think that they, how to say, rushed a bit with the Bronze Soldier. Didn’t 
take the Russians’ feelings into account. I’ve told them that ‘you’re rioting 
because we took the dead people from the trolleybus stop to the cemetery 
where they belong. Where they can rest in peace.’ At the same time in 
Russia there was this news that also some military pilots were buried and 
they simply pulled down the monument and made it into a parking lot. They 
weren’t relocated anywhere. Nobody talks about that. But… with Russians 
you can’t… they sort of won’t take it as the truth. They ask about why this 
[the Bronze Soldier relocating] was done. If someone had told them, then 
this 9th of May would have stopped. ‘We know that it is being removed, no 
problems (viige rahulikult)’. There would have not been any riot. But I think 
that it was a good excuse to simply create some anxiety to the other side 
and see what comes from it.” (Anna, 65, Tallinn). 
Even though the quote above demonstrates how she tried to negotiate between 
the so-called two sides of the incident, she also used the same Orientalising 
practices to justify her perception of the situation. 
“There is no point fighting over monuments. If you, the state (riik) thinks 
that it is not in the right place, let’s take it to where the right place is. 
Why do we have to be like the Russians – came here and destroyed all our 
monuments?” (Anna, 65, Tallinn).  
The third aspect that can be brought forward from here is the more instrumental 
education system, which was seen as key to integration in terms of contributing 
to Estonian language skills and understanding Estonian/European perspectives.  
“[The problem lies in] the Russian schools. Mostly this refers to Tallinn or 
that Ida-Virumaa because everywhere else it has taken the natural path – 
the Russian schools simply wither away because Russians put their children 
in Estonian schools. […] I think that there have been political reasons behind 
it, why at one point or another ahead of the elections they’ve wanted to 
get more votes from the opposing camp. […] It has now taken 22 years since 
re-independence and we are still talking about making secondary school 
60% Estonian based, but this has been excessively prolonged (pika 
vinnaga).” (Mart, 50, Brussels). 
The topic of education was relevant in most interviews and especially so when 
talking about the Bronze Soldier incident. Here, a contributing factor can be seen 
to lie in education also being a source of self-esteem and pride for Estonia. The 
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biannual international PISA13 tests demonstrate that Estonian schoolchildren rank 
among the top developed countries in the world while being at the absolute top 
in Europe. The emphasis on smart-products and IT-development, the adaptability 
of the people and again, the quick economic growth that Estonia has had can be 
seen to bring out the complex source for self-esteem which alongside the 
perceived ‘natural’ traits of Estonians as hard-working and resilient provide a 
backdrop for placing the rioting and looting people during the Bronze Night into a 
completely different, incomprehensible ‘underclass’. 
“Let’s say that I don’t have personal experience, but when I read a couple 
of days ago now how some Estonian and Russian gangs got into a fight 
(omavahel kokku läksid) in Tartu, then I suppose there are plenty of 
problems. And this probably has to do with the level of education. Who 
from an educated family and themselves educated [would do that?]. I think 
this is the same for an Estonian (she laughs).” (Signe, 70, Muhu island). 
The rioting and looting were seen from within the Orientalising framework 
discussed in the previous chapter as something that would be undertaken only by 
the uncivilised and uneducated or in a word the ‘abnormal’ Russian-speakers, 
therefore removing it from the sphere of any meaningful identity debate and 
wider societal problems with integration in the Estonian society. The Estonian 
respondents seemed to attribute the Bronze Soldier riots to external forces and 
the actions of some kind of ‘uneducated’ underclass who have nothing in common 
with the vast majority of ‘loyal’ and law-abiding Russians. As one respondent 
stated:  
“It was more a brawl of these underclass people (madalate inimeste). 
Breaking, stealing and carrying… An educated and smart Russian did not 
partake, I think.” (Aino, 77, Tallinn). 
The quote above refers to a redefinition of the boundaries between ‘normal’ and 
‘abnormal’ against the background of the economic changes of the 1990s. It was 
not the ethnic division in itself that provided a dividing line in the society, but 
rather the perceptions of ‘normal’ educated, law-abiding people versus the so-
called underclass who allow themselves to be manipulated into destructive action 
                                                          
13PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment) is an international survey conducted 
on the OECD’s (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) initiative which 
aims to evaluate education systems worldwide by testing the skills and knowledge of 15-year-
old students. Students from randomly selected schools take tests in functional reading, 
mathematics and science. 
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by the Russian state as discussed in Chapter 6 (see Section 6.2.4 for detailed 
discussion on ‘sphere of influence’). 
Education was a topic that was frequently referred to in the mainly Russian-
speaking town of Narva as well, although in a different context. At the time there 
had been significant controversy surrounding the transition from Russian language 
schools to schools where at least 60% of the language of tuition is Estonian. This 
has been especially problematic in Ida-Virumaa including Narva, where most of 
the population is Russian-speaking (over 85% in Narva, the third largest city in 
Estonia).  
Analysing the data from the interviews in Narva, there appeared little resistance 
to the perceived social expectation to learn the Estonian language. The responses 
could have been influenced by the fact that they were giving the interview to an 
Estonian-speaker and therefore were providing answers according to how they 
understood that an Estonian-speaker might expect them to. However, while 
keeping this in mind, some interesting elements emerged from these interviews 
that have to be highlighted in the context of education.  
However positive the respondents appeared regarding the necessity (economic, 
societal) to learn the Estonian language, an issue that was highlighted in regard 
to Estonian-language training in schools was the lower level of general education 
that pupils in Narva would be receiving as a result of not having suitable Estonian 
language skills prior to that. A recent school graduate, a 20-year-old Russian-
speaking woman from Narva, laughed that she was able to study some of the 
subjects in Estonian, but was not able to learn history for example in Estonian. 
Here it is interesting to note that the Estonian perspective of ‘educating’ the 
Russian-speakers to fit ‘our values’ is seen to have a reverse effect in terms of the 
level of education received – a difference in perceptions of ‘normality’ in this 
regard. Another respondent in Narva stated that:  
“In Narva, the situation is like that, that when you have two Russian 
parents, it is easier for the child to study in Russian. Because the [Estonian] 
programme is difficult for children. Like myself – I have two children both 
in a Russian secondary school. From the other side, for them to have 
conversational Estonian… it’s called ‘immersion’ (погружение; kümblus). 
They speak Estonian from the first grade. They simply speak it. But the 
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level of education is lower like that I think. I can make a few comparisons 
and Russian children get a lower level of education in Estonian. Because of 
this I think that there has to be a Russian secondary school, where they 
could together learn Estonian, and English obviously.” (Nadya, Narva). 
Some of the problems highlighted by respondents in Narva included limited 
opportunities for practising the language and the cost of the language courses if 
one wanted to learn on one’s own. Estonian courses are subsidised from the state 
budget only for people applying for Estonian citizenship and for the ones Language 
Inspection has qualified for language testing. 
As briefly mentioned earlier, the controversial issues surrounding the Language 
and Citizenship Laws in Estonia were not brought up by either the Estonian- or 
Russian-speaking respondents. The issue of citizens and non-citizens can be seen 
to have been relieved with the changes introduced to the Citizenship Law in 1998. 
However, this also indicates that the crux of the issue was never about citizenship 
per se, even though this dominated all official discussions of the issue during the 
1990s and in EU accession – it has always been more about knowledge of Estonian 
and a person’s attitude to the state.  
 
7.3 ECONOMIC ASPECTS 
When discussing interethnic relations in Estonia, one of the core angles from which 
the Estonian-speaking respondents discussed relations with Russophones was in 
pragmatic economic terms. The economic recession, fatigue from austerity 
measures and political disappointment was perceived as having no dividing lines 
in this regard and therefore the ‘us’ and ‘them’ narrative did not appear within 
this context among the ethnic groups, as discussed already above as well in terms 
of references to an ‘underclass’, indicating that tensions brought on by the Bronze 
Soldier events were quickly overshadowed by the common experience of economic 
recession. 
“I think that the problem is the same for the people living here. Life is 
getting poorer, prices are going up. In reality this old politics and history 
isn’t really discussed here too much. The main thing for a person currently 
is that life would start getting better and not worse. […] The rest of it has 
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been left in the background. Should some sort of a hassle start between 
some countries and the topic gets brought up, then the differences might 
start coming up again, but in general I believe that plenty of the non-
Estonians here in Estonia consider Estonia their home.” (Priit, 49, Tallinn). 
The nature of the perceived improved relations was often framed through the 
economic prism which is compatible with the wider construction of Estonian 
identity – reconciling the neoliberal economic paradigm with the esteem of not 
accepting contrasting interpretations of history (by Russia) or perceptions of 
Russia (by the ‘West’). One could argue that a good integration tactic could be to 
find a new, uniting Other for common identity-construction. While the period of 
economic growth in the 2000s provided a basis for this construction in terms of 
moving forward to a prosperous European future that everyone would benefit 
from, then the recent economic crisis and the general lack of economic growth 
have offered a solid common ground for that again from another perspective. For 
both the Estonian and Russian-speakers most of everyday life aspects were seen 
through the economic prism.  
The standard of living and average wage were constantly brought up when 
discussing various aspects of life in Estonia and were seen as a crucial element 
separating Estonia from the Western European states. Within the respondents’ 
understanding of what ‘Europe’ entails, Estonia was seen as lacking the economic 
prosperity they envisioned there, although it was seen to uphold the economic 
values associated with belonging to the ‘West’ better than the ‘others’ (see 
Chapter 5). In other words, the ‘West’ was seen as ahead of Estonia economically 
because of the freedoms it had enjoyed during the decades after the war but was 
also viewed to be in danger of stagnating if it does not follow independent 
Estonia’s example in the face of the challenges arising from globalisation. Within 
the discussion surrounding perceptions of EU and Europe in this context, the 
Western European states were framed according to the perceived higher standard 
of living (even if not always accurately) and provided the Other in terms of 
unifying the different ethnicities.  
As one respondent from a mixed-family background said:  
“I think this comes from our overall poverty. The people are, in fact, still 
poor. It’s not normal that a person goes to the shop and looks for discounted 
193 
 
products. It isn’t normal. We don’t see these kinds of stacks of discounted 
[products] anywhere else in the world. [Discounted] because the deadline 
is passing.” (Anna, 65, Tallinn). 
With the reference to what ‘isn’t normal’, the continued existence of a boundary 
between perceptions of the Estonian Self and the Western Other can be seen. As 
discussed previously the notion that the Western model is not sustainable and that 
Estonia followed the ‘correct’ path in response to the economic crisis is there 
within the discourse as a statement of self-esteem designed to legitimise the 
current social and economic order. 
However, one needs to keep in mind that the economic aspect is simply one 
perspective in a complex web of interethnic constructions in Estonia, which 
nevertheless deserves to be explored in more detail in an attempt to acquire a 
more adequate understanding of how people (re)construct identity narratives on 
an everyday level. Since the fieldwork for this research was conducted in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis (in 2013), it is hardly surprising that the 
respondents saw this aspect as most relevant in their daily lives. This perspective 
is also encouraged by the inward and outward labelling of Estonia as an economic 
success prior to the economic crisis and becoming the poster-boy for the EU for 
implementing austerity measures during the crisis (see Chapter 5).  
In accordance with the general acceptance of neoliberal market economy, the 
idea of consumerism was highlighted by the respondents and seen as superseding 
nationalist tendencies in the post-EU context. A consumer has been elevated onto 
a high platform and this corresponds to the idea of belonging to the ‘Western’ 
capitalist world – the understanding of what the ‘West’ means in itself.  
“[The Russian-speakers] are consumers. They are relevant in the economic 
sense. It took us years to figure that out. […] That was the case during re-
independence era – that Estonian is the national language and please speak 
Estonian. It’s become more pragmatic now – if you own a company and you 
want the client, well the income, the client’s money, you have to [be]. 
Even if you have that pride or are fundamentally nationalistic, you will just 
have to swallow that.” (Tiina, 37, Brussels). 
As can be seen in the quote above, the reconciliation between the pragmatic 
understanding of economic necessity and the more national emotional element is 
still relevant a decade since joining the Western structures. However, as also 
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discussed in Chapter 6, national self-esteem has been shifted more towards 
economic success and therefore ‘swallowing’ the nationalist feelings in light of 
this does not in fact undermine national pride, but rather demonstrates the moral 
high ground taken by Estonia (for this Estonian-speaker).  
The differences in economic equality in terms of access and progress in the job 
market received a more varied approach. Several discourses can be extracted 
from this perspective according to regional (urban-rural) as well as within 
different urban settings (Tallinn-Narva).  
From the urban perspective, relating mostly to the respondents from Tallinn, 
several respondents highlighted the increasing possibilities of Russian-speakers in 
the job market. This could possibly be interpreted as a way to put a positive spin 
on the integration process through the pragmatic economic framework, and 
therefore reinforce the understanding that it simply makes economic sense to 
learn languages. The same is occasionally said about Estonian-speakers – that if 
possible, they should still learn Russian as Russia is a neighbour and knowing 
several languages is both economically beneficial (Russia as a trade partner etc.) 
and also culturally more enlightening. This is a relatively new phenomenon as the 
emphasis in the 1990s had been on learning English and attracting Western 
tourists, the importance of learning Russian for pragmatic reasons had surfaced 
again leaving the more national emotional issues to the background. However, this 
could only come from an Estonian-speaker in Estonia – the Russian-speakers 
remained relatively modest about their language skills. 
“Well, let’s put it like that – my daughter’s friend is a human resources 
manager at a [name] hotel and she says that she doesn’t want to hire 
Estonians any longer. [She says] ‘I have people coming from Ida-Viru[maa] 
- they have decent Estonian, decent Russian and decent English. […] I can’t 
[hire them any longer because] they are not competitive in hotels.’” (Anna, 
65, Tallinn). 
“Just this morning they (radio) were saying that the Russian youth is taking 
over the Estonian job market. That the Russian student learns English, 
learns Estonian and knows Russian and has three languages. But the 
Estonian student learns English but doesn’t learn and doesn’t want to learn 
Russian. And so there are lots of young Russians on the job market getting 
better positions.” (Leeni, 73, Tallinn). 
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This approach was not however shared by the Russian-speaking respondents in 
Narva or Tallinn. On the contrary, the Russian-speaking respondents discussed the 
issues surrounding the job market in relatively negative terms, placing emphasis 
on the disparity between Estonian- and Russian-speakers in hiring practices (i.e. 
that Estonian language is required) or opportunities for getting a relatively well-
paid position. 
"And not only in Narva do we have unemployment. Unemployment is 
everywhere. There are simply places with more of it and less of it. This is 
what I know for sure. People want to work, but ... Many are made 
redundant, people are fired. That's why, for example, they go, for example, 
so they wouldn’t lose their jobs, they take Estonian language courses. To 
know Estonian at a level where they could keep their jobs. Or, for example, 
they learn Estonian to increase their salaries." (Nadya, Narva). 
Even if certain differences are highlighted in terms of language issues in the job 
market, in the context of the economic crisis, everyone was still seen as being in 
the same ‘boat’, supporting the view that economic concerns have (to a significant 
degree) managed to trump questions of ethnicity. The economic woes were seen 
to cut across the country and affect people of all ethnicity and age. One of the 
more acute divisions in terms of perceived economic differences was rather urban-
rural than interethnic. 
A respondent in Narva highlighted the desolate situation in the border town in the 
aftermath of the economic crisis. The problem of depopulation through emigration 
from Narva to the larger cities in Estonia (or abroad) was especially critical for 
her (as can be seen from the exaggerated numbers).  
“People have low level of education. Most people have only general 
education. […] People get made redundant and they turn to drinking 
alcohol. […] Everyone who can, will leave. […] The population has 
decreased significantly. If about 5% of people leave Estonia annually, then 
in Ida-Virumaa that number is 20%. It is big. Nobody will come here. The 
thing is that people go to Tartu and Tallinn, from Narva as well. But nobody 
comes to Narva. We should exchange [remove] the state and local 
authorities. This is not how they should behave. Everybody knows that they 
steal. […] Everything has been proven, and they still sit here and govern 
the town! First thing is that they all should be exchanged.” (Yulia, Narva). 
The economic inequality perceived by people in the countryside also highlight the 
more difficult situation in peripheral areas compared to the better-off urban ones 
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(meaning mostly Tallinn and Tartu). As one respondent from rural Estonia, near 
the Russian border, spoke about the expectations she has for the economy from 
the everyday perspective:  
“To take the system of these [public institutions]. Why does the director of 
a rural [institution] have to earn two times less than the director of the 
same [institution] in the city? I think that to survive in this periphery… and 
we are actually on the same level with the best in Estonia. But not in terms 
of pay. I don’t know why it has to be like that – it isn’t normal. […] At the 
same time I’m sad that the salaries are so low in the Estonian state. As I 
love to say, the janitor should be able to feed and school their family and 
live off [their salary]. Not to mention when you’re a specialist – then I 
should be able to allow myself a lot more than I can now. It’s become 
especially sad in recent times. If I was young, I would leave as well because 
I only have one life and I want to allow myself… I have been working really 
hard for it all my life. In the old times people went to the Leningrad market 
(including her). I’ve been a cultural worker, but the pay was so modest 
that… I’m on a stage in front of people, I need party clothes for that, I can’t 
have sweats (dressikad) or work clothes on, which would be easier and 
cheaper. […] To have a second work day after [finishing] your main job was 
not easy. I’ve picked mushrooms, berries, done needlepoint and so on and 
so on. When the time came for establishing your own companies, then we 
had a three-family-company and then [you worked] from early morning till 
late at night, from morning to morning during Christmas holidays. So in one 
word, we should be able to live a normal life with eight hours [of work]. I 
feel sorry for the young families. I’m talking about big families. We could 
have more children but the current system just doesn’t favour it.” (Laila, 
55, Setomaa). 
In this sense, Estonia was seen as not having reached the expected goals and what 
are perceived as Western criteria for people’s welfare, not reached the 
‘normality’ envisioned in these terms for Estonia. There appears to be an idealistic 
view of the achievable standards of living. Even though she talks about the 
shortcomings of ‘the current system’, this refers more to the disappointment with 
the state political elite and the lack of investment in the rural areas rather than 
the overall free market economy. 
However difficult the economic circumstances were envisioned, the general 
neoliberal market-economy approach was not questioned or criticised by any 
respondent. The problems were seen not as deriving from the generally accepted 
‘commonsense’ market economy principles per se, but from the lack of restraint 
some other countries were demonstrating in not adhering to the austerity 
measures (see Chapter 5) (therefore contributing to the overall economic crisis), 
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and the decline in the standards of integrity by the local political elite compared 
to the 1990s.  
 
 ENTERING THE EURO ZONE 
Also, adding to the more practical and economic line of thought, even though the 
Euro was introduced in Estonia only in 2011, it is seen as an identifying part of 
being in the EU, and the most relevant part for the ‘common person’ of belonging 
to the Union. There are three main associations with the Euro that run through 
interviews. First, on an everyday level almost all respondents mentioned how the 
introduction of Euro drove the prices a lot higher in Estonia. 
“But… well there was this thing that… it was more like a campaign that 
“Euro won’t increase the prices!” and what not. And to think about it like 
that, then yes, the introduction of Euro and Euro in itself didn’t change 
anything, but well, we saw, right, how much more expensive life became 
all of a sudden. And we were already warned about this by the smart Finns, 
who had gone through it.” (Merike, 49, Muhu island). 
The second aspect was from the pragmatic line of thought seeing changing the 
currency as a necessity or a logical step for deeper integration into Europe. The 
practicalities of having a common currency while travelling were highlighted, 
however, this has little effect on a lot of Estonians due to limited resources. Giving 
up the Estonian Kroon was seen in terms of a necessary sacrifice for securing 
Estonia’s financial position in the West and losing a piece of its identity along the 
way. 
“I absolutely felt sorry. It was a beautiful currency. And our own money 
still. And we wanted it so so badly and of course I feel sorry. But I’m also 
happy with the introduction of Euro, but certainly sorry for the Estonian 
money. At the same time, as such a small currency, I suppose it would’ve 
been difficult for it to last.” (Laila, 55, Setomaa).  
Third, certain nostalgia for the Estonian Kroon was certainly detectable when the 
respondents, especially within the older generation, discussed giving up the 
Kroon. It was referred to as the identity of a country, although as said above, not 
all agreed and some respondents thought of it as simply necessary means with one 
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quoting: ‘I would rather read (loen) books than count (loen) money’ (Greta, 52, 
Tallinn). 
“Well we could have kept the Estonian money. […] I don’t understand why. 
We are European Union – fine. Everything is common – I can understand 
that. But every country could have kept their own identity. That money, it 
was somehow Estonian, it felt good. But now it’s sort of generic. Well of 
course it’s easier to travel, but [kroon] should have stayed.” (Linda, 34, 
Tallinn). 
“I felt really sorry to lose the Kroon. They were such cute bills. [They] 
honestly were, beautiful also. And I knew that everything would get more 
expensive with the Euro.” (Aino, 77, Tallinn). 
The discussion surrounding the Kroon indicates a certain tension between the 
‘spatial’ and ‘temporal’ narratives of ‘normality’. The negotiation between how 
the new ‘spatial’ normality - everything that goes with belonging to the EU (e.g. 
Euro) – fits with the new ‘temporal’ narrative of the glorification of the 1990s 
(e.g. Kroon as a ‘beautiful currency’), provides a good backdrop for understanding 
the complexity of people’s perceptions of ‘normality’. 
The neoliberal capitalist understanding for individual responsibility for any 
success/failure in the economic system also came through in the interviews. This 
perception did not only lie in learning the Estonian language as an instrument for 
possible economic success, but also more generally in perceptions of society in 
Estonia. 
“The gap between the rich and poor is big. But at the same time, I’m not 
arguing against the fact that unfortunately the so-called poor create that 
situation somewhat themselves, where they are poor. That they don’t use 
money sensibly. Like for example the SMS-loans. […] One thing is that a 
person can’t get out of it when they’ve foolishly taken the loan, but another 
thing is that they were foolish enough to take out the loan at all.” (Raul, 
22, Tallinn). 
 
 FINDING ESTONIA’S NOKIA 
Another aspect that deserves discussion here is how Estonia has made attempts to 
brand itself through the economic prism. Ever since Lennart Meri put forward the 
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idea of finding an Estonian Nokia in 199914, this has every now and then resurfaced 
in Estonia. Various things have been discussed as the different possibilities for an 
Estonian Nokia, which could be anything from an idea to an object which would 
drive Estonia forward economically and distinguish it in the international arena. 
This Nokia was seen as part of becoming a ‘normal’ competitive state in a 
globalised economy. The interview data revealed that this idea of finding 
something ‘truly’ Estonian that would distance it from the Soviet past and also 
differentiate it within the European space appeared to be something still sought 
after.  
Me: “What could Estonia promote itself with?” 
Tarmo: “Are you asking me what the Estonian Nokia is?” (27, Tallinn). 
The reference to Nokia, a highly successful Finnish brand in the 1990s, Estonia’s 
own understanding of branding was tied to this prosperous, innovative and 
technologically advanced ideal, which also forms a part of Estonia’s Nordic 
discourse discussed in Chapters 1, 2 and 5. The key theme emerging from the 
discussion of ‘branding’ Estonia was expectedly the IT dimension, as this has been 
the niche painting the picture of Estonia as a small but innovative, adaptive and 
even courageous country in line with the slogans of ‘the little country that could’ 
and ‘shining star’ put forward during the 1990s. This image has been largely 
cultivated externally but appears to have been ‘successfully’ assimilated by the 
wider public in the sense that it is accepted and appreciated by the people on the 
ground. The interview data also revealed the image of an E-stonia as the most 
effective factor for introducing Estonia to the world. However, these statements 
also indicate that people appear to have uncritically assimilated the whole IT 
dimension as part of the dominant neoliberal orthodoxy. The IT aspect along with 
other but related nation-branding elements were referred to by respondents of 
various backgrounds, ages and genders demonstrating how deeply this dimension 
has been internalised in Estonia. 
“For example I think that the E-stonia is really cool (kihvt). Kind of brings 
forward our essence!” (Eveli, 48, Brussels) 
                                                          
14 President’s speech at Hansapank Economic Conference on May 5, 1999 (https://vp1992-
2001.president.ee/est/k6ned/K6ne.asp?ID=3915, accessed 22/06/2017) 
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“I think this E-state is a nice indicator I’d say. What else do we have… Well, 
a lot of good people have gone abroad and showed us and introduced us.” 
(Aino, 77, Tallinn). 
“Well, it’s a country with specialists and developed IT landscape and good 
economic environment. I think these are the ones.” (Tarmo, 27, Tallinn). 
“And as I’ve understood, we’re kind of a E-state as well. All the elections 
and stuff take place over the internet and different technologies are quite 
advanced. The EST CUBE thing for example. This kind of a technical side.” 
(Siret, 22, Southern Estonia).  
“Well we promote and talk about how Skype comes from Estonia. That’s 
much better (kõvem sõna) than Welcome to Estonia.” (Mart, 50, Brussels). 
The last quote refers to the brand logo Welcome to Estonia, which was used during 
the interview process to spark discussion on nation-branding in general. Nation-
branding can be seen as directly connected to how the nation is imagined. It is 
constrained by this image and constructs it at the same time. The Brand Estonia 
project was commissioned in 2001 prior to Estonia’s accession to the EU to 
introduce Estonia to the world. The logo was accompanied by the slogan 
‘Positively transforming’ to demonstrate Estonia’s move towards to West and 
highlight the relatively successful transition period and away from the East and 
past (Jordan 2011: 85). However, as expected and shown in previous research 
(Jordan 2011), the negative attitudes towards the campaign surfaced clearly from 
the interview data. 
“Oh, I don’t want to talk about it. I’d rather not discuss it. Unfortunately, 
in a word, I’m not a supporter of it. It was a true waste of money.” (Greta, 
52, Tallinn). 
“Estonia, the Old Town. […] This would be much better than any English 
text (referring to the Welcome to Estonia logo). I don’t understand it. Now 
it’s become familiar and it’s everywhere and you’re used to it. But it 
doesn’t say anything about Estonia. There’s nothing. Only that EST. In 
capital letters, that’s the only thing you look at that this is characteristic 
of Estonia.” (Linda, 34, Tallinn). 
After nearly a decade of belonging to the EU and being part of other international 
organisations, there were indications from the interview data that the Estonian 
Nokia is yet to be discovered and perhaps it hadn’t fully yet become ‘another 
boring’ (as Toomas Hendrik Ilves referred to Estonia hopefully ‘becoming another 
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boring Nordic country’ already in the 90s) European country and was still searching 
for its je ne sais quoi to be recognised for in the wider world. This aspiration for 
becoming a ‘boring’ country can be seen as a byword for the ‘normality’, when 
counterpoised to Estonia’s turbulent past and historical sense of geopolitical 
vulnerability. 
“I think that we have darn (kuradi) little in this area. In promoting Estonia… 
What do people know. They know that – an IT republic, right? Perhaps also 
the Singing Festival, but that’s more… There aren’t that many things to be 
proud of. Well Skype, but that’s gone now as well.” (Greta, 52, Tallinn). 
Nation-branding in itself can be seen as symptomatic of the neoliberal paradigm 
and globalisation, with the territorial state being reconceptualised as the 
competition state and the normative criteria of international subjectivity can be 
seen as changing (Browning 2015: 283). Browning explains that when a world is 
characterised in terms of global market competition, the entrepreneurial 
capacity, openness to trade and investment, and flexibility become the 
legitimising force for a country through which self-esteem is gained (2015: 283). 
This affects the national narratives states tell about themselves and the emphasis 
of nation branding programmes is increasingly on rejecting the traditional focus 
on nationalism and kinship ties in favour of presenting societies as cosmopolitan, 
multicultural spaces open for investment (Browning 2015: 283). While Browning’s 
take can certainly be seen in the Estonian case, these attempts at branding Estonia 
were not seen to have been successful, as on the one hand the respondents 
expressed concern that Estonia was not known in the world which also indicated 
that the historical experience was not recognised at times even on the European 
level.  
“It’s so sad to listen to when someone in, I don’t know, Southern Europe 
doesn’t know anything about Estonia. It’s simply horrible. I’m not even 
going to talk about that America. But the fact that in Europe [people don’t 
know], that shows that people [generally] don’t know. […] That’s more in 
Southern Europe, Northern Europe and Central Europe, I hope, [know what 
Estonia is].” (Greta, 52, Tallinn). 
“I think they know us already in the European Union, but I don’t know, you 
look at some of the travel shows on TV from America or some place and 
they [don’t know] Estonia. We should get to the point where everybody 
knows us.” (Piret, 37, Tallinn). 
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And on the other hand, however, they also struggled in coming up with anything 
to promote about Estonia. 
“I think it’s the nature. I don’t think we have anything else to offer which 
wouldn’t exist anywhere else (she laughs).” (Katrin, 32, Tallinn). 
 
7.4 NATURE OF THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 
As discussed in Chapter 1, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the main 
goals for Estonia was to gain membership in the European Union and NATO. The 
conditionality of accession to various international organisations became a 
benchmark for officially becoming a consolidated democracy with reliable, 
accountable and responsive institutions and meaningful participation in the 
political process – a ‘normal’ Western country in a sense. The following section 
looks at how the respondents discussed politics and politicians after having lived 
nearly a decade in this achieved ‘normality’.  
 
 GLORIFICATION OF THE 1990s 
The era of re-independence in the 1990s is glorified and there seems to be a level 
of disappointment with the present-day politics of Estonia. A certain 
disillusionment with politicians and politics in general surfaced in the interviews. 
Even though there is little surprising about people’s disengagement from the 
political scene and disappointment with politicians in the Western world in 
general, having only gained independence in 1991, this fatigue with the political 
establishment has come about relatively quickly for Estonia. In a negative sense 
this falls into the category of being a small and flexible country able to rapidly 
implement the Western ways. However, this disillusionment with politics has a 
few particular elements given the context in Estonia.  
While the narrative of state restoration and glorification of the first period of 
independence have been emphasised in previous studies focussing on Estonian 
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identity, these themes rarely appeared in the interviews, and as was also 
discussed in Chapter 5, belonging to the EU has brought about the idea of a 
‘Second Estonian Republic’, which had become a more tangible point of reference 
for the respondents within the new ‘normality’ of belonging to the Western World. 
The beginning of the 1990s can be seen to symbolise an idealistic virtuous era, 
when few benefits were offered to politicians in return for the possibility of 
rebuilding a state repressed under the Soviet rule for 50 years apart from national 
pride and working towards a common goal. Put simply, ‘times were hard, but we 
were all in it together’. A nostalgia for the perceived solidarity of the 90s, that 
had given way to individualism, consumerism and atomisation. This longing for 
more zeal-based politics reflects more the ideal rather than the ambition for 
actually altering the more general neoliberal direction. The photos of the three 
Estonian presidents appeared to provide a good basis for the respondents to 
reflect on the re-independence era and the changes they perceived on the 
political level. As one respondent remarked:  
“These portrait pictures are like Estonian history for me. The history of 
independent Estonia.” (Eveli, 48, Brussels).  
When discussing the political situation in Estonia and various politicians, the 1990s 
were constantly brought up by the respondents in a romanticised manner and 
Lennart Meri, the first president of the newly re-established state (in office 1992-
2001), was referred to as a ‘great man’.  
“Well he was a brilliant personality. Very unique. And to think about him 
as the president, then he was certainly the best (ainuõige) choice at the 
time, because he was the one who managed to attract attention for Estonia 
and bring us onto the European map better. A nice, wonderful person. I 
didn’t know him personally, but well, he was intellectually very capable 
with a broad horizon, knew the languages. Well, everything there should 
be. And occasionally stubborn, which is also necessary.” (Tiina, 37, 
Brussels). 
“Lennart Meri, the first president. Truth be told, I was young then still. But 
life was better before, I think. From 1991 to 2000. The economic situation 
was calmer before.” (Dimitry, 27, Narva). 
Besides Meri, the other presidents got a relatively lukewarm reception among the 
respondents who highlighted their function as a figurehead. The political career 
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of President Arnold Rüütel (in office 2001-2006) received less attention, but he 
was credited for being a ‘ladies’ favourite’ and having a wonderful ‘head of hair’ 
(Greta, 52, Tallinn; Leeni, 73, Tallinn). Even though Rüütel had a comparable role 
to Meri in the restoration of independence, he was tarnished by his Communist 
Party past in a way that Meri was not. Opinions on president Toomas Hendrik Ilves 
(in office 2006-2016) varied, as some saw him as a perfect representative with his 
foreign policy experience and good language skills, while others viewed him as 
still a foreigner born abroad and questioned his Estonian language abilities. 
“Well let’s just say that comrade (товарищ) Ilves came from nowhere.” 
(Toomas, 39, Tallinn). 
“Ilves-Ilves, I’d like to say that Ilves is continuing what Lennart Meri started. 
That Lennart Meri brought Estonia to the European map and Ilves is sort of 
continuing that. Which I really like.” (Tarmo, 27, Tallinn). 
“He wants to do Estonian things, but from the start he’s been very foreign, 
since he didn’t speak Estonian very well. He spoke it, but very roughly 
(konarlikult). He already made some mistakes in his speeches – the 
president’s language should be perfect!” (Kaili, 70, Central Estonia).  
Politics and politicians were generally perceived as having lost the ‘right’ way 
with the measured pragmatic mode (although consistent with the neoliberal 
agenda guiding various other approaches) substituting the national emotional path 
for politics. The differences in perceptions of the presidents can be attributed to 
this to a degree. 
“Things have changed for sure. I think that in the beginning of the 1990s, 
this [politics] was done with this great … zeal (õhin) or perhaps with this… 
I don’t know the best word for it – patriotism isn’t perhaps the right word, 
but well… Present-day politics is much more calculated (kaalutletud).” 
(Mart, 50, Brussels). 
Several reasons can be cited here as possible causes for the shift in the direction 
of discontent and partly this was already discussed in Chapter 5 regarding Estonia’s 
positioning in the EU. The economic success Estonia had in the beginning of 2000s 
was seen as an outcome of the shock therapy and having gone through the painful 
transition period in the 1990s. Fulfilling the criteria and gaining access to the 
European institutions were supposed to provide a solid basis for further 
advancement. The expectations had been high for the rise of living standards in 
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the years following EU accession in 2004. As mentioned in the previous chapter 
the Reform Party slogan about taking Estonia into the five top richest countries in 
Europe as part of their 2007 election campaign illustrates these expectations 
(even if exaggerated at the time), but received ridicule both in the media and by 
the people in light of the disappointment with the economic situation in Estonia, 
which started to deteriorate already at the end of 2007 as pointed out in the 
introduction. The year 2009, when the financial crisis, which hit Estonia relatively 
hard, brought about a different reality in Estonia. The recovery from the economic 
crisis has been slower than expected in Estonia and has left an imprint how people 
frame the political scene both domestically and on the EU level (see Chapter 5 for 
discussion on Greece).  
Even though the established narrative of ‘returning to Europe’ suggests that 
Estonia was always part of Europe, having been in the role of ‘catching up’ 
politically, economically and socially to the rest of the Western world, was part 
of the perception. Having formally achieved the ‘normality’ of belonging to the 
Western world through EU and NATO accession, however, appeared to mean 
accepting joint responsibility in the EU economically (see Chapter 5 for discussion 
on Greece) and the exhaustion of these political ideals to an extent.  
 
 DISTANCING IN THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SPHERE  
The discussion regarding the Estonian presidents usually led to wider discussion on 
Estonia’s present-day politics, where it was apparent, that a general 
disappointment with the political actors in Estonia had taken root. Quite a few 
Estonian-speaking respondents accentuated the growing distance between the 
politicians and the ‘regular person’. 
“I’ve been supporting Reform Party all this time, I still think that their 
politics is not for the most common person. It’s more for the people who 
live better – they represent their interests most with their politics. […] 
Their politics has taken Estonia forward on the world stage and a lot of 
people have gone for that [and voted for them]. But I don’t know, with the 
elections coming up, I don’t know… I think they’ll be getting fewer votes 
this time. The circle of people I know (tutvusringkonda), I think a lot of 
them are thinking like that. Myself included, when the new elections come, 
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I don’t know who I’m going to vote for. I don’t want to vote for one, the 
other, third or fourth [party]. In a word, whether I’m going to go to vote – 
that’s not right either – but currently my head is so empty that I don’t know 
who to vote for. […] I think that the parliament also – they have a good 
salary. When you look at some of their sessions, the seats are empty. At 
the same time they tell you that they don’t rest, that they only work-work-
work. […] Well, I don’t know, they don’t appear to be working 24 hours a 
day, but they want a big salary and then things are good. […] So I don’t 
think that things are fine with that.” (Priit, 49, Tallinn). 
The distancing from the wider political sphere carried on to the key political 
figures at the time. The respondents were provided images of the two main 
political leaders in Estonia at the time: Prime Minister Andrus Ansip and the leader 
of the opposition party – the Centre Party – Edgar Savisaar.  
Opinions varied about Prime Minister Andrus Ansip, who is seen as a firm leader 
but also as having grown distant from the people. For example, the long-time 
prime minister was described in the following terms:  
“Well, Ansip was fine (okei) at first but now he’s completely lost it. Totally, 
I think.” (Linda, 34, Tallinn).  
“He seems a bit too dictatorish and that frightens me.” (Laila, 55, 
Setomaa).   
However, respondents were also concerned that there is too much criticism 
pointed towards him and he was credited for making tough decision during the 
crisis. As discussed also in the methods chapter, the Russian-speaking 
respondents, especially in Narva, were somewhat reluctant to discuss politics and 
refrained from discussing the Prime Minister. In one interview, a respondent even 
clearly stopped herself from saying anything concrete about him:  
“Here, in Narva, we have a lot of negative about Andrus Ansip... a lot of 
negative information about him, about politics. […] As a person - I do not 
know. But as a politician ... A lot of people are dissatisfied with his 
policies.” When asked about her own opinion on this, she struggled, “I ... 
it's hard for me to say, as for ...ehm… I'm not very interested in politics, so 
I cannot say what's right, what's wrong.” (Nadya, Narva). 
During the Bronze Soldier crisis Ansip became a polarising figure. His personal 
ratings and those of his party, the Reform Party, soared among Estonians (45% in 
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May 200715), but he attracted opprobrium from Russians. In 2013, the highest 
rating for the Reform Party was 25% in March-April and lowest 18% in November-
December. Even though the ratings were unusually high for the party in power in 
2007, one could interpret the fact that Estonians were quick to round on him (and 
his broken election promises) after the economic crisis as an indication that 
people’s minds were first and foremost on the economy rather than ‘national’ 
themes.  
The opposition leader and mayor of Tallinn, Edgar Savisaar, was widely disliked 
within the Estonian-speaking community, and while receiving some credit for his 
actions during the 1990s, he was viewed as a ‘sell-out’ for Estonians and as one 
respondent put it ‘drawing on votes from the opposing side’.  
“I feel like [Savisaar] is kind of trying to hinder our European topic.” (Piret, 
37, Tallinn). 
“To me, Savisaar, appears to be a bit more Russian-minded person.” (Siret, 
22, Southern Estonia). 
On the other hand, and not surprisingly, Savisaar, who has been appealing to the 
Russian-speaking vote for a long time, was viewed favourably by the respondents 
in Narva.   
“This is the mayor of Tallinn - Savisaar is a good person, and as a politician 
has done much more for Estonia than some of the more influential 
politicians that I see here.” (Dmitry, 27, Narva). 
The reluctance for people to discuss politics in Narva can also (in addition to the 
methodological issues discussed) be attributed to little engagement with the 
political sphere both as living in a more peripheral city in Estonia and perhaps on 
a more personal level as well. A respondent in Narva brought out an interesting 
perspective regarding Narva as a ‘forgotten’ town in terms of state politics.  
“In Narva, I think that we have been forgotten (she laughs) in Estonia, 
[forgotten] that we are here at all. I don’t know. Narva rarely takes part in 
any of this [politics], that things pass the way they do and it is always on 
the sidelines a bit. That is why, in principle, we are not always that 
informed. […] In general I think that more should be done for the people 
                                                          
15 Kantar Emor Party support ratings in Estonia: http://www.emor.ee/erakondade-toetus/ 
accessed 29.05.2017 
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and not for themselves. It seems to me that our politicians, democracy and 
so on – they are always out for themselves.” (Nina, 20, Narva).  
This statement falls in line with Smith and Burch (2012) claims regarding Narva as 
having a particular niche identity of its own, which doesn’t seem to fit into 
Estonia, but not belonging to anywhere else either. 
The disappointment with politics and current state of affairs can also be seen in 
other rural areas, where a respondent brought out the lack of enthusiasm for 
participating in the political sphere. People living in more rural areas tended to 
discuss politics more in terms of local politics rather than the state level. 
“I wish there was some change at least. That the people in front could be 
changed or exchanged. Well on the local level here […] the faces have been 
basically the same for 20 years. […] We had a group of people here – an 
electoral alliance (he was part of it). We had this enthusiasm for doing 
things. It’s only been four years. And I think that we took on some good 
things, [we had] good thoughts and plans about what to do. And now when 
we look at the whole thing – there were almost 20 people in this alliance 
and 4 got elected to the municipal council – we sat down one day and looked 
at whether and what we could do with the local life [for the coming 
elections]. And [the enthusiasm] has disappeared for some reason. 
Everyone is disappointed somehow. I don’t know whether disappointed or 
jaded – I don’t know what it is.” (Martin, 69, Setomaa).  
 
7.5 CONCLUSION 
As the chapter demonstrates there still appeared to be a generalised 
understanding that Estonia should be consolidated as a nation-state instead of any 
multi-national civic society and that the Russian-speaking population should 
‘integrate’ according to the terms set by the majority, core nation. The interview 
data also suggested that limited emphasis was placed upon the formal 
requirements (e.g. in terms of gaining citizenship) and that more general attitudes 
towards the state and society (e.g. in terms of language, culture and education) 
were accentuated as the most relevant to the integration process meaning that 
for the people in Estonia integration is more based on knowing the state language 
and attitudes towards the state.  
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Even though the themes of language, cultural Othering and education are still 
important dividing factors in perceived ethnic boundaries in Estonia, another 
important element emerged in the aftermath of the economic crisis. I argue in 
this chapter that the reconciliation between the pragmatic understanding of 
economic necessity and the more national emotional element is pertinent in 
understanding interethnic relations in Estonia a decade since joining the Western 
structures and forming part of the Estonian ‘normality’. As discussed in Chapters 
5 and 6 as well, the Estonian national self-esteem has been shifted more towards 
economic success and therefore ‘swallowing’ the nationalist feelings in light of 
this does not in fact undermine national pride, but rather demonstrates the moral 
high ground taken by Estonia. Also, the Russophone interview findings arguably 
suggest a generalised trend towards ‘pragmatic adaptation’ to new realities rather 
than voice of protest. 
The final section of the chapter brings out how the respondents discussed the 
domestic political dimensions in Estonia. The expectations had been high for the 
rise of living standards in the years following EU accession in 2004, but the 
recovery from the economic crisis has been slower than expected in Estonia and 
has left an imprint how people frame the political scene both domestically and on 
the EU level. The glorification of the 1990s becomes a clear idealised benchmark 
again (as discussed in Chapter 5) for addressing the political actors in Estonia and 
unsurprisingly, a general disappointment with the politics in Estonia had taken 
root. The nostalgia for the more ‘emotional’ dramatic politics of the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, compared to the dull and routine ‘normal’ politics that followed 
was an interesting point to come from the analysis. However, as the chapter (and 
the thesis) demonstrates, the complex layers of national identity constructions in 
Estonia still provide interesting perspectives and explanatory grounds for 
understanding the political, economic and societal perceptions in Estonia even 
after becoming a ‘normal’ European country. 
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CHAPTER 8. ‘RETURNED TO ‘NORMALITY’?’ 
 
 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
This research is a qualitative in-depth investigation into Estonian national identity 
constructions after joining the European Union and NATO. This thesis sought to 
bring forward a complex multi-layered picture of Estonian identity that emerges 
with examining the perspective from below. The main argument advanced in this 
thesis is that a certain ‘normality’ compatible with the Estonian national identity 
constructions had settled nearly a decade after joining the EU when this research 
was conducted. This thesis claims that having gained accession to the European 
Union and NATO in 2004, Estonia formally validated its ‘return in Europe’, 
however, the way in which this belonging to Europe is conceptualised by the 
people living in Estonia can vary. At the risk of simplification, there appear to 
have been shifts in both the temporal and spatial narratives of ‘normality’ as put 
forward by Eglitis (2002). The main new prisms that discussions on Estonian 
national identity appear to run through are how the non-negotiable neoliberal 
paradigm, which, especially in the after-math of the economic crisis, had 
contributed to the emergence of a new North-South axis indicating an alteration 
in the spatial ‘normality’ for constructing ‘Europe’; and having the idealised 1990s 
and the ‘Second Estonian Republic’ as a benchmark for national identity 
constructions, a clear temporal shift from the interwar period.  
But why is it important to study these themes in the post-enlargement context? 
As a full EU member, Estonia has had the ability to shape conceptions of European 
values and ‘customise’ EU policies in a way that it did not before 2004 when it 
was a ‘norm taker’ rather than a ‘norm maker’. Gaining a deeper understanding 
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of the particular perspectives it brings to bear is therefore essential to 
understanding the wider development of the EU and Europe as a whole.  
Also, how relevant are the much-discussed East-West divisions nearly a decade 
after the 2004 enlargement despite the formal claim that a Europe ‘whole and 
free’ had come into being? Are there other possible ideational divisions that have 
become pertinent from the Estonian perspective? And what is Russia’s continued 
role as the Other for the EU as a whole, not just for Estonia? Arguably 
‘normalisation’ of relations with Russia was never going to imply that they were 
the same as those with Finland, Latvia or other nearby countries – it was more a 
case of Estonia Othering Russia in a more consistent way with some other European 
countries.  
The economic crisis, which hit Europe in 2008, intensified the competition for 
defining the Europeanness to which Estonia was ‘returning’. It has arguably 
encouraged a new binary of North/South division in how Europe was perceived, 
with Estonia seen by the people there as embodying the ‘true’ neoliberal values 
associated with the understanding of ‘Europe’. The strident neoliberal paradigm 
has helped to shape other national identity constructions – this includes most 
notably understandings of the external significant negative Other, Russia, which 
in turn has framed the domestic interethnic relations to a degree. Along with this, 
themes of security have not lost their relevance in the highly complex national 
identity constructions and continued to shape Estonia’s self-positioning in Europe 
and vis-à-vis Russia, even if a certain reconciliation between the pragmatic 
understanding of economic necessity and the more national emotional element 
appears to be pertinent nearly a decade after officially ‘returning to Europe’. 
From a more present-day standpoint we can see how this crisis has put the EU 
under severe strain by fostering the rise of populist politics across a range of 
countries. In Estonia, the rise of the right-wing populism has been slower, although 
gaining more ground in recent years, and this thesis provides significant grounds 
for a better understanding of these developments in Estonia.  
Additionally, and more importantly, since gathering the data for this research, 
one needs to keep in mind that there has been a significant shift in the ‘normality’ 
that had arguably settled in by 2013, with Russia invading Ukraine the following 
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year and altering the wider security perspective in Europe. Even though some 
politicians in Europe, including in Estonia, continued to make alarmist remarks 
about threat from Russia prior to 2014 (e.g. during and after the Georgian War in 
2008), there appeared to be a general view that, while unpredictable, 
‘mysterious’ and not on board with the vision of a ‘New Europe’, Russia was not 
about to mount any active challenge to Europe16. 
However, with hindsight, the EU in general was already sleepwalking its way into 
the confrontation with Russia over Ukraine. Russia’s incursion into Ukraine in 2014 
may have changed the paradigm, but official Estonia’s attitude seems to be one 
of ‘keep calm and carry on’, and a direct attack on an EU and NATO member state 
by Russia is viewed as inconceivable. Rather, Russia is seen as a problem to Europe 
as a whole, not specifically to Estonia or the Baltics, and as threatening to 
European values. This demonstrates a considerable change compared to the 1990s 
and this research brings out the foundation for understanding how and why this is 
so. 
The amount of academic research done on Estonian national identity has 
decreased since accession to the EU and NATO. Even more so, very few have 
explored this topic from a grassroots perspective. This research makes a 
significant contribution to understanding the ‘normality’ that had settled in 
Estonia (and Europe) within the decade of belonging to the EU and NATO. By taking 
a bottom-up view, it looks at the extent of feedback loop between official 
narratives and the grassroots perspectives. The former shape the latter, but the 
latter are also held by those who make policy. Thus, it is important to gain this 
deeper qualitative understanding of the discourses that exist within the society. 
This concluding chapter will provide an overview of the thesis. It will first discuss 
the theoretical approach employed for this research and what it adds to the 
existing academic research. It then highlights one of the significant contributions 
this research makes to the field by discussing the bottom-up approach taken and 
the innovative visual methodology employed for conducting the interviews for this 
                                                          
16 E.g. the UK Parliament House of Lords EU Sub-Committee on External Affairs (2015) 
report ’The EU and Russia: before and beyond the crisis in Ukraine’ 
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study. The main section discusses the principal findings of this thesis before 
concluding with a look at possibilities for further research. 
 
8.2 THE APPROACH FOR STUDYING ESTONIAN ‘NORMALITY’ 
Chapter 2 establishes the theoretical grounds for why and how ‘normality’ and 
national identity are approached and analysed in the study at hand. ‘Normality’ 
is broadly addressed as the common sense and taken for granted situations in the 
social world which usually don’t get noticed by the people living it. ‘Normality’ 
can help us understand the frames in which people see and interpret their 
particular historical circumstances and what they find desirable about their 
society, limited by the cultural and structural context they inhabit. 
The theoretical premise for understanding identity and groupness relies on Henry 
Hale’s (2008) account of ethnicity, which he sees as being mainly about 
uncertainty reduction in a complex social world. Identity is defined as a set of 
points of reference which help categorise and navigate the world around us and 
groups are formed by having common relationships to points of reference. Pulling 
the broader theoretical discussion together, ‘normality’ is used in this research as 
an ideational collection of thicker points of reference related to perceptions of 
national identity which are useful for the people in Estonia for navigating and 
reducing uncertainty in the social, economic and political world.  
The chapter then explains how national identity is approached in this study within 
the social constructivist paradigm. This study follows Benedict Anderson’s (1983) 
famous definition of the nation as ‘an imagined political community’ and looks at 
national identity not as something fixed or in an essentialising sense, but rather 
as discursively produced and reproduced by means of language and constantly 
negotiated and renegotiated. The best way for comprehending these constructions 
of national identity is through studying the discursive fields from ‘below as well 
as above’. 
In the final section, the specific Estonian post-Soviet but pre-accession ‘normality’ 
central to narratives of Estonia’s national identity is discussed through the works 
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of Eglitis (2002) and Rausing (2004). One of the core points of reference for 
‘normality’ in Estonia was opposition to the ‘abnormal’ Soviet rule. ‘Normality’ 
was largely based on the idea of what Estonia would have been like had the Soviet 
occupation not taken place. The spatial – belonging to the Western world – and 
the temporal – glorification of the inter-war era of independence – became the 
pillars for identity construction for Estonia after regaining independence in 1991.  
Joining the EU and NATO in 2004 has certainly had an impact on the dominant set 
of ideas which shape the policy-making process and Estonia’s self-positioning 
within the international arena. The chapter explains how and why the concept of 
‘normality’ provides a very useful framework for looking at national identity 
constructions in Estonia. It forms the basis for the main agenda for this research 
as to how the idea of becoming and being a ‘normal’ country again after regaining 
independence in 1991 has changed in the post-2004 context, which ostensibly 
signified becoming a ‘normal’ Western country again.  
This research is guided by the bulk of previous academic literature on Estonian 
national identity constructions (Chapter 3). While the topic was especially 
prominent academically in the 1990s and has lost some of its appeal in the post-
accession era, the significant contributions made by David J. Smith (2002, 2003, 
2005, 2010), Richard Mole (2012), Maria Mälksoo (2006, 2009, 2010), Merje Kuus 
(2007, 2010, 2011), Eiki Berg and Piret Ehin (2009), Andres Kasekamp and Karsten 
Brüggemann (2009, Brüggemann 2007), Eva-Clarita Onken (2007, 2009, Pettai 
2011), Vyacheslav Morozov (2003, 2005), Marko Lehti (2005, 2006, 2007, 2010), 
Pami Aalto (2003), Daina Stukuls Eglitis (2002) and others have been valuable in 
providing context and different perspectives on the Estonian national identity 
debates.  
Chapter 3 starts by looking at some of the ethnographic research conducted on 
Estonian national identity in recent years and establishes the need for a further 
careful uncovering of how ordinary people think about various identity-related 
themes in the post-EU context. 
In general, the chapter situates the current study in relation to existing work on 
the question of Estonian national identity and brings out the main themes running 
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through prior research on this topic. These themes provided the context for 
addressing the post-accession ‘normality’ in Estonia and guided the methods for 
conducting fieldwork for this study. The literature review discusses the main 
threads running through the spatial and temporal narratives in Estonian 
‘normality’ in the pre-accession era and looks into some of the changes within 
these narratives through previous research. 
These themes are broadly divided into three sections. First, a section is dedicated 
to discussing the role conflicting narratives of history with Russia and memory 
politics in general play in Estonia’s identity and how it frames the policy-making. 
Second, it brings out the various Others of Estonia’s identity-building process, 
since identity is always constructed in relation to Other. Here, the threatening 
qualities of Russia as the Other are drawn out through looking at previous 
research. On the other hand, this section also looks at how the perceptions of 
Europe and the European Union guide Estonia’s self-positioning in the 
international sphere and how this in turn impacts upon people’s perceptions of 
everyday life and through that ‘normality’ on a grassroots level. Third, the 
literature review brings out the variety of labels which have been attached to 
Estonia’s self-definition, whether internally sought for or externally placed upon 
and the negotiation of these within the Estonian identity-building process. These 
include the regional identification labels such as Baltic or Nordic and temporal 
concepts such as new Europe. It also looks at the attempts to establish Estonia as 
the flexible, innovative and an economic success story within the new democracies 
of 1990s and expands the discussion on the unquestionable neoliberal agenda 
which has been part of a top-down discourse of ‘normality’ in Estonia. It further 
elaborates on the useful term of nationalist neoliberalism for understanding this 
paradigm in Estonia and helping frame the discussion around neoliberalism in the 
following empirical chapters. 
The chapter establishes the three underlying themes framing Estonia’s identity 
construction and shaping perceptions of ‘normality’ - the narrative of ‘returning 
to Europe’, constructions of Russia as the Other in Estonia’s identity-building 
process and conflicting narratives of history. These main themes guided the 
preparations for data collection for this research.  
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Most existing studies on Estonia’s identity-building process and its relation to 
Russia and history have focused on dominant discourses, media outlets, archives 
and survey results, with an emphasis on the role of the political elite. The need 
for examining the grassroots level in order to achieve a better understanding of 
national identity constructs has been emphasised in recent literature as well as 
the theoretical discussions surrounding nations and nationhood, and this research 
has drawn on this necessity to provide an empirically different perspective on how 
Estonian national identity is constructed on an everyday level and gain a more 
nuanced understanding of perceptions of ‘normality’. Within this wider bottom-
up approach, in the hopes to widen and deepen the empirical data further, I 
incorporated a more innovative approach to data gathering – namely I introduced 
images guided by the themes of Estonian national identity to the interviewing 
process. 
 
8.3 STUDYING ESTONIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY THROUGH IMAGES 
While there is strong agreement among scholars that multiple layers of inter-
community identities do exist, the use of ethnographic or ground-up methods, in 
order to receive a better understanding of the complexity of these identities, has 
hardly been utilised in the case of Estonia. This research took a bottom-up 
approach to analysing Estonia’s current political and social situation, and through 
in-depth interviews offers a more detailed and nuanced insight into the life-worlds 
of the respondents and their constructions of Estonian ‘normality’. 
The interviews were not simply structured talk-based sessions, but I incorporated 
a novel aspect to them – namely I used images during the interviews in order to 
generate additional insight into the issues under investigation, relying on Gillian 
Rose’s (2013) claim that things are discussed in the talk about visual materials 
that do not get discussed in talk-only interviews. Photo elicitation or image 
elicitation method proved successful and highly valuable for this research. It 
provided a way to decentre the narrative and offer the respondents a chance to 
discuss various aspects more on their own terms, even though certain limitations 
still remain within this context (e.g. perception of what is expected of them, the 
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choice of images). As mentioned, the range of images I introduced to the process 
were based on previous academic research into Estonian national identity and 
were chosen to reflect the dominant discourse on these topics in the Estonian 
media. These included: 
▪ ‘return to Europe’; and Europe as the positive Other;  
▪ Russia as the negative Other;  
▪ conflicting history narratives. 
These themes formed the basis for selecting certain key events, persons, objects 
generally seen as associated with these themes and the formed the grounds for 
choosing images from the media and other sources in order to provide a stimulus 
for discussion.  
I was looking for ‘rich’ data and possible different perspectives in Estonia and 
conducted 33 interviews with Estonian- and Russian-speakers in all over Estonia 
and some in Brussels between January 2013 and January 2014. Rather than 
aspiring to statistical generalisability or representativeness, the aim was to reflect 
the diversity within the Estonian population and draw out these perspectives 
arising from the discussions on themes of national identity. 
Although, as with any research project, some issues emerged with conducting the 
fieldwork, the visual methodology proved to be very useful as it helped to open 
up internal worlds and interpretations of participants regarding issues that I might 
not have thought to probe, and from the more practical side, it facilitated asking 
questions and provided structure and focus for the interviews. This was especially 
useful during the interviews with Russian-speakers as explained in more depth in 
Chapter 4.   
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8.4 OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN FINDINGS 
8.4.1 ESTONIA IN EUROPE 
The first of the three empirical chapters takes on the challenging task of exploring 
the internal essence of ‘Europe’ (5.2) and the EU (5.4) in Estonian national identity 
constructions a decade after Estonia had ‘returned’ to this entity. As discussed 
throughout the thesis, the ‘return to Europe’ narrative was in the 1990s embedded 
in the idea of achieving collective security, which emphasised Estonia’s belonging 
to the European value structures already during the interwar period.  
As the chapter demonstrates, the value dimension within the respondents’ 
understandings of Europe is still prevalent, however, there appeared to be little 
critical reflections as to what these values actually are. This might be due to 
several interlinking factors that play a part in Estonian national identity 
constructions. The official validation of Estonia belonging to Europe, and 
therefore adhering to the ‘European values’, came in 2004 when Estonia formally 
joined the EU. Estonia was seen as already inherently embodying these values 
from the interwar years of independence and therefore there appeared little 
reason to critically reflect on what these might entail. Further to this, the 
‘abnormal’ Soviet occupation years provided a ground for Othering ‘normal’ 
Europe in this construction and therefore Europe was defined rather in terms of 
what it is not than what it is. If Estonia had not been occupied by the Soviet Union, 
it would have been a ‘normal’ European state. The Soviet experience also provides 
another angle for perceptions of Europe or the West in general. The suffering 
narrative is implied in various pillars of identity construction and the years of 
suffering appear to contribute to the national self-esteem in the sense that 
Estonians understand best what it really means to be ‘European’ and have the 
toughness to carry it through. In this sense, the European identity becomes an 
extension of national identity, of the Self, to be customised according to one’s 
own needs and understandings. 
The neoliberal approach can be seen as the leitmotif running through from the 
1990s to present-day and the economic crisis provided a strong continuation in 
Estonia for the understanding that following these principles in the only ‘correct’ 
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or ‘true’ way. The adherence to the ‘true’ European values in terms of adopting 
austerity measures has been a particularly important element also in the top-down 
construction of demonstrating Estonia’s European essence and was reflected on 
similarly by the respondents especially in comparison to the Southern European 
countries. A clear dividing line could be drawn in this regard between the Northern 
and Southern Europe (5.2.4) and through that establishing a new dimension for 
Estonia’s spatial ‘normality’. Even though the Northern or Nordic identity has 
played a significant role in Estonian identity-construction since the beginning of 
1990s, the economic crisis brought about a new North-South axis in conceptually 
dividing Europe and provided a useful ‘Other’ in further consolidating Estonia’s 
Northern European identity aspect. This perspective was also interlinked with the 
already mentioned suffering narrative, which translated into taking pride in 
toughness and modesty during hard times.  
As to the spatial boundaries of ‘Europe’ (5.3), these appeared to be mostly drawn 
according to perceived cultural differences. Not surprisingly the significant Others 
for ‘Europe’ in this regard were Russia and Turkey, who were largely not seen to 
embody the ‘European’ values. However, as to some former communist countries 
like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, some residual feelings of solidarity going back 
to the Soviet past could be detected in the responses for including them on the 
European mental map. In a sense, these countries were framed as ‘not quite 
Europe’, as Estonia had been before officially validating its place within it in 2004. 
The second part of the chapter addressed how the respondents discussed 
belonging to the European Union more specifically as this was not necessarily 
conflated with the idea of Europe. While discussions surrounding Europe were 
based on values and cultural differences, the EU was addressed in terms of fixed 
rules and regulations applied by the structure. The EU regulations were 
counterpoised to the flexibility of the small Estonian state and common-sense 
attitude of the Estonians. The EU’s broad-brush policies without regard for the 
regional, cultural or most importantly, the economic differences between EU 
member states were depicted as unfair and a ‘threat’ to the traditional way of 
life. However, the respondents had to negotiate the various existing national 
identity constructions when discussing fulfilling the different criteria set by the 
EU. On the one hand, this ‘poster-boy’ image is used to highlight adherence to the 
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‘true’ European values and perceived as something to take pride in. On the other 
hand, a level of disgruntlement is evident when discussing some of the 
‘unreasonable’ requirements set by the EU which Estonia’s government fulfills to 
the letter in part to maintain this image and demonstrate its deep-rooted 
belonging to the EU structures and European values. The unconditional 
implementation of EU norms and directives has certainly come under criticism by 
the respondents after a decade of experience in the union. 
The most significant element arising from these discussions was what I have 
termed in this thesis as the ‘Second Estonian Republic’ (5.4.1). The term is used 
to indicate a shift from drawing on the first, interwar period of independence of 
the Estonian Republic as a foundation for the present-day Estonian identity 
construction in terms of belonging to the EU, and instead the comparison, 
especially in economic terms, came from the period between regaining 
independence in 1991 and joining the EU and NATO in 2004. This new benchmark 
of temporal ‘normality’ can be attributed both to generational change, but also 
to inherently perceiving Estonia as a sovereign state, even if constrained at times 
by EU regulations, without the need to rely back on the narrative of state 
restoration. In this sense Estonia has achieved ‘normality’, ‘returned to Europe’.  
 
8.4.2 RUSSIA AS THE ‘OTHER’ 
Following on from addressing Europe and EU in Estonian national identity 
construction, Chapter 6 moves to analysing Russia as the perennial Other in 
Estonia’s national identity construction. While the ‘return to Europe’ by accession 
to the EU and NATO was supposed to officially validate Estonia as a ‘normal’ 
European country, this same integration to the West was seen as a necessary 
prelude to the full ‘normalisation’ of relations with Russia. In the 1990s this 
‘normalisation’ was mostly seen through the prism of security in Estonia, which 
was arguably still relevant during the time the data was gathered for this research 
(2013), and which has attained whole new dimensions since 2014. However, as the 
chapter demonstrates, in the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis and 
prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the emphasis in Othering Russia had 
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shifted to the more pragmatic aspects in line with the neoliberal paradigm 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
As the first part of the chapter argues, the underlying securitisation of relations 
with Russia was still evident in 2013 in Estonian national identity constructions. 
The interview data revealed the various and at times conflated themes regarding 
continuous securitisation of Russia. First, the interwar period, the ensuing 
occupation, and the conflicting history narratives regarding the Second World War 
still formed a significant element in perceptions of Russia among the respondents 
(6.2.2). The interview data provided supporting evidence for the understanding 
that Russia’s nostalgia for the Soviet Union and its expansionist interests had not 
disappeared with Estonia joining the EU and NATO.  
Second, the expectation of ‘normalising’ relations with Russia in the 1990s did not 
materialise with accession to the Western structures and is in fact argued to have 
taken a more controversial turn as Estonia and other new member states felt more 
secure in expressing their true position. The research demonstrates that the 
threat emanating from Russia was still a valid concern for the Estonian-speaking 
respondents in 2013, even if diminished to a degree and a more ‘cultural’ way of 
Othering had become applicable.  
The more traditional threat perception is interlinked with this cultural Othering 
on the EU/NATO sphere, where the respondents expressed concern over 
EU/NATO’s ability to see Russia for its real intentions. This ‘more Western than 
the West’ construction of Estonia in terms of understanding Russia’s intentions 
better than the older member states in these organisations builds on both the 
more traditional security dimension (threat perception) as well as Orientalising 
practices towards Russia as the ‘chaotic’ East (cultural Othering). In a word, 
Estonia has the experience to understand how truly unpredictable Russia is, and 
this needs to be taken on board more fully by the ‘West’. Therefore the people in 
Estonia see themselves as having a truer understanding of and attachment to 
Western values than perhaps the ‘West’ and the need to defend them. 
However, the constant process of ‘normalising’ relations can be seen as having 
formed a different ‘normality’ in relations with Russia. This means that the idea 
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of ‘normalising’ relations has been effective in shaping the wider national identity 
constructions in the post-accession period and not simply a foreign policy goal as 
set out in the 1990s. This different ‘normality’ in relations with Russia is in line 
with becoming a ‘normal’ European country, which implies that the security 
concerns have diminished, and Russia was Othered more in terms of European 
values than any specific threat Estonia might face as a country.  
The ‘abnormality’ of Russia for its failure to ‘normalise’ relations was placed on 
the Russian political elite by the respondents which appeared to contrast the 
official discourse, which posits neo-imperialism as a basis for this ‘abnormality’. 
The Yeltsin era in the 1990s was seen as building a path towards ‘normalising’ 
relations, while Vladimir Putin coming to power was seen to have derailed this 
process of ‘normalisation’ and contributing to the opposite. Again though, one 
needs to keep in mind the pre-2014 context for these constructions and one could 
argue here that perhaps the perception of 1990s Russia with Yeltsin as the 
president has altered as well in today’s changed context. 
The second part of the chapter discusses a more recent interesting development 
emerging from the interview data regarding Russia as the Other; namely framing 
the more pragmatic approach in strengthening economic ties with Russia within 
the wider national identity construction. The importance of the neoliberal 
paradigm in Estonian national identity construction comes through in shaping 
respondents’ understandings also in relations with Russia. The interviews revealed 
that relations with Russia were conceived in terms of the neoliberal economic 
narrative that had taken hold during the EU accession period and which is used to 
position Estonia within the framework of the enlarged EU. Having spent almost a 
decade in the EU and NATO in relatively calm times in terms of security, the 
chapter demonstrates that a certain ‘normalisation’ – different to that which had 
been articulated as a goal in the 1990s - had been achieved in relation to Russia 
and that pragmatic economic themes had become more relevant in people’s 
everyday perceptions. This perspective, especially in terms of diminished threat 
perception, has certainly changed after Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 
2014 and the ongoing war in Donbass, but at the time of conducting the interviews, 
in the immediate aftermath of the economic crisis, the pragmatic issues appeared 
to have gained more relevance. 
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8.4.3 LIVING THE ESTONIAN ‘NORMALITY’ 
While chapters 5 and 6 explored post-EU accession understandings of the Estonian 
Self from the standpoint of its relationship to two (distinct yet also inter-related) 
external Others - the positive and the negative, Europe/EU and Russia, Chapter 7 
takes a look at how the people discussed everyday life in order to gain a more in-
depth understanding of how people in Estonia perceive ‘normality’. These more 
local relevant themes which emerged from the interview data are intertwined 
with the perception of Others discussed earlier but add value in terms of bringing 
out further complex points of reference for constructing ‘normality’ in post-
accession Estonia. Chapter 7 first looks at themes of societal integration, a highly 
important political, economic and cultural issue in Estonia which can reveal a lot 
about the constructions of national identity and through that the perception of 
‘normality’. The chapter then discusses how larger goals or projects related to 
national identification and attempts at branding are framed by the respondents. 
It also brings to light how the respondents discussed the wider political landscape 
and certain prominent political actors in Estonia in order to help understand the 
perceptions of the internal to complement the external elements discussed in the 
previous empirical chapters.  
As one might expect, the relevance of ethnic and ethno-linguistic boundaries has 
not disappeared in the Estonian society. In terms of societal integration, the 
interview data suggest that limited emphasis was placed upon the formal 
requirements (e.g. in terms of gaining citizenship) and that more general attitudes 
towards the state and society (e.g. in terms of language, culture and education) 
were accentuated as the most relevant to the integration process. These themes 
have been explored in depth through a variety of platforms and the fact that 
certain dividing lines were not seen to have disappeared among the ethno-
linguistic groups is not a significant or novel finding in itself. An interesting 
element emerged in discussions surrounding understandings of cultural differences 
in relation to perceptions of what constitutes ‘normal’ Russian behaviour. These 
perceptions can be viewed as Othering not in terms of ethnicity per se but rather 
in terms of assigned belonging to a kind of ‘underclass’ – the ones who don’t 
understand Estonian ‘normality’. 
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However, even though themes of language, cultural Othering and education are 
still important dividing factors in perceived ethnic boundaries in Estonia, another 
important element emerged in the aftermath of the economic crisis. I argue in 
this chapter that the reconciliation between the pragmatic understanding of 
economic necessity and the more national emotional element is pertinent in 
understanding interethnic relations in Estonia a decade since joining the Western 
structures. The Estonian national self-esteem has been shifted towards economic 
success as explained throughout this thesis. This shift has become especially 
relevant in the immediate post-crisis era, and therefore taking a pragmatic line in 
relations internally or externally demonstrates a moral high ground taken rather 
than abandoning nationalist sentiment. This appeared to be uniting approach 
among the respondents as the Russophone interview findings arguably also 
suggested a generalised trend towards pragmatic adaptation to new realities 
rather than voice of protest. The post-crisis economic fatigue appears to have 
increased the importance of the neoliberal paradigm within Estonian national 
identity constructions and provided a consolidating element in the interethnic 
relations. Additionally, new boundaries such as urban-rural have become more 
salient in how political and economic aspects were discussed among the 
respondents.  
The economic fatigue and disappointment associated with the high expectations 
for the rise of living standards in the years following EU accession in 2004, have 
also affected the way respondents framed the political landscape in Estonia. 
Again, as discussed in Chapter 5, the main finding within this dimension is that 
there appeared to be a clear glorification of the 1990s as an idealised benchmark 
for politics instead of the interwar period which has been highlighted in previous 
studies. The beginning of the 1990s can be seen to symbolise an idealistic virtuous 
era, when politics was zeal-based and engaged in for the common good rather 
than personal benefit. Certain nostalgia was detectable in how the respondents 
discussed the more ‘emotional’ dramatic and eventful politics of early 1990s, 
compared to the dull and routine ‘normal’ politics that has followed. The interplay 
of political and economic factors has had an effect on the general disillusionment 
with the political landscape and politicians in Estonia.  
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In conclusion, almost a decade within the EU, the security dimension of belonging 
to the EU had lost some of its relevance and economic themes had started to 
prevail. This can be explained with the recent economic crisis and relatively stable 
security situation within the area for some time. Since then, and with Russia’s 
illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the ongoing war in Donbass area, there 
has been a shift in this perspective, but at the time of conducting the interviews, 
I would argue that the expected European ‘normality’ had settled in to a degree. 
The sense of firmly belonging to the value structures, and even surpassing the 
dwindling regard for ‘true’ values of Europe by Southern European countries, had 
become evident. As the thesis demonstrated, exploring the complex layers of 
national identity in Estonia is still important for gaining a more in-depth 
understanding of the political, economic and societal perceptions in Estonia even 
after having returned to ‘normality’. 
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8.5 POSSIBILITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The main result of this research was to demonstrate that a certain European 
‘normality’ had settled in the decade following accession to the EU and NATO. But 
a lot has changed since then. At the time of conducting the research, Russia had 
not invaded Ukraine which drastically changed the European security architecture, 
the migration crisis had not reached the EU, the rise of populist political 
movements in Europe was not yet flourishing with the rhetoric for dividing 
societies and breaking up the EU, there was no Brexit, the escalation of terrorist 
acts had not yet made an impact on people’s everyday life in Europe, and the 
president of the USA was still Barack Obama.  
The Lennart Meri International Conference held in Tallinn in 2016 was titled 
‘Shaping the New Normal’ describing this new normality as the situation where 
international treaties were being blatantly violated; national borders changed by 
force once again; huge masses of people are on the move seeking refuge; national 
identities are being challenged, and extremist tendencies are flourishing, and in 
all this, it put forward the thought that the West has lost the initiative. This New 
Normal refers in itself to the idea that certain normality had been attained prior 
to 2014, and this is something that this thesis attempted to bring forward. 
However, this New Normal deserves further exploring and hopefully, some findings 
from this research will help to provide a baseline of a sort for comparison into the 
constructions of ‘normal’ in this new environment. While this thesis brings out 
significant and new elements in Estonian identity construction to consider, the 
changes that have occurred on the global level affect Estonia’s self-narration in 
terms of Othering the positive Europe and the negative Russia, while the economic 
woes have not disappeared and provide a backdrop for how the various Others are 
negotiated on the ground.  
In addition to that, perhaps a further angle to explore in order to deepen our 
understandings of the Estonian national identity constructions would be from the 
‘outside’ as Estonia’s national identity constructions are a mutual process with 
the various Others. Looking at how Estonia is seen from Europe, either from the 
official perspective or grassroots level, would provide further insights into 
Estonian national identity. Accordingly, looking at how Estonia is depicted in the 
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Russian narrative would allow for a deeper reflexion on the nature of constructing 
the negative Other.  
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APPENDIX A: Overview of the respondents 
 
 
TALLINN 
Linda was a 34-year-old woman. The interview was held in the beginning of 
January 2013 in Tallinn at her work place. She was a specialist working in the 
retail area. Linda was relatively modest and quiet at first but seemed to feel 
relaxed about sharing her opinions with me as the interview progressed.  
Katrin was a 32-year-old woman. The interview was held in the beginning of 
January 2013 in Tallinn at her work place. She was working in marketing. Katrin 
was very confident in her opinions and appeared comfortable in sharing her 
thoughts and feelings about the topics discussed. 
Greta was a 52-year-old woman. The interview was held in the beginning of 
January 2013 in Tallinn in an office at her place of work. She was a mid-level 
manager at a retail company. I knew her from earlier but did not have a personal 
relationship with her. She was very outspoken about her opinions, at times perhaps 
even trying to provoke me during the interview.  
Aino was a 77-year old woman. The interview was held mid-January 2013 in Tallinn 
at her home. She was a retired former teacher and related a lot of her answers 
back to her experiences through the years in that profession. She appeared to 
enjoy discussing various issues surrounding the images and other topics arising 
from them. 
Leeni was a 73-year-old woman. The interview was held mid-January 2013 in 
Tallinn at her home. She was a retired former teacher. She was relaxed, talkative 
and related a lot of the discussion back to her personal experiences.  
Raul was a 22-year-old man. The interview was held in late January in Tallinn at 
his work place. He was working as an IT support specialist at an educational 
organisation. The interview was held in a public area but there were very few 
disturbances and he did not appear to have any issues about conveying his 
opinions. He said he was an apolitical person and did not read the news. He had 
heard of certain events and people in the images and had relatively general 
opinions about the topics discussed during the interviews.  
Toomas was a 39-year-old man from a mixed family (Russian-Estonian) 
background. The interview was held in late January 2013 at a private residence in 
the outskirts of Tallinn in a quiet setting. He had an applied education degree and 
did various construction jobs. He appeared somewhat sceptical at first about what 
was expected of him during the interview and inquired thoroughly after the 
interview about how what he considered a broad discussion around the images 
would be qualified as research. The interview was held in Estonian. He had 
attended both Estonian and Russian schools and had near-native level Estonian 
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skills. However, it appeared to me that he might have been slightly careful at 
times in discussing the interethnic relations in Estonia, but not to an extent that 
he would have refrained from giving his opinions (perhaps just choosing the 
wording at times). 
Piret was a 37-year-old woman. The interview was held in the middle of February 
2013 in Tallinn at her work place. She was working in a retail distributing unit, but 
the interview was held in a separated area in a quiet setting. She appeared open 
and comfortable during the interview and offered to start talking about the images 
before I even started to introduce what I’ve placed on the table.  
Pille-Riin was a 48-year-old woman. The interview was held in Tallinn in the 
middle of February 2013. She was from a smaller town in Estonia but had lived in 
Tallinn for most of her life. She was working in a retail distributing unit. She was 
very friendly, perhaps at times modest about her opinions, but became more 
relaxed as the interview went on.  
Priit was a 49-year-old man. The interview was held in Tallinn in the middle of 
February 2013. Priit worked as a driver in Tallinn. The setting for the interview 
was a private quiet area and he was reactive to the themes brought to the table 
and appeared to feel relatively comfortable sharing his opinions with me.  
Anna was a 65-year-old woman from a mixed family (Russian-Estonian). The 
interview was held in Tallinn in late February 2013 in Estonian. Anna spoke native 
Estonian. She was working as a secretary. She was very friendly and talkative and 
was keen to discuss the images as soon as I laid them out on the table. The 
interview took place at her work place in a quiet area. I did not sense any 
hesitation regarding any topics that we discussed during the interviews and she 
appeared to be open about sharing her opinions. 
Tarmo was a 27-year-old man. The interview was held in Tallinn at the end of 
February 2013. Tarmo was a specialist working for a government institution. 
Coming from a smaller place in Southern Estonia, he had been living in Tallinn for 
four years at the time. He expressed his opinions and personal experiences related 
to the images openly and appeared comfortable during the interview. The 
interview was held in a quiet setting in his place of work.  
Aleksey was a 52-year-old man. He was of Ukrainian decent and we conducted 
the interview in Russian. He had been living in Tallinn most of his life. The 
interview took place in December 2013 in an office in Tallinn city centre. He was 
very articulate and did not appear to have any issues discussing any topic placed 
in front of him. Aleksey was very interested in my research and continued asking 
questions about it after we finished the interview.  
Elena was a 65-year-old woman from a Russian-speaking family in Tallinn. She had 
good Estonian skills and even though I expected the interview to take place in 
Russian, she offered to hold it in Estonian. The interview took place in the 
beginning of January 2014 in Tallinn in a more public area in her office building. 
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She was working in the private sector in Estonia and appeared to have no problem 
providing thoughts and opinions on the images and follow-up questions.  
 
NARVA 
Maria was a young woman in Narva. Her case is described in more detail in the 
discussion section here as the interview with her was the one that did not work at 
all. Maria was an administrator and the interview took place privately at her place 
of work in the beginning of May 2013. The interview was held in Russian. She 
appeared nervous and uneasy during the interview, had prepared short ‘formal’ 
answers prior to the interview and was reluctant to provide any answers to the 
follow-up questions. The interview lasted only 15 minutes and gave more data for 
this research regarding the process than the substance of the interview.  
Nadya was a woman in Narva with a 17-year-old daughter. The interview took 
place in the beginning of May 2013 in a quiet area at her place of work and was 
held in Russian. Nadya worked as a mid-level manager in a shop. She generally 
seemed open about discussing various topics but was slightly cautious in discussing 
political matters.  
Dimitry was a 27-year-old man in Narva. The interview was held in a quiet area in 
his place of work in the beginning of May 2013 and was held in Russian. Dimitry 
worked in a shop in a shopping centre in Narva. He seemed open and talkative 
about the images placed in front of him. 
Nina was a 20-year-old woman in Narva. The interview was held in a quiet area in 
her place of work in the beginning of May 2013 and was held in Russian. She was 
working in a shop there. She did not appear reluctant to touch on any topic placed 
on the table. 
Yulia was a mother of two young children. She was from Narva but had studied at 
an Estonian university and spoke very good Estonian. The interview was held at a 
children’s playground in Narva in the beginning of May 2013 in Estonian. She was 
actively involved in local issues and very well-informed in various political matters 
in Estonia. Yulia had clearly formulated opinions on most matters discussed and I 
did not sense any reluctance in her sharing these thoughts.   
 
CENTRAL ESTONIA 
Kaili was a 70-year-old pensioner from a small settlement in Central Estonia. The 
interview took place mid-May 2013. She was involved in local activities and the 
interview took place in a small community centre where she was doing some 
voluntary work, but at the time it was empty, so the setting for the interview was 
quiet. Kaili appeared pleased to share her opinions and relate the images and 
other arising topics to personal experiences.  
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Tõnu was a 57-year-old man from a town in Central Estonia. The interview took 
place in mid-May in his office. He was working for the local government there. 
Tõnu was involved in politics and appeared happy to share his opinions on various 
political matters and relate different topics that came up to local issues.   
 
SOUTHERN ESTONIA 
Siret was a 22-year-old woman from a small settlement in Southern Estonia. The 
interview took place in mid-August 2013. At the time she was studying in a larger 
town but was home for the summer. The first part of the interview took place 
outdoors, but due to rain, we moved the interview to a car. She took part in 
various local activities and was generally open and talkative about various issues 
that emerged during the interviews.  
Epp was a 46-year-old woman from a small settlement in Southern Estonia. She 
was working in the agricultural sector there. She was very friendly and open about 
her opinions and the interview process went very smoothly. Since she was in the 
middle of a busy day, then the interview was perhaps slightly rushed. The 
interview took place in mid-August 2013. 
 
SETOMAA 
Laila was a 55-year-old woman from Setomaa. The interview took place there at 
her place of work in late August 2013. She was working for a local state 
organisation at the time and we were able to use her office for the interview. 
Laila was at first hesitant about what she could possibly have to add for my 
research project but agreed to do an interview after I explained the project to 
her in more depth. During the interview she no longer appeared to have any issues 
with giving her opinions on the images and other emerging themes. As with other 
people from more rural parts of Estonia, many of the topics that surfaced during 
the interview were related back to local matters. 
Martin was a 69-year of man from Setomaa. He was a teacher there and the 
interview took place in a school during summer holidays. The interview was held 
in late August 2013. Martin was also active in various community activities. As with 
several other respondents, I had to explain the research project and the purpose 
of the interview in more depth for him to feel comfortable starting a discussion 
on these topics. He was slightly reluctant to share personal opinions at first, but 
mainly because he appeared to think of those as irrelevant for my research and 
became much more inclined to talk about various things as the interview 
progressed.  
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ISLANDS 
Signe was a 70-year-old woman from Muhu island. She was working as a teacher 
and the interview was held in one of the classrooms there in late August (2013), 
when school had not started yet. She had an immediate reaction to one of the 
images and the interview went in smooth manner. Signe expressed her thoughts 
and opinions clearly and appeared to feel comfortable with me during the 
discussion. 
Merike was a 49-year-old woman from Muhu island. Muhu island community is 
small and in order to keep the anonymity of the respondent, it is not possible to 
disclose her profession or the location of the interview. Merike appeared slightly 
modest about expressing her opinions on various topics and kept the answers on a 
relatively general level. It appeared to me that she seemed to consider her 
personal experiences and opinions irrelevant and I had to take more initiative in 
asking follow-up questions during the interview.  
 
BRUSSELS 
Tiina was a 37-year-old woman. She had been working in the public sector in 
Estonia for quite a few years and was an Estonian official in Brussels at the time. 
The interview was held in her office there in mid-July 2013. The interview started 
off in a more official manner, with her responses to the images or questions being 
more of official nature, but the discussion moved on to include also personal 
experiences and sentiments.  
Eveli was a 48-year-old woman. She had worked several years in the public sector 
in Estonia and was an Estonian official in Brussels at the time. The interview was 
held mid-July 2013 in her office there. Her answers reflected that she had given 
some thought to the issues discussed during the interview, but this was not 
necessarily due to her position in Brussels. It seemed to me that Eveli was simply 
generally more engaged in public matters. She also included quite a few personal 
experiences during the interview. 
Mart was a 50-year-old man working in the EU structures in Brussels. The interview 
was held in an outdoor quiet café outside his place of work. His answers were 
more of personal nature and the fact that he had been living in Brussels for quite 
a few years appeared to make little difference apart from occasional comparisons 
to the living situation in Brussels. 
Kaidi was a 41-year-old woman working in Brussels on a more permanent basis. 
The interview was held in her office. She visited Estonia quite regularly and 
approached the interview from a personal perspective, relating answers back to 
when she was still Estonia or things she had ‘heard’ were happening there. 
Riina was a 33-year-old woman working in Brussels. She had not been based there 
for too long but had prior experience in the government sector in Estonia. The 
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interview took place mid-July 2013 on the roof of her office building. She 
appeared very well-informed in general about various political issues and managed 
to reflect on them in depth, but this was again not necessarily due to her position 
in Brussels.  
Birgit was a 35-year-old woman working as an official in Brussels for the past five 
years already. The interview was held mid-July 2013 in her office. She appeared 
somewhat uneasy about discussing the interview topics, almost apologising for 
providing personal opinions at times.  
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APPENDIX B: Information sheet for the respondents 
 
 
 
Information Sheet 
 
Constructing ‘normality’ in a wider Europe: the case of Estonia 
 
You are being asked to participate in a research study. Please read and consider 
the following information about the study carefully and do not hesitate to ask for 
clarification should anything remain unclear. 
 
About the study 
 
My name is Kerstin Mahlapuu and I am a PhD student at the University of Glasgow, 
the subject area of Central and East European Studies. I am currently conducting 
fieldwork for my PhD thesis. My research looks into how Estonian people perceive 
the current Estonian political and social situation. The purpose of this study is to 
develop a perspective into what is considered ‘normal’ in present-day Estonia, 
and to build an in-depth understanding of how the societal, political and economic 
aspects in Estonia are perceived by its inhabitants. 
 
What does taking part in the study involve? 
 
As part of the research, I am hoping to interview Estonians and Russian-speakers 
living in Estonia. If you agree to take part in the study you will be asked to 
participate in one interview conducted in your native language lasting about an 
hour and a half. The interview will be conducted face-to-face at a mutually 
convenient location. I am interested in talking with you about: the political and 
social situation in Estonia prior to the 1990s; the changes that took place during 
the 1990s; with the main focus on the period after Estonia joined the EU and NATO 
in 2004. 
With your permission I would like to tape record the interview. You do not have 
to answer any questions you do not wish to, and you may stop the interview at 
any time. 
 
What will happen to your answers?  
 
The requirements of the Data Protection Act and Freedom of Information Act will 
be observed. All your comments will be anonymised and you will not be identified 
in the final research report. Only I will have access to raw data arising from the 
research and this will be stored securely within a locked cabinet. All computer-
held data will be password-protected. All information collected will also be 
treated confidentially, unless you reveal details of harm towards yourself or that 
you are causing harm to others. If this occurs, ethical guidelines will be followed 
which involves contacting relevant bodies to enable help and advice to be given. 
 
 
If you have questions about the research you can contact me at the details below:   
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Kerstin Mahlapuu (MRes) 
PhD student in Russian, Central and East European Studies 
Central and East European Studies 
School of Social and Political Sciences 
University of Glasgow 
Email: k.mahlapuu.1@research.gla.ac.uk 
 
 
Supervisor:  
Professor David Smith 
Central and East European Studies 
8 Lilybank Gardens  
University of Glasgow 
Glasgow G12 8RZ  
Email: David.Smith@glasgow.ac.uk 
 
 
College Ethics Officer: 
Dr Valentina Bold 
School of Interdisciplinary Studies 
Rutherford/McCowan Building 
Dumfries Campus 
University of Glasgow 
Email: Valentina.Bold@glasgow.ac.uk 
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APPENDIX C: Consent Form 
 
Consent Form 
 
Title of Project: Constructing ‘normality’ in a wider Europe: the case of 
Estonia 
 
Name of Researcher: Kerstin Mahlapuu 
 
 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet 
provided for the above study and have had the opportunity to ask 
questions. 
 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving any reason. 
 
3. I agree/do not agree to the interview being digitally recorded. 
 
4. I agree to take part in the above study. 
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APPENDIX D: Confidentiality agreement for the transcribers  
 
 
Confidentiality agreement 
 
 
Title of project: Constructing Estonian identity in a wider Europe  
Name of Researcher: Kerstin Mahlapuu 
Name of Transcriber:  
 
 
I hereby confirm that: 
 
2. I will use the audio files sent to me by the researcher only for the 
purpose of producing transcriptions; 
5. I will assure the safety of the data and will be the only person who has 
access to it; 
6. I will permanently delete the data from all data carriers and e-mail 
accounts after completing the transcriptions and forwarding them to the 
researcher. 
 
 
 
 
           
Transcriber        Date         Signature 
 
 
 
 
 
     Researcher                  Date            Signature 
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APPENDIX E: Example of the data analysis process in NVivo 
 
The following provides an indication of some of the main nodal (thematic) points 
emerging from the data sets. The original data were in a combination of 
Estonian and Russian and the references below have been translated into English 
for display here. Yellow = main nodal point; Green = secondary nodal point(s). 
Following this initial coding period, the emergent themes were then placed 
within wider analytical frames. 
 
Nodes 
Regaining independence (90s) 
History – politics of memory 
   Monuments 
Branding 
   IT 
   Tallinn 
Estonia in the EU and NATO 
   Eurozone 
   Enlargement (immigration) 
   Economy (Greece) 
   Present-day perspectives 
’Estonia’ 
Estonian politicians (perceptions of 
politics) 
   Estonian politics (disappointment) 
   Estonian politics and politicians (personal    
contacts) 
’Estonians’ 
   Protest; self-interest 
Economy – everyday perspectives 
   Emigration 
Estonia as Nordic 
Regional belonging in Europe (regional 
identity) 
   Culture (cultural identity) 
Claims regarding gender and age 
„Good old Estonian times“ 
Relations with Russian-speakers and vice 
versa 
   Bronze Night  
Russia; relations with Russia 
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